

A PAPER
ON
SYNERGY/JOINEDNESS IN THE ARMED FORCES
WITH SPECIAL FOCUS ON DEF INT

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Introduction

1. The changing character and conduct of warfare is increasingly putting Jt Force elements into unfamiliar op environments. To succeed in these environments, they need to have the ability to rapidly integrate varied kinds of unanticipated sets of capabilities to succeed in their msn objs. They achieve this through seamless integration of their capabilities and by op at lowest possible echelons. However, if they fully exploit both shared knowledge and tech convt, then the resulting capabilities will dramatically incr msn effectiveness.

2. The Jt Force in times to come will have to be fully **integrated, networked, enjoying info superiority and relying on all kinds of info ops**. However, the current state of human and tech convt and interoperability of the Jt Force and its ability to exploit it are woefully inadequate to achieve the desired levels of op effectiveness and efficiency for assured success. The value of **info and knowledge** assumes importance in Jt ops.

3. When threatened, it is not only the Armed Forces which have to respond in a unified manner but it is the entire nation viz the govt and its organs, the media and the people which have to respond in an integrated fashion. The Kargil War was one such event that unified the nation. The pol and mil insights gained during the prosecution of the Kargil War have brought the compulsive need for overall synergism at all the spheres especially in Def Int. It made us think about effective and jt apch towards Def Int.

AIM

4. The aim of the paper is to bring out the combined effects of synergy as related to Indian Armed Forces with special focus on Def Int.

Preview

5. The paper covs the details in the following manners:-
- (a) Understanding Synergism: Various Aspects.
 - (b) Prevailing Int Structure.
 - (c) Why the Need.
 - (d) Synergy in Def int.
 - (e) Conclusion.

(Note:- Joint Services Staff Duties Manual Vol II used for abbreviation)

Understanding Synergism: Various Aspects

6. The characteristics of synergy may be articulated in many ways the most befitting could be as conj where the whole is greater than the sum of the parts or as a state in which combined action is liked over sum of indl partner actions or may be as a behavior of entire sys unpredicted by that of their parts taken separately. Even though it may be difficult to summaries all the aspects of synergy in a single definition, but the aspects given below are necessary for understanding the aspects of Jointness:-

(a) **Unified Comd Structure.** On receipt of the pol dir, the COSC is reqd to convert the abstract pol aims of war to achievable mil aims and obj under the chairmanship of the sr most Service Chief, the results more often than not are based on mutual coord, as the chairman has no powers to interfere in the affairs of the other Service. This sys is workable till such time there is a very clear pol leadership and dir. However in case the dirs or the decisions do impinge on the inter-service resources and pers aspirations the sys may not result in desired output during trying times.

(b) **Intellectual Synergy.** There have been a lot of deliberations in the past on the issue that instead of having a full time chief we may have at the time of need a tri services 'Jt HQ Op' or we may have 'Ops Force Cdr'. Somehow all such ideas over the pd have proved that these are adhoc measures and are incapable of achieving complete synergy. We therefore, need to appt a C-in-C of proven ability who will have full auth on the three services and apply the forces in the best national interest besides nurturing the three services alike. However, we must not forget that with our kind of mil leadership, selection procedures and jt trg there is no intellectual synergy for which jt doctrine, jt trg and a comprehensive jt int setup are the prerequisites.

(c) **Emotional Togetherness.** Besides the above the emotional synergy is also an essential factor which can only be achieved once the issues of higher leadership jointness in the def forces is resolved. However, they are:-

- (i) No one-upmanship.
- (ii) No holding back: Be eager to share resources.
- (iii) Render positive sp.
- (iv) Equal growth opportunity to all.
- (v) Jt financial & perspective plg.

(d) **Physical Synergy.** The physical synergy an another imp aspect is being prac on grnd in a ltd manner. The aspects of the physical synergy being prac are interoperability, compatibility of eqpt, be available when and where reqd.

Prevailing Int Structure

7. From the very beginning not much imp has been given to mil int. The main function assigned to the mil hierarchy was fd security. It had been decided by the Govt

During the 1971 war, the success of the int ops could be attributed to the long prep time we had before outbreak of hostilities. We did not fare very well on the int front in Op Pawan in 1987. The Kargil episode has been a monumental int failure. The various agencies involved are:-

- (a) **JIC.** The Jt Int Committee which had the task of coord the int at the highest level has been converted to the secretariat of the National Security Council. Whether, this arng would create more problems rather than solve them in the field of integrated int, only time will show. The erstwhile JIC and now NSCS has no primary collection resource but it receives the inputs from various int agencies and preps reports which would help in policy formulations and address issues having vital bearing on national security.
- (b) **R&AW & IB.** R&AW came into being in 1967-68 with the charter of acquiring int related to external devps having a bearing on national security and thereafter its dissemination to relevant consumers like MEA, MHA and Def Services, NSCS (National Security Council Secretariat) and IB. It largely depends upon HUMINT, TECHINT and IMINT. The dissemination of int thus gained is forwarded to the all concerned on reqd basis.
- (c) **PMF.** Para-military forces like BSF have their own ltd int set-ups for obtaining info in their area of ops.

9. The three Services of the Def Forces have their own int dte (DGMI, DNI&DAI) which org and plan for int acqn and dissemination to their specific Services. We have Nodal Def Int Agency to coord and synergise the functioning of three Services int agencies. It has SIGINT units of all the three services, which provide vital SIGINT. There is Def Imagery Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC) which looks after the imagery needs of the Services. There are serious voids in the ELINT info acqn and availability of the same at the HQ IDS.

Why The Need

10. It is a well known fact that JIC has not been able to achieve its msns because of rivalry among int agencies. This became apparent when Mr Jaswant Singh, the then Minister for External Affairs, in his book Defending India has remarked on the politicisation of int agencies and their lack of accountability. He further goes on to add that an unintended but debilitating consequence of all this has been a crippling of the professional competence of India's entire int apparatus. The agencies tend to shy away from accountability.

11. KRC has emphasised on the need for a centralised comn int agency and has stressed that "while the effort to build-up adequate comn and electronic int capability should be tailored to suit India's particular needs, parochial dept interests should be effectively countered." Therefore, resources of Sig Int Dte and DIPAC supplemented by all other national resources (incl space recce) need to be gp under one agency. This would provide eco, avoid duplication & achieve optimisation assets of strat imp.

12. Since then the need of int reqmts for Armed Forces have incr manifold accordingly the modern Tech int resources are providing the Def Services int for most of their int needs. There is a reqmt of augmenting the capability of Def Services in Tech int assets of both strat and op nature to improve their abilities of obtaining real-time actionable int.

13. As brought out above the NSCS has no primary collection resource but it receives the inputs from various int agencies. It has therefore not been able to achieve its msn because of rivalry among int agencies, tendency of certain int agencies like R&AW and IB to report dir to PMO or pol bosses first and keep JIC oblivious of vital int inputs reqd by the consumer for urgent action.

14. The impediments encountered in integrating the int agencies and achieving jointness among the three Service's int dtes are almost similar to the ones experienced by the Britishers/Americans in the evolutionary process of their int set up. The stress on removing duplication of wk raises the fears of losing out a portion of resp to another Service. There is a tendency to create needs specific to parent Service, which militates against jt working and effective use of existing resources. Force multiplication achieved by timely and accurate int would be much more in order of magnitude than purchase of costly modern wpn platforms.

15. Since transformation is a continuous process there is a need to develop methods that assess legacy and proposed sys and define reqd jt capabilities. Technological advances will continue to affect the transformation of the Jt Force. We must remember that ***high-tech wpns alone will not transform the Forces unless we transform the way we think, train, ex and the way we fight.***

Synergy in Def int.

16. Info and knowledge are power and has always been used as a wpn. Today the extent and depth of battlefield has severely affected the reqmts of int, their sources and the setup needed. It is not only the int but also an rg of subjects, which contribute to mil potential of the adversary. These factors could be like en's economic str, industrial infrastructure, comn and tpt sys, pol leadership, scientific and geographical factors etc which assumes importance. Hence, the msn of int agencies is essentially to sp def plg and ops and contribute to national security through a coord effort by the entire int community. Concentrated efforts are reqd to bring in synergism in Int by taking in to consideration physical, emotional, intellectual and financial synergy aspects along with present apparatus of Def Int.

17. We are relying more and more on the info in our war fighting processes so is our adversaries. Large No of EM pulses have proliferated in the modern comb Z. These are gen by the rdrs, sensors, infrared and LASER emitting devices/sys. Force Cdr of modern battle fd are more dependent on svl devices, EW sys & NW to sp sophisticated wpn sys. Therefore, there is a dire ***need to not only fully expl the SIGINT but also the ELINT potential*** of the en. A sincere endeavor will have to be made to achieve credible capabilities of acquiring int by augmenting the existing SGINT, ELINT& DIPAC resources.


18. The Nodal Def Int Agency synergies the functioning of int agencies of three Services. But has an ltd mandate. ***DIA needs to be given an expanded mandate for obtaining external int*** which would not only improve the quality of product reqd by the Def Forces, but would also provide a second stream of external int, in addition to R&AW, for cross-checking and validation. As depending only on one source for imp and sensitive mil int inputs may be fraught with danger.

19. We lack in strat int whereas tac int is quite OK. Though the sys has the capacity but the quantum being very less leaves voids. For a focused dir and devp, ***all the strat TECHINT, SIGINT, COMINT and IMINT (incl space reece) assets /resources of the three services need to be integrated and org under the DIA.***

20. The business of int needs to be taken seriously. Int set-up in a piece-meal manner does not address mil or national int needs in a comprehensive manner. ***The role of Def Int Agency needs to be strengthened and be given addl executive powers besides de linking it from the NSCS. Jt Int doctrine is formulated at the earliest.***

21. **Conclusion.** It would be appropriate to highlight that pol will is reqd to have jointness at national level within the various organs and agencies of the country ***with spl emphasis on def int*** to defeat the evil designs of the en of our country. This has been recently aired by the COAS. He stated that India's IS challenges were far more than the external threats. Gen Kapoor may well be rapped for telling the truth, just as someone in New Delhi who repeated it and went even further, when he stated that Jointness betn the Armed Forces and with paramilitary and int agencies was sadly lacking.

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