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JOINTMANSHIP

1. Winning in any event, be it a game or a war, is a joint effort of all the players. How you orchestrate this effort is integration. Both these fundamentals are very universal. These do not require proof. Yet, quite often, while dealing with inter-service matters, in the desire to promote enhanced jointmanship and integration, one comes across decisions, which do not lead to true jointmanship. While there may be extensive amount of joint training, the same may contain insufficient training for jointness. Some of the measures may appear specious but turn out inappropriate, because the end results do not seem commensurate to the applied effort and time. This is the result of insufficient analysis for enhancing jointmanship.

Defining Jointmanship

2. Jointness is not a word in the Concise Oxford Dictionary. A definition jointmanship as "Integrated planning and application of military power at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, with proper sequencing of combat power of the three Services, in time and space, as per requirement and in relation to the enemy's centres of gravity and culmination points, is a must to win a war. Co-operation is a time-tested principle of war and would need to be exhibited in full measure by the Services to prosecute our combined military strategy. Good jointmanship will result from proper joint training, understanding of each others capabilities and limitations, mutual trust, confidence and respect for each other." Whereas 'Joint Operation' is defined as "Operations planned and executed by two or more Services, operating under a single designated Joint Task Force Commander. Joint operations are normally mission oriented and have specific objectives. The joint task force stands dissolved on attainment of its objective or as specified in the operational directive. Joint forces normally operate within two distinct chains of command - one for operations and the other for administration and logistics". The Americans term to express jointmanship is 'Jointness'. The aim of Jointness, as per US Joint Doctrine is to, "Co-ordinate the combat capabilities of the Services and allies or coalition partners to achieve the greatest possible military advantage. This is accomplished through the creation and execution of plans which maximised the unique capabilities of each of the Services". Another expert Michael C. Vitale (US Navy) defines jointness as, "A holistic process that seeks to enhance the effectiveness of all military operations by synchronizing the actions of the Armed Forces to produce synergistic effects within and between all joint integrators at every level of war". In all of the above definitions/explanations few fundamentals emerge which can be called the sine quo non of jointmanship. These are, two or more players, their combat capabilities, meshing of these capabilities to attain war aims with better results than would be the case otherwise. If 'Seamanship' is about the wisdom of seafaring and sea warfare, and 'Airmanship' is about flying and air warfare; then 'Jointmanship' should represent the wisdom about fighting together. There is now a universal acceptance that in the wars of today and tomorrow, the impact of the three instruments of war that is the three Services will generally apply in the following order: Air and Space power, wisdom of seafaring and sea warfare; and 'Airmanship' is about flying and air warfare; then 'Jointmanship' should represent the wisdom about fighting together. There is now a universal wisdom of seafaring and sea warfare; and 'Airmanship' is about flying and air warfare; then 'Jointmanship' should represent the wisdom about fighting together. There is now a universal acceptance that in the wars of today and tomorrow, the impact of the three instruments of war that is the three Services will generally apply in the following order: Air and Space power will have the maximum impact in all three domains of warfare, and will be the first to be used. Hereafter, the sequence and amount of utilisation of other Services would be a function of prevailing situation and concerned medium. When we consider the accumulated wisdom of warfare, we notice that the maximum wisdom pertains to land warfare and least to air warfare. This poses a great dilemma towards enhancing jointmanship. Without meaning to the wisdom of the land warfare tends to be super imposed.

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on the wisdom of air warfare. If such a state of affairs is not corrected, then the resultant "jointmanship - the wisdom about fighting together" gets misinterpreted or misconceived. It is akin to constructing a building on unsound and a weak foundation. The moment the joint structure is subject to the unpredictable and unforeseen nature of actual war, it is bound to collapse. This has happened so catastrophically in the past: examples include when it happened in World War II to France, Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 1991 and 2003, Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia in 1999 and to the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001.

Higher Defence Organisation

Present Position

3. In a democracy the higher direction of defence and its policy formulation is strictly the prerogative of the political leadership, there being full political control over the Armed Forces. It needs to be reiterated that the combat power of the Indian Armed Forces is conceived as a political instrument, which serves the objectives set forth in the national security strategy. Defence strategy including the employment of Armed Forces to secure national security objectives and higher direction of defence, must both constantly evolve through objective analysis of the present and future needs. From the national security interests outlined stems the defence policy and the framework for jointmanship. Effective joint operations require the development and adherence to joint doctrine. A step has been taken in this direction by the publishing of the joint doctrine. The force structure of the national Armed Forces has been created by the institutionally independent Services, acting in accordance with their own priorities and perceptions under debatable centralised control and direction. This un-integrated force structure and operational environment does not promote nor emphasize jointmanship. Insufficient attention has been paid to develop a joint military education system and the current Services career development practices do little to encourage specialists in joint military planning and operations. In addition, the Services have been reluctant to co-operate on joint requirements for equipment, overlooking the advantage of commonality, compatibility and interoperability. This approach results in an un-integrated force structure. Despite immense opposition from the system as well as those with vested interest in maintaining status quo, the following has emerged which aims at enhancing jointness.

- National Security Council (NSC) has been established supported by National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) and assisted by the Strategic Planning Group (SPG).
- Chief of Integrated Staff Committee (CISC) along with requisite staff is in position.
- The Theatre Command for Andaman and Nicobar is established and is in place.

We should be aware that true jointmanship in our context has yet to emerge, and that instinctively the Services will fight each other ruthlessly, if they think that their share of budgetary cake is under threat, or what they perceive as their 'core competence' is likely to be encroached upon. This has happened without exception in almost all the developed countries.

Prerequisites for Jointmanship

4. For jointmanship to take root in our context the following are essential prerequisites: -

- (a) **Unified Command and Integrated Operations.** Air assets should never be parceled out. Unified thinking should substitute unified command, achieving maximum military effectiveness within the limited resources. We must be fully aware of the dangers of dividing the assets of air power. It is pointless for us to try and model our defence forces on nations with vastly different resources and national objectives. The need, therefore, is integrated thinking and application. Only by doing so can we move towards true joint planning, where each Service has the freedom to operate in a manner they know best.
- (b) **Trust, Confidence and Mutual Respect.** Trust and confidence resulting from sincere efforts to learn about the other Service, as well as understand the capabilities and accept the limitations, which each member brings to the team is essential. Jointmanship is not achievable within the three Services without the admiration for each other's capabilities resulting in mutual respect.
- (c) **Concept of Air Superiority.** Concept of air superiority needs to be understood by all who are involved in the art and science of war waging. One needs to understand in our context the difference between air superiority and practically attainable favourable air situation, in time and space.
- (d) **Co-operation.** Cooperation rather than competition with each other should be the mantra. It may be well worth remembering, that the competition is in fact with the enemy. "There is no conflict between specialisation and synergism: indeed specialization on the battlefield generates (dynamic) synergism."

5. Before we proceed to joint operations per se it is necessary to first understand and appreciate the role of air superiority in an armed conflict. The side that has air superiority has never lost a war and conversely the nation that lacked it has never won a war. Once acknowledged that air superiority is mandatory pre-requisite to all natures of successful air, land and sea operations, we can proceed towards defining the component structures of an air campaign. Air Forces, by nature being flexible can rapidly switch from one target to another. This implies that an air commander will employ his scarce resources primarily towards wresting the requisite degree of control of the air. Only by doing so, can destructive and demoralising air attacks against own surface forces be minimised and the inherent mobility of modern surface and air forces be exploited to the fullest. Hence doctrinally, the fight for the control of the air will get first priority in every case without ever implying that it alone will defeat the enemy or that it is 'for its own sake'. Today, the air superiority battle is not done at the expense of support to the surface forces, since, it is the achievement of the requisite degree of control of the air that makes roles like Battlefield Air Interdiction (BAI) and Battlefield Air Strike (BAS) possible. While employing air power, it must be remembered that it is not one particular application that represents air power's chief strength. It is the application of the appropriate ones to the situation at hand, in the light of the objectives sought that define the utility of air power. Air power can go it alone, lead or follow as the situation demands.

Togetherness is Jointmanship

6. There is a strong and popular (mis) perception that spending time together leads to jointmanship. This perception is valid if we consider fighting together as a team. That is as part of a section/ platoon/ company or even a battalion. But the moment you bring in say support from an artillery regiment to the concerned group, the need for intimacy of being together reduces markedly. At this moment what is most important is that the artillery support be accurate, timely and of the required amount. Thus, professional outlook is considerably more important than camaraderie alone, by virtue of being together, whereas, in case of a platoon, camaraderie is more important than anything else. In the above example let us replace the artillery support by air support. The same logic still applies.

7. If I were one of the troops in need of air support during critical times, I'd rather have a thorough professional from the air force even though I may have never met him. I'd rather prefer a pilot who can attack accurately and precisely rather than the one who knows me and knows something about land warfare, but in the bargain his own professional capability is not as good as of the former. Flying, more so combat flying is an extremely demanding lifetime profession. It requires extensive amount of training. To safely and gainfully fly a modern combat aircraft, costing millions of dollars one must thoroughly understand the system. To master the difficulties posed by small, camouflaged, mobile targets to a pilot moving dynamically in a fast jet requires entire lifetime training. In discussions with my comrades from the Army and the Navy, we perceive that theirs too is a life time study of respective art and science of warfare. Therefore, the question, can we train some persons who can master the complete gamut of all types of warfare and yet be as good professionally as the one only learning his one dimension of warfare? If the answer is NO, then we must review our process of joint training in order to weed out joint training, which contributes little to training for jointness and in the latter, ensure correct weightage and coverage to essential subjects for achieving true jointmanship. For promoting inter-service jointmanship, the joint training at National Defence Academy, the DSSC and other such institutions meant for studies at tactical level, does not fully serve the intended noble purpose. Playing together, living together and socialising together leads to good team spirit. It is a must for group of people who are going to fight together in one plane and dimension. But when jointness is indirect, by way of fire support without the need to physically see or know each other, the so-called teamwork by being together contributes little. Far more is the contribution of highly professional personnel excelling in their chosen field, well versed with practical nuances of the synchronization required at the time of execution with the other Service. That is the process of live training. More the indirect and impersonal way of modern war more is the relevance of professional experts. The best results will be obtained when personnel from all Services are trained as a result of realistic war like training rather than just being together, minus the practical training.

Purpose of War

8. We fight to win. We win to impose our will over the adversary. We must fight jointly so that winning is made easier and the cost in terms of attrition to manpower and equipment is minimal. This must be the benchmark to promote jointness. Whatever facilitates above, we must incorporate. Whatever does not, we must reject. There are multiple routes to winning a war. Even today, despite a century of combat aviation, there often is a clash of war wisdom between the three Services, the land warfare wisdom versus the naval warfare wisdom and both versus the air warfare wisdom. Each Service seems to feel, most sincerely, their role to be the primary one. Sometimes analytical minds do accept the reality of increasing dominance of the air arm in winning wars.

quickly, precisely and with least cost. But as soon as the clouds of war are blown away by the winds of serene peace, the clash between the Services wisdom resurfaces. "A tectonic shift in the nature and character of how ground forces fight," said Major General Robert Seales, former head of the US Army War College, in describing the use of ground forces in Afghanistan to support air operations (rather than vice versa) by revealing the location of an enemy or forcing it into open. He amplified: "The purpose of a manoeuvre force is to find the enemy, locate him, determine the outline of his force, find those specific points on the ground that are most vulnerable to attack by fire, observe it, separate civilians from military, deception from the real targets and then to superintend going after those targets." 4 Another author states, "In this new construct (of warfare), the traditional roles of ground and air power are reversed - making ground the supporting element and air the now decisive force." If my lifetime profession in land warfare how can, then, I not consider it supreme? If I am a sailor for life and that too a result of my deliberate choice, how can I accept other Services superior to mine? To accept thus, is against the very basic human nature. It is against what is taught in each Service. It runs contrary to the very existence and continuance of a Service. It is basic to further development of individual organisations. It is the reason for protecting one's own turf. So turf wars are inevitable - definitely in peacetime. However, during the shooting war, the compulsion to win forces us to accept the reality. In the last century, USA has had extensive experience of actual war and integrated fighting. Yet, when it comes to planning at strategic level and correct prioritisation, Service interest takes over. That is why in 1980s in the USA the proposed force structure was a 600 ship Navy, an 18 division Army, an Air Force with 40-air wings. We cannot really proceed on the path of jointness unless we truthfully answer the question regarding winning modern wars. Of course the spectrum of modern wars is far too wide for one set of answers to fit all the extremes. Yet, broad trends are clearly evident.

9 Modern warfare changed forever with the advent of Air Power in the 20th century. As the aircraft and the air doctrines evolved, the air power dimension came to dominate the battlefield and the space above. The rate of improvement in air powers ability to reach and rain its might far and wide, its ability to find, fix, locate, track, attack and assess the result has been phenomenal. The advance in the ability of air power to apply fire power on multifarious targets has been most remarkable when compared to naval or land power. The movements with either the land or naval power have been, in contrast, quite limited in the aspects of range, reach, quantum, accuracy, flexibility and mobility. "The airplane is the only weapon which can engage with equal facility land, sea and other forces", said Maj Gen Frank M. Andrews in 1938. 7 Joint Force Command's (USJFCOM) concept of joint operations is "Rapid Decisive Operations" (RDO). In a war game called Unified Vision 2001 it tried for RDO. "In describing the experiment, the participants used a number of terms and concepts with a clear Air Force pedigree. Instead of attacking his war fighting capabilities, we attack his war-making capabilities." To a modern air force, the entire hostile nation including its armies, navies, industry, economy, leadership and population stands exposed as targets. Air power makes the war - a total war. This characteristic of air power opens up multiple routes to defeating the enemy. Routes, suited to the demands of each peculiar situation. In some cases, leadership may be the prime target, in some other industrial and economic targets.

10 However, in most of the cases destruction of multitude combination of targets will result in victory. Earlier, when air power was less accurate the target destruction was sequential and slow. First destroy enemy air power, then his Army and then the industry or leadership as the particular situation demanded. Air Campaigns of World War II illustrated this. Today a modern Air Force can engage most of the targets simultaneously. This is called 'Parallel War'. USAF is working towards a 'Hyper War' capability. Thus in modern wars, the enemy nation is denied the chances of recuperating and fighting again. Therefore, we need to consider the roles and missions for the three instruments of military power. Which Service is best suited to what tasks? And what are the variations in tasks when dealing with either extremes of the spectrum of warfare? That is from total war against a nation state on one side to internal security against insurgencies on the other extreme. Jointmanship is the art of integration and synchronisation of various Arms and Services within a Service and similar arrangement between the three Services as per the demands of the situation. To be able to do so optimally we need to understand how each Service and its component functions.

The Air War

11. Simply stated the air war is about destroying/ degrading selected targets. As has been summed up so succinctly - "Air power is targeting and targeting is intelligence". The targets must be clearly defined, their location known and preferably fixed, their size large enough for acquisition by pilot or concerned sensor system and their characteristics vulnerable to weapons delivered from the air. Fixed or static targets, once detected are easily attacked. On the other hand mobile targets cannot be easily attacked due to their mobility and small size. First of all, small mobile targets are extremely difficult to acquire visually by a pilot. Secondly, even after visual

acquisition, hitting a small moving target is still in its infancy. It will remain so for many years for almost all the Air Forces. "Whatever the merits of the target imagery produced by spy satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles, without the support of a ground observer's 'eyes on target', air power can still be singularly ineffective in reducing an enemy's ground combat power if not his will."

The Land War

12. Land War basically deals with destroying hostile Army first. Traditionally, in normal conditions, attacker requires a 'three to one' superiority over the defender for success. This ratio increases in difficult terrain and conditions. In hills and mountains it may go up to 'ten to one'. Seldom do opposing armies have such disparity in numbers. But it is by clever manoeuvre and deception that attacker hopes to create the desired numerical superiority at the point of his choosing. Napoleon perfected the art of manoeuvre combined with deception and was its most leading practitioner and thus his series of spectacular victories. What does this reveal to us about land warfare? That till the very last moment an Army Commander cannot decide his exact place of attack. His likely avenue of attack is subject to many factors. The terrain has major bearing on avenues of attack; so does the required logistics build up and subsequent support. What one commander can analyse, the same is also analysable by the opposing commander. This allows the defender to plan his defences. With the increasing transparency in modern battle space, the movement of large body of troops and equipment can be monitored easily. So how does then the attacking commander create the numerical superiority at his chosen place of attack? This is achieved through subterfuge and deception and right till the last moment adapting to the opposing commander's defensive plans. Therefore upto the last moment it is difficult for the land commander to firm up his plan of attack. This poses a dilemma for joint planning between the Army and the Air Force. The air war mandates firming up of plans as early as possible. To be able to decide on targets and thereafter, gather intelligence on the target. Very precise intelligence is prerequisite to match the highly accurate PGM's. This requires a lot of lead-time. Lead time is precisely what the Army Commander cannot give with respect to his plans. So, then, how can the two plan jointly? If the joint planning lacks thoroughness, then the execution definitely will be sub-optimal.

Air - Land Operations

13. With the requisite degree of control established, the air, with its inherent flexibility and versatility would be able to deliver combat power effectively in co-ordination with the surface forces to attain military objectives. In fact, air power's vast potential can only be fully realized when applied in conjunction with surface action. The inherent speed could translate into surprise and the reach of combat air power enables rapid engagement of target systems which when co-ordinated and sequenced will provide synergistic effects at the operational and tactical levels. Air-Land warfare doctrines have been refined over the years and the first five concepts appended below are extracted from a paper titled "Dual Track Approach to Jointmanship" by Maj Gen Arjun Ray VSM. - The operational level of war in our context is at the level of regional commands and not the Corps. The essence of operational art lies in employing joint forces to attain strategic goals in a theatre of operations. A Corps by itself cannot achieve strategic objectives. Its success will depend upon the efficacy of air power, the synergization of strike and pivot Corps operations, and how the operational level battle area is shaped by the Army Commander. There is also a lack of understanding regarding the principles of simultaneity the ability to fight deep, close and rear operations together. This is where the focus of joint energy should be. Simultaneity at the operational level of war particularly, is not possible without the application of air power. There continues to be a lot of ambivalence in the concept of employment of attack helicopters as a manoeuvre arm. There is a marked tendency to use them independently like strike aircrafts.

- Finally, we need to appreciate that, information technologies have imparted air power the ability to shape political dimension and battle space to an extent that, intervention by ground forces can be minimised or even completely done away with. The Gulf war and Kosovo are recent examples of air power substituting ground power to a considerable extent. Counter air operations will always be the first priority of the Air Force to address hostile air power first, and fully. By controlling the air space we reduce the cost of winning the war. Consequently, counter air operation is not a fight or a war between two Air Forces. Rather, it is fought to win a war.

- Air is best integrated with surface campaigns when planned jointly from inception with air and surface forces as coequal and independent partners. The orientation towards joint planning is the key to success. In battles of manoeuvre, the attributes of air power i.e. weight and accuracy of fire power, concentrated in time and space will have a telling effect on the course of the ground war. Air-Land warfare in support of land forces is most effective when larger portions of the resources are devoted to BAL in proportion to BAS.

The Way Out

14. If both the Army and Air commanders understand this dilemma and agree to adapt, then thoroughness in joint planning, leading to smooth joint execution, is possible. The following factors therefore must be kept in mind by Army Planners. An airman can plan better against following:-

- Static and large targets.
- Targets with precise and updated intelligence.
- An orchestrated attack plan (to take care of enemy fighters and ground based anti-aircraft weapons) requires a lead-time of 48 to 72 hours. Reacting at shorter notice will be sub-optimal especially when adequate command of air has not been obtained both against hostile fighters and ground based anti-aircraft weapons. Mobile targets destruction probability remains very low because it can continue to change its location till the last moment. This is not likely to change in near future. Most of the mobile targets within the battle area, like tanks, APCs, artillery guns, mortars and troops appear very small to the pilot in a fast-moving jet. They are most difficult to acquire visually from 4-6 km distance due to limitations of the human eye. Yet to attack a tank safely, it must be picked up by the pilot from a distance of 4-6 km. At that distance a tank subtends a very small arc indiscernible to the average human eye. If these targets are camouflaged, then the chances of missing them are far more than the chances of hitting. The modern attack helicopter is best suited for mobile column busting role and would continue to be the best weapon system for this role. It is easier to pick up tanks when they are moving by their tell-tale signs like dust plume. So ask air strikes in a dynamic situation. For a pilot in a fast-moving jet it is nearly impossible to distinguish a friendly tank from hostile tank even if identification SOPs have been devised. Fratricidal casualties in Gulf War 91 were close to 35 percent of the total.

15. To support the land battle, there are many other associated support systems like dumps, trucks, fuel storage areas, vehicle waiting areas, roads and railway lines and bridges which a pilot finds easier to acquire and attack. Also, these have lesser lethal air defences, and most are stationary. To engage mobile targets in real time requires phenomenal amount of resources in terms of sensors to detect and on-call orbiting aircraft to attack. The pay-off is just not worth it unless there are no other targets and tasks whatsoever for the Air Force.

16. Air resources are far too few for the increasing number of tasks. So they cannot be blindly allotted formation wise. Moreover, the flexibility of air power and increasingly rapid communications make it possible to control air power centrally while looking after needs of many fronts. Centralised planning and decentralised execution is the principal for air power utilisation. Therefore, to allot air effort to individual formations as a SOP militates against the above principal. Moreover, human nature seldom permits any commander to forego his Allotment (air effort or any other effort) to a commander who needs it more. This is because of two reasons. Firstly, the commander will not know in real time the needs of others who may need air effort in larger amount. Secondly, the commander will always find some justification to use the allotted effort. Only the commander in overall picture of a theatre can prioritise the needs of various commanders under him and direct the air effort to appropriate place. He can switch the entire effort to a large distance, up to 400-800 km within a matter of hours. He can direct the use of armament, from PGMs to others, as per the need in real time. Some historical examples are listed below in proof. In Gulf War-91, Marines seldom permitted Marine Harriers to be used elsewhere even during the 38 days of pure air war. The Commander of VII Corps General Fred Franks, remained convinced that JFACC, Gen Charles Horner was not giving VII Corps adequate air support. This was in spite of the CENTCOM C in C, Gen Schwarzkopf, an Army General, directing the entire war and having hourly contact with Charles Horner. During 1971 Indo Pak War, on the Western front, HQ II and HQ I Corps continuing to utilise allotted air effort even in the absence of worthwhile targets. This was done even when at Chhamb, an adverse situation had begun to assume alarming proportion. Indeed factors like uncertainty of war, need for high assurance level, fear of enemy competition with other formations, the feeling of my kingdom etc tend to adversely affect human nature. That is why Americans failed at Kasserine Pass in 1943 to a numerically inferior Luftwaffe. While most of the surface based resources have to be under command, this is not always so. The reserves at higher level like Corps HQ, Command HQ and Army HQ are released only after battle is joined. They could be placed under the command of any one, basically dictated by unfolding battle campaign. Compare a regiment of tanks with a squadron of strike aircraft. Tanks are mobile, but once committed in a battle are of no use to any other formation. Whereas strike aircraft which after delivering devastating firepower in few sorties can easily be switched to another formation. That is why aircraft are not put under command at lower HQ except at Command level. Related to this point is the misperception in some minds that strike aircraft are flying artillery. While one may grant this (mis) understanding to a totally rigid mind, the same cannot be true of the modern flexible and adaptive minds. It must be appreciated that as modern aircraft and weapons have improved manifold their costs have sky rocketed. That while the tasks for air power are continuing to increase, the


numbers of aircraft are continuing to reduce. As an example, USAAF at the end of World War II had 68000 aircraft. Today it has 5000. So as numbers reduce, one needs to employ the fewer numbers innovatively to maximise their impact. Like the Israeli AF, which in the 1967 War, on a single day i.e. 5th June flew about 1000 strike sorties by applying a mere 200 strike aircraft and that also within 6-8 hours. All this can be done only when all aircraft are controlled centrally.

17. The Army Commander has multiple contingencies planned. His final plan emerges only at the last moment. Even then it is flexible to cater for enemy land commanders emerging reaction. Therefore the army planner cannot give a firm detailed plan in advance to the air planner. Army Commander needs a lot of assurance from Air Commander in terms of fire support. Psychological assurance is very important before the battle begins. He needs to be convinced beyond any shadow of doubt that air support will be available for unexpected critical situations, no matter what the state of air war is. But this will happen only during emergent situations and not as a SOP. Often Army Commanders are pre-occupied by direct threats from the enemy. Therefore he needs to be goaded towards selection of targets, which have indirect bearing. Dumps, lines of communication, POI stores, supply vehicles and even reserves at Army/ Corps level can be considered in the indirect category. If the Army Commander is cajoled to share the Air Commander's wide view, typically within 300-500 Km radius, he will be able to specify these indirect targets more easily. These indirect targets will not change much with newer contingencies that the Army Commander may face. Which means that air planner can do necessary planning work on identified 'indirect' targets before the battle is joined. This will allow more efficient, rapid and effective air power response.

Conclusion

18. Jointness or Jointmanship indeed is an inescapable necessity for modern wars. To win quickly, precisely, with least casualties to own side as well as the civilians on the other side is the key to war waging. Understanding the characteristics of each Service's way of warfare and factoring it in joint planning can enhance Jointmanship. In the modern warfare air and space have come to occupy a dominating position. Moreover, air power opens up multiple routes to victory in comparison to only a single route, which existed, in pure land warfare and in naval warfare. Perforce, more time needs to be spent on grasping air warfare since it has multiple routes to victory. For this the notion of aircraft as a 'flying artillery piece' will have to be discarded. Similarly, air warriors will need to understand the land war and naval war and dilemmas of land commander in firming up his plans or the need to have continued flexibility even during battle. Professional approach will pay far greater dividends than an approach, which emphasises physical togetherness as higher priority. Greater benefits would accrue from practical joint training under warlike simulated conditions. This facet needs greater thought, time and effort than presently is the case.

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(R. S. Cheema)
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