

Joint Operational Personnel Administration

Interim Joint Warfare Publication 1-00

INTERIM JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATION 1-00

JOINT OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

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Director General
Joint Doctrine and Concepts

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PREFACE

SCOPE

1. **Purpose.** The purpose of Interim Joint Warfare Publication (IJWP) 1-00 ‘*Joint Operational Personnel Administration*’, is to provide understanding, information and guidance to those most likely to be involved in the planning and provision of personnel administration on Joint operations. It is intended principally for staff officers and civil servants responsible for the planning and mounting of operations, and for those who will have to manage the provision of personnel administration in-theatre.

2. **Context.** IJWP 1-00’s context is the UK’s involvement in operations managed to UK rules and procedures. In general personnel administration is a coherent set of administrative processes carried out by the individual, the Chain of Command and Agencies¹ to contribute to sustained effectiveness of the military manpower. In the context of this publication Joint Operational Personnel Administration (JOPA) covers, at the military strategic and operational levels, the personnel administration required by Force commanders in the provision and sustainment of manpower as part of their fighting power.² It does not cover personnel administration of a tactical and very temporary nature, or specific management matters concerned with the detailed implementation of administrative tasks. The dividing line between operational and tactical personnel administration is not based upon geography, but upon the procedures used to control its implementation, and must be determined by the operational commander. The Joint Personnel Administration (JPA) project is seeking the harmonisation of single-Service policies, procedures and processes in order to provide a single joint support system in the 05/06 timeframe. The IJWP will provide a source document for the requirements of the deployable capability. The IJWP will be fully reviewed, and a decision to publish a JWP will be taken, in the light of Lessons Identified from recent operations and on the introduction of JPA.

3. **Structure.** The publication is in 4 parts to facilitate quick reading in accordance with the guide below. Each Part should be readable with minimal reference to the other Parts. The Annexes have been created as *Aide Memoire*, guides and checklists which can be used directly by practitioners, who may wish to remove these from the binder for reproduction and use. The Parts are as follows:

- a. Part I defines Joint Operational Personnel Administration (JOPA), it outlines the purpose of JOPA and the nature of the responsibilities for the J1 staff executing JOPA. Part I also sets the high-level context of JOPA.

¹ Agencies - MOD (internal) and external organisations.

² In the final part, and by exception, administrative matters not directly associated with personnel are covered, as these matters are not yet dealt with in separate JWPs.

- b. Part II details the aspects of JOPA of direct relevance to the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) in terms of the operational command, the command and control and organisation arrangements for the J1 staff.
- c. Part III is of specific relevance to J1 staff; it details roles and responsibilities for JOPA in planning, conducting, sustaining and redeployment.
- d. Part IV details other administrative functions, some of which are not yet supported by separate JWPs, which impinge on JOPA and the J1 staff responsibilities.

Reading Guide

4. The following Table 1 is provided as a guide to reading this publication when time does not readily permit reading the whole publication.

Suggested Readership	Applicable Parts			
	Part I	Part II	Part III	Part IV
Jt Comd and planning staff	✓	✓		
JTFC and planning staff	✓	✓		✓
J1 Staff	✓	✓	✓	✓
Commanders	✓		✓	
Other Service Personnel	✓			

Table 1 - Quick Reading Guide

LINKAGES

5. **Allied and Single-Service.** Currently, there are no NATO or single-Service doctrinal publications solely concerned with JOPA. Single-Service publications do exist that detail the routine procedures and processes for personnel administration within the Services. IJWP 1-00 does not replace these publications. IJWP 1-00 sets out the UK doctrine for personnel administration on joint operations. JWP 1-10 '*Prisoners of War Handling*' deals with the physical handling and administrative aspects of PW. JWP 1-10 will endure although, for coherency, related aspects are covered in IJWP 1-00. Considerable reference is made to JWP 4-00 '*Logistics for Joint Operations*', and thereby AJP-4, as joint logistics is the vehicle for delivering many J1 facilities. Similarly the operational planning aspects are cross-referred to

JWP 3-00 '*Joint Operations*' and the publication should be read in conjunction with JWP 0-10 '*United Kingdom Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations*'.³

6. **Peacetime Procedures.** The procedures in IJWP 1-00 are consistent with the more detailed provisions directing the peacetime management of personnel administration contained in the documents listed below, and ease the transition to these peacetime procedures when prolonged operations require their introduction:

- a. **Armed Forces Overarching Personnel Strategy.**
- b. **Joint Service.** Joint Service Publication (JSP) 354 '*Casualty Procedure: Serious Aircraft Accident*'.
- c. **RN.** Books of Reference (BR) 14 '*Drafting Regulations*', BR 60 '*Regulations for the Royal Naval Reserve*', BR 61 '*Royal Fleet Reserve and Recall Reserve (Naval and Maritime) Regulations*', BR 63 '*Royal Marine Reserve Regulations*', BR 64 '*Regulations for the Naval and Marine Reserves*', BR 81 '*Royal Navy and Royal Marine Uniform Regulations*', BR 1066 '*Advancement Regulations*', BR 1797 '*Further Education, Vocational Training and Resettlement Information*', BR 3162 '*Redeployment and Mobilisation of Reserve Personnel*', BR 8373 '*Officers' Career Regulations*', BR 8587 '*Naval Leave and Travel Regulations*', BR 8588 '*The Welfare of Naval Personnel*', BR 8741 '*Royal Marines Casualty Instructions*', BR 8748 '*Terms of Service for RN, QARNNS and WRNS Ratings and RM Ranks*', BR 8886 '*RN Casualty Procedures*'.
- d. **Army.** Army Field Manual Part 6 '*Combat Service Support*', Army Code (AC) 10 '*The Regulations for Army Allowances and Charges*', AC 12974 '*Army Casualty Procedures 2000*' and Personnel Administration Manual.
- e. **RAF.** Air Publication (AP) 3392 '*RAF Manual of Personnel Administration*' and AP 1922 '*RAF Manual of Casualty Procedures*'.

³ Both JWP 1-10 and JWP-3-00 will be subsumed into JDP 01 '*Joint Operations*', JWP 3-00 Edition 2 '*Joint Operations Execution*' and JWP 5-00 '*Joint Operations Planning*' due for publication in Apr 04.

JOINT OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

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JOINT WARFARE PUBLICATIONS

The successful prosecution of multinational and joint operations requires clearly understood doctrine that is acceptable to all nations and Services concerned. It is UK policy that national doctrine should be consistent with NATO doctrine and, by implication, its terminology and procedures (other than those exceptional circumstances when the UK has elected not to ratify NATO doctrine).

Notwithstanding, the requirement exists to develop national doctrine to address those areas not adequately covered, or covered at all, by NATO doctrine, and to influence the development of the latter. This is met by the development of a hierarchy of Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs).

Interim Joint Warfare Publications (IJWPs) are published as necessary to meet those occasions when a particular aspect of joint doctrine needs to be agreed, usually in a foreshortened time scale. This is usually in association with a planned exercise or operation, or to enable another aspect of doctrinal work to be developed. This will often occur when a more comprehensive 'parent' publication is under development, but normally well in advance of its planned publication.

The Joint Doctrine Development Process and associated hierarchy of JWPs is explained in DCI JS 91/2003.



PART I - JOINT OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION OVERVIEW

This Part will be of interest¹ to those wishing to understand the broad nature of Personnel Administration on Joint Operations (JOPA) and the contribution it makes to the fighting power of the UK forces. It also defines JOPA and identifies its objectives. In addition, it sets JOPA in the overall framework of the Levels of War and its context in relation to J1 staff.

Suggested Readership	Applicable Parts			
	Part I	Part II	Part III	Part IV
Jt Comd and planning staff	✓	✓		
JTFC and planning staff	✓	✓		✓
J1 Staff	✓	✓	✓	✓
Commanders	✓		✓	
Other Service Personnel	✓			

Table 1 - Quick Reading Guide

¹ This publication has been structured to allow the use of the Quick Reading Guide. This is detailed in the Preface to this publication.

CHAPTER 1 – JOINT OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

101. **Personnel Administration and Fighting Power.** The men and women of the UK Armed Forces are the fundamental element of the nation's fighting power. Both employer, the Services, and employees, the servicemen,¹ have expectations. Personnel administration is key to managing these expectations. This chapter provides a definition for Joint Operational Personnel Administration (JOPA) and covers the objectives of JOPA in relation to joint operations.

102. **Policy.** Currently there is no joint personnel administration policy² beyond the vision articulated in the Armed Forces Overarching Personnel Strategy (AFOPS) 2003. However, within AFOPS, there are areas where the formulation of personnel policy is led by MOD Centre and others where the single Services are wholly responsible. Hence, the application of JOPA is restricted to joint operations.

103. **Levels of War.** An appreciation that military activities are conducted at different levels involving different people will help understand the context of JOPA. The British interpretation³ of these levels can be summarised as follows:

- a. The Grand Strategic Level involves the maintenance of political independence and territorial integrity and the pursuit of wider national interests. Grand Strategy is the collective responsibility of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.
- b. The Military Strategic Level is the military component of Grand Strategy, and is developed by the Chiefs of Staff supported by their officials (both military and Civil Service) under the direction of the Secretary of State (S of S) for Defence, within the Ministry of Defence (MOD).
- c. The Operational Level is the level of war at which campaigns are planned. During the planning phase this responsibility rests with the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), specifically the Joint Commander (Jt Comd). Once deployed to the Joint Operations Area (JOA), these are the activities of the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC).

¹ Hereafter the terms men, man, servicemen or serviceman are used as generic descriptors of both men and women i.e. they should be regarded as gender free terms.

² The Joint Personnel Administration Project (JPA) is seeking harmonisation of policies, procedures and processes in order to provide a single joint support system in the 05/06 timeframe.

³ JWP 0-01 'British Defence Doctrine'.

d. The Tactical Level is the level at which the war fighting actually takes place. In a joint operation, the highest tactical commanders are the environmental Component Commanders (CCs) for Maritime, Land, Air, Special Forces (SF) and Logistics, who work directly to the JTFC. Below them are formation and unit commanders whose task is it to engage directly with the enemy.

SECTION II – DEFINING JOINT OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

104. **Military Definition.** In its most comprehensive military sense personnel administration can be considered as ‘the art of enhancing military effectiveness by cultivating, obtaining, retaining, sustaining and remembering⁴ service personnel’ - the Services’ most valued assets. At the operational level, personnel administration comprises those aspects which deal with ‘the provision of manpower for joint operations, the sustainment of personnel⁵ and their subsequent redeployment following the operation’. Thus, by definition, JOPA is carried out on joint operations and used at the operational and tactical levels.

105. **Administration and Combat Service Support.** Administration has been accepted within NATO to mean ‘the management and execution of all military matters not including tactics and strategy’.⁶ Hence, administration is considered an enabling function for operations and can have loosely defined boundaries, particularly in the provision of ‘services’. To reflect the diversity of this enabling function, operational support is often referred to as Combat Service Support (CSS), incorporating both logistics and administration. Logistics is covered in JWP 4-00, (Edition 2) ‘*Logistics for Joint Operations*’. (For completeness, other administration functions are discussed in the final part of the publication). The majority of CSS lies within the primary responsibility of J1 and J4 staffs; their functions and services are often mutually dependent and collocated.

106. **Tri-Service and Joint Operational Personnel Administration.** A distinction needs to be drawn between Tri-Service Personnel Administration and JOPA. In the

⁴ AFOPS has the following definitions for these activities as follows:

Cultivate – ‘prepare the ground’ for obtaining personnel.

Obtain - attract, acquire and train high quality, motivated people.

Retain - provide personnel with a rewarding career which stimulates and develops them and provides the foundation of a second career on leaving the Services.

Sustain - provide an environment in which Service men and women and their families will be willing to maintain their commitment.

Remember - provide ex-Service personnel and their dependants with help and support, particularly with resettlement back into civilian life.

⁵ This will include servicemen and deployed Civil Servants; it may include other personnel such as voluntary services (e.g. WRVS), media representatives, detained persons, deployed contractors, and Prisoners of War. The supporting doctrine for the latter 2 groups is detailed in JDP 4/01 and JWP 1-10 respectively.

⁶ AAP-6, ‘NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions’.

former, the demands of elements of 2 or more Services are simply co-ordinated by a single-Service staff organisation. In JOPA, capabilities are centrally marshalled.

SECTION III – EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS IN JOINT OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

107. **Philosophy.** For an operation, discrete elements of capability, formations and units, are drawn together. Typically, formations and units want their own tailored support organisations to enable independent personnel administration. However, as a Joint Task Force (JTF) is constituted, oversight of personnel matters by the JTFC is essential to his ability to command. Moreover, opportunities for economy of effort in personnel administration will occur. The UK philosophy is to make best use of the limited resources available, including manpower, and be responsive to the increasing need for rapid deployment - a unified, yet pragmatic, approach.

108. **Integration, Economy and Efficiency.** Overall efficiency in personnel administration is achieved through the combination of economy and effectiveness. However, the delivery of personnel administration depends on many different specialisations, not just in terms of knowledge and skills, but also in experience at staff level. In the joint arena the specialisations are yet more diverse, each coloured by its parent Service. Identifying the correct mix of personnel administration, knowledge and skills for joint operations is the key to success.(See Para 510) Integration of the single-Service capabilities offers great potential for efficiency but requires careful and detailed planning at every level. Success is reliant on a change of culture amongst commanders, staff and operators, who must recognise, for example, where another Service's personnel administration capabilities can benefit them and *vice versa*.

109. **Structural Efficiency.** Efficiency can be achieved through either permanent or task-organised joint structures:

- a. **Permanently Structured Organisations.** Currently there are 2 permanently structured joint personnel administration organisations at the operational level. There are permanently manned J1 divisions within PJHQ and the Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ); both of these are augmented for many operations. In due course the Joint Personnel Administration (JPA) system will introduce both processes and a system that replaces current 3 single-Service personnel administration processes and information systems. It will operate at the operational level and below.
- b. **Task-Organised Personnel Administration Structures.** The scope for optimising deployed JOPA is driven by the situation. The structure will be decided as a result of the operational level estimate and campaign plan prior to deployment. A task-organised structure requires engagement at an early stage by planners with knowledge of the various Component support needs and must

be controlled by commanders and staff who are trained, organised and well rehearsed in drawing together task-organised personnel administration structures from the single-Services. The object of this approach is to identify common personnel administration tasks that can be resourced by a single organisation on behalf of other deployed assets and implement a plan to execute them. JOPA tasks may be time or phase specific, or may be permanently in operation throughout a campaign.

110. **Efficiency Benchmark.** ‘Jointery’ in personnel administration should not be a foregone conclusion. To function most effectively JOPA must make good operational sense and is entirely dependent on the situation. The aspiration should be to deliver more for the same or the same for less, but not at the expense of meeting the operational requirements. Sound single-Service practice will often be the benchmark against which JOPA capability is tested.

111. **Multinational Personnel Administration.** National self-sufficiency is normally the deployment standard. Currently, no NATO or other multi-national personnel administration doctrine has been developed; thus, there is limited scope for immediate interoperability.

SECTION IV – JOINT OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION OBJECTIVES

Joint Operational Personnel Administration Objectives

112. **Primary Objectives.** There are 2 primary objectives for the J1 staff who provide JOPA,⁷ these are:

- a. To provide the JTFC with manpower⁸ as the key element of his fighting power; the manpower contribution within the Concept of Fighting Power is detailed in Annex 1A. This involves the manning of fighting units with suitably qualified individuals through mobilisation, augmentation, roulement or substitution, and accounting for the manpower⁹ in terms of allocation to units, and numbers of casualties, dead and available for action. As the operation progresses, it will include repatriation of casualties and the

⁷ This accords with the J1 role defined in JWP 3-00. However it creates a new term ‘Personnel Administration’ which is a subset of the NATO definition in AAP-6.

⁸ The forces assigned to an operation are usually identified in Chief of the Defence Staff’s (CDS) Directive to the Jt Comd. However, the assignment, and where necessary the complementing of the assigned forces, will be made in consultation with J1 and other staff in the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) or the single-Services N1/G1/A1 staffs.

⁹ Operational Location (OPLOC) is the primary enabler for manpower accounting and tracking.

administration of Prisoners of War (PW);¹⁰ it may also include the administration of Detained Persons (DP).

b. To sustain¹¹ individuals such that each is capable of making a positive contribution to the fighting power,¹² the Framework for Sustaining Individuals is at Annex 1B. It is the role of commanders at sub-unit, unit and formation level to harness that capability through leadership, training and motivating the sustained individuals to deliver their contribution to the fighting power.

113. **J1 Staff on Operations.** The J1, or complementary single-Service, staffs are not directly responsible for the preparation or delivery of all the facilities necessary to provide and sustain personnel on operations. Their role is to ensure the co-ordination and management of the facilities throughout the planning, mounting and conduct of an operation and the subsequent redeployment. The delivery of the majority of the personnel sustainment facilities is the responsibility of the J4 Logistic and Medical staff. Hence J1 and J4 staff are often collocated or combined. In fulfilling the J1 role, the staff will provide personnel administration support to the JTFC, the commanders within the JTF at all levels and, ultimately, to individuals within the force. At the tactical level the provision of personnel administration support to servicemen on individual basis will be through their sub-unit, unit and formation staff,¹³ although the J1 staffs will co-ordinate and manage the sustainment of individuals on a collective basis.

114. **Expeditionary Joint Operations.** The extended Line(s) of Communication (LOC) associated with expeditionary operations impact upon the sustainment of both the individual servicemen and collectively the manpower. At all levels, both physical and psychological issues will predominate in JOPA. Effort is applied to ameliorate the impact of expeditionary operations on personnel. It is not enough to amass personnel and sustain them; the timely and balanced application of manpower to the prevailing operational need is paramount. Effectively applied, JOPA contributes positively to the achievement of the aim; poor JOPA can have a severely limiting effect. The J1 staff may therefore influence the approach and rate at which the selected aim can be achieved.

¹⁰ JWP 1-10 'Prisoners of War', details the administrative arrangements for PW which are also summarised in the Introduction to Pt III of this publication.

¹¹ JWP 4-00 details the difference between sustainment and sustainability. The context used above is associated with, and interchangeable with, the term sustainment.

¹² Sustaining the individual so that they can be effective is achieved by enabling the individual to develop or preserve their sense of well being physically, mentally and spiritually.

¹³ Until the implementation of JPA the methodology for delivering personnel administration and the supporting systems will continue to be managed on the basis of an individual's own Service.

Divergence within the Joint Operational Personnel Administration Role

115. **Opposing Demands.** The J1 staffs are subject to opposing demands in that their primary objectives serve the JTFC, at one end of the spectrum, and the servicemen in the frontline, at the other. The J1 staff will need to plan for such complications and advise the JTFC accordingly should such tension arise. For example, advising the JTFC of the impact on morale when he needs to balance the provision of telephone calls to families for welfare purposes and the need to restrict outgoing communications for Operations Security (OPSEC).

116. **Circumstances at Home and on Operations.** In addition, there is a requirement for the J1 staff to have a view of circumstances both within the JOA and at the home bases.¹⁴ They will need a threefold appreciation. They need to understand the conditions being faced by the personnel throughout the JOA, the circumstances of their families and the circumstances of other service personnel not assigned to the operation. Perceptions held by the assigned forces of these 3 sets of conditions, particularly regarding equity of welfare provision, will set levels of expectation within the Force. These expectations will need to be managed if tensions between individuals and within elements of the JTF are not to rise and threaten morale. An example may be where servicemen from different Services are working in the same unit, yet they, their families or their peers receive different levels of support from their parent Service personnel administration staff. Thorough planning and good communication is usually the most efficient way of managing perceptions and expectations.

117. **Principles of Personnel Administration.** In resolving any ill feeling that may emerge from unwarranted expectations or perceived inequitable personnel administration, it is important that all commanders and the J1 staff have an understanding of the source of such tensions. The Principles of Personnel Administration can serve as the guide to solutions. These principles are detailed in Annex 1C.

Personnel Administration Objectives at the Tactical Level

118. **Formation and Unit Commanders' Responsibilities.** It is the responsibility of all commanders within a JTF to maximise, and personalise, the effect of the collective measures taken to sustain the servicemen, which are co-ordinated by the J1 staff. It is equally their responsibility to identify shortfalls in individual sustainment, as well as delivering the tactical level personnel administration, to enable the J1 staff to provide and sustain the fighting manpower for the JTFC.

119. **Component Commanders' Responsibilities.** Within a JOA the CCs bear a responsibility to ensure their units are effectively supported. However, this support

¹⁴ FLCs retain responsibility for personnel administration for the home bases and good communication between the FLCs and J1 staff will be needed to ensure that problems are managed seamlessly.

need not be provided only from within Component resources. Implementation of a JOPA plan should always be considered. At this level JOPA, or tri-Service personnel administration, can bring efficiency and speed through leveraging their assets towards a common objective.

JOINT OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

- Unique to Joint Operations and is applied at the Operational level.
- Ensures delivery and sustainment of manpower and sustainment of individuals for the operation.
- Considers personnel administration in the widest form, ensuring coherence of support.
- Identifies the scope for economic and efficient, yet effective, delivery of personnel administration to a Joint Force on operations.
- Assists the Commander in identifying and prioritising the risks and benefits, in terms of fighting power, associated with the many possible methods of delivering JOPA.
- Forecasts, identifies and informs the Commander where sustainment of personnel will be a critical constraint to the operation, and the means of compensating for this.

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ANNEX 1A – THE MANPOWER CONTRIBUTION WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF FIGHTING POWER

1A1. The Concept of Fighting Power is detailed in JWP 0-01 ‘*British Defence Doctrine*’ (BDD). In this Annex, the essence of the Concept is reiterated with emphasis on the need for Joint Operational Personnel Administration (JOPA) from the perspective of the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and the individual Serviceman.

SECTION I – THE CONCEPT OF FIGHTING POWER

1A2. Fighting power defines armed forces’ ability to fight and achieve success in operations. It is made up of an essential mix of 3 inter-related components: conceptual, moral and physical. It does not matter how advanced one’s platforms, weapons and sensors are if the people manning them lack motivation, training or adequate leadership. The Components of Fighting Power are summarised diagrammatically in Figure 1A.1.




Figure 1A.1 – The Components of Fighting Power

SECTION II – THE CONCEPTUAL COMPONENT

1A3. The conceptual component provides the thought processes needed to develop the ability to fight. It comprises both lessons from the past and thinking about how the Armed Forces can best operate today and in the future. The conceptual component of fighting power today consists of 2 elements: the principles of war and conceptual thinking, from which a body of doctrine is derived. It is the combination of those principles and doctrine, applied with imagination and initiative by their commanders, that provides the intellectual force driving the UK Armed Forces' fighting power in current operations.

The Principles of War

1A4. The Principles of War are discussed in detail in BDD.¹ They are the foundation upon which British doctrine is constructed.

Conceptual Thinking

1A5. There is a further essential element which assists with the development of fighting power into the future. The development of concepts for future operations is vital for both force and doctrine development. Without it, the Armed Forces could not maintain fighting power, including equipment superiority, over time. In thinking about the future of warfare and the forces necessary to cope with its challenges, the UK uses a capability-based approach. There are 7 fundamental defence capabilities required to deliver fighting power; each of them involves an element of JOPA. These are:

- a. A robust and responsive means of **Command** (the authority for the direction, co-ordination and control of military forces).
- b. A process to **Inform** the command (the acquisition, collation, processing, management and distribution of information).
- c. A means to **Prepare** forces for employment (all the activities needed to define, resource and deliver fighting power for operational employment, within readiness criteria laid down in policy).
- d. Measures and resources to **Project** and recover in a timely manner, a force that is appropriately packaged for the objective it is pursuing.
- e. The means to **Protect** and preserve fighting power, principally on operations (involves countering wider threats, natural, human and technological).

¹ JWP 0-01, Chapter 3.

- f. The ability to **Sustain** the force (the maintenance of the necessary level of fighting power required to achieve objectives).
- g. All of which are necessary in order to discharge the prime function, namely to **Operate** by conducting military actions, primarily in combat (including movement, supply, attack, defence, and manoeuvre).

1A6. These fundamental defence capabilities are inter-related and supporting; none can be considered in isolation, and all are required in varying measure to meet the requirements of Government policy. A representation of this multidimensional inter-relationship is shown in Figure 1A.2.




Figure 1A.2 – The Seven Fundamental Defence Capabilities

SECTION III - THE MORAL COMPONENT

1A7. Ultimately it is people who realise fighting power. The UK has highly skilled and fully volunteer Armed Forces with a history of excellence in performance. Their world-recognised strengths require time, effort and resources if they are to be developed, maintained and exploited to the nation's advantage. The moral component of fighting power is about persuading our people to fight. It depends on good morale and the conviction that our purpose is morally and ethically sound; these promote an offensive spirit and a determination to achieve the aim. There are many things which contribute: training, confidence in equipment, fair and firm discipline, self-respect and a clear understanding of what is going on and what is required. With all of those in place there is clear potential for military success. To realise the potential, however,

requires motivation, leadership and management. Good personnel administration is a key aid to these.

Motivation

1A8. Motivation implies a determination for getting things done. It derives from a personal commitment to an idea, a sense of purpose, and a feeling of belonging. In many people, there is an instinctive desire to do what is right and good. One means of generating motivation, therefore, is to ensure that our Armed Forces believe in what they are doing. A sense of purpose is achieved when that belief is linked to the individual's involvement in its pursuit. Involvement is a stronger source of motivation for most people when they feel themselves to be a part of a team, all members of which provide the others with support. In military units, given the challenges inherent in warfighting, the need is to go beyond mere team building, to develop genuine comradeship which will endure even as the violence and fear of war, death and injury begin to bite deep into an individual's consciousness. It is pride in belonging, best described by the term *esprit de corps* in relation to unit identity but which, at a higher level, includes a belief in patriotic duty. Being highly motivated in peacetime is one thing; to retain that motivation in the face of battle requires a profoundly deep commitment to one's comrades, one's unit, and one's country, and to the cause for which one is fighting.

Leadership

1A9. Leadership at all levels is the principal element in the maintenance of morale. Without good leadership, morale will undoubtedly crumble in the face of adversity. All leaders must accept their responsibility for maintaining morale and the fighting spirit of those under their command. Military leadership is the projection of personality and character to get subordinates to do what is required of them and to engender within them the confidence that breeds initiative and the acceptance of risk and responsibility. Born leaders are rare, but leadership potential can be developed by training, experience, study of the methods of great leaders in the past and a knowledge of military doctrine. Through these, individuals develop their own style of leadership and no 2 people will necessarily lead in exactly the same way.

1A10. Leadership starts with self-discipline. It is a continuous process throughout training and daily life. Leaders promote this process amongst their subordinates by: decisive action; precept and example; advice, encouragement and admonishment; and by giving subordinates every opportunity of contributing to operational and tactical success. It is a truism that operational success provides the quickest and most effective boost to morale for those at war, but outstanding leadership will sustain high morale when all other factors are against it.

1A11. **Management.** Management is no substitute for leadership but is a vital element of the moral component nevertheless. It is about making the best use of resources. It is an attribute of command that cannot be overlooked because it is fundamental to efficiency and, of course, relates to 2 Principles of War, economy of effort and sustainability. In those senses, especially in relation to People, management also has a bearing on the physical component of fighting power. It is regarded as an element of the moral component, however, because without good management of personnel and the provision of sufficient administrative support, the maintenance of morale and the motivation of the force would be rendered considerably more difficult. The measure of good personnel administration is the ability to achieve the right balance - neither an over-abundance nor a shortage of manpower, either of which would undermine the concentration of effort on the main objective.

SECTION IV – THE PHYSICAL COMPONENT

1A12. The physical component of fighting power is the means to fight. It has 5 elements: manpower, equipment, collective performance, readiness and sustainability. It is, therefore, a combination of: the ships, land vehicles, aircraft, associated weapons and sensors, and other equipment and establishments; the people that man them and the training they undergo to fight, both as individuals and as members of operational units. They do so in order that they can be deployed in good time and sustained to achieve the tasks assigned by HM Government.

Manpower

1A13. The Servicemen who comprise our Armed Forces, both regular and reserve, are highly trained and skilled volunteers. They go through a rigorous selection and initial training process which gives them an essential grounding for the further professional development and collective training necessary to turn them into effective combatants. The UK's Armed Forces have been involved in active operations throughout the period since the Second World War and have accumulated a wealth of experience, with many experienced Servicemen still serving. The Forces are highly regarded internationally. Nevertheless, their skills need to be nurtured, developed and retained. No matter how successful they might have been in the past, their effectiveness can so easily be undermined internally by poor personnel administration and externally by changing economic, social and political factors and by significant shifts in the values of society as a whole.

1A14. The UK's Armed Forces go to war and fight with the equipment they already have and British doctrine reflects that. However, a fundamental part of maintaining fighting power is the procurement of the best and most effective equipment that can be afforded, the aim being to maintain a technological advantage which represents a war-winning capability. The conceptual component of fighting power includes the

development of concepts to inform and guide the UK's equipment and personnel training programmes and to develop fighting power into the future.

1A15. **Collective Performance.** Collective performance is only achieved through an understanding of common doctrine combined with collective training and exercising to rehearse and sharpen the ability to apply it. Commanders devise ways of ensuring that the forces under their command are as prepared as possible for the ultimate demands of warfighting. There can be no compromise on this, for the ability to deploy fully prepared for combat is at the core of fighting power. As a component of this fighting power, there must be have a common doctrine for JOPA, which must be exercised in training.

1A16. **Readiness.** The ability to deploy combines the physical process of transit into a Joint Operations Area with the readiness to do so in as short a time as possible. By their nature, crises spring up unexpectedly in equally unexpected places. Timelines are likely to be short. Government policy lays down readiness criteria for the Armed Forces, in which priorities are listed and forces allocated differing levels of required readiness. The readiness details are themselves a part of policy and not doctrine, but a commander's responsibility to meet them is a doctrinal imperative. JOPA is key to the commander's ability to identify, select and deploy the appropriate personnel of the right readiness state with the appropriate skill set.

1A17. **Sustainability.** Sustaining military forces in war is as vital a function as their ability to deliver firepower. As soon as an operation starts, events will generate further demands on the force. It cannot be assumed that a campaign plan will survive the first encounter with the enemy. This is why the ability to sustain both people and equipment is so important a part of fighting power. JOPA should both provide and sustain people for the JTFC.

ANNEX 1B – FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINING INDIVIDUALS

SECTION I – INTRODUCTION

1B1. **Sense of Well-Being.** Men and women join the Armed Forces because they are attracted by the career they perceive it offers them. They believe that the Terms and Conditions of Service (TACOS) under which they join will adequately reward them for their contribution. While the TACOS may not explicitly detail every aspect of the rewards and contribution expected, the Service ethos is given prominence, not least in the Armed Forces Overarching Personnel Strategy (AFOPS). At the core of this strategy is the provision of appropriate manpower for the Armed Forces. However, having drawn people in to the Forces, the key to sustaining them in the Forces in peacetime and on operations is providing ‘*an environment in which Service men and women and their families will be willing to maintain their commitment*’,¹ in essence, maintaining their sense of contentment or well-being.

1B2. **The Three Dimensions of the Individual.** There are 3 dimensions to an individual: mind, body and spirit. If the individual perceives that each dimension is in healthy balance then there is an overall feeling of well-being and contentment, represented in Figure 1B.1. The ‘Body’ is the health of the human frame, fitness and freedom from illness or injury.




Figure 1B.1 – The 3 Dimensions of the Individual

¹ Armed Forces Overarching Personnel Policy, Chap 1, page 6.

The Mind is the intellectual health, psychological health and cultural alignment.² The Spirit is about the values and beliefs held by the individual and the ability to uphold these values and beliefs.

1B3. **Operational Welfare Package.** While the measures, or enablers, to maintain the sense of balance in all 3 dimensions are usually in place during peace, they are often missing during operations. During an operation, these measures may need to be put in place, and sometimes enhanced, by the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC). The package of measures³ put together for operations is often termed the ‘Operational Welfare Package’ (OWP). The term is used in a manner which excludes the provision of food, shelter and clothing. Sustaining individuals requires both an OWP tailored to meet the operational environment, and the provision of food, shelter and clothing.

1B4. **Operational Environment.** Personnel deployed for protracted periods may have to accept significant deprivation. They may have to maintain combat effectiveness for long periods under tiring and, sometimes dangerous, circumstances, experiencing periods of boredom interspersed with short bursts of high-intensity, and often high-risk, activity. To this should be added possible emotional strains due to separation, such as concern for their families. Although good leadership and the chain of command can alleviate much of the stress resulting from such circumstances, additional welfare support may be required to maintain the sense of well-being in personnel. This in turn will contribute to the high morale necessary for operational effectiveness.

SECTION II – FRAMEWORK FOR SUSTAINING INDIVIDUALS

1B5. People are most operationally effective when they are able to commit themselves to their duties physically, mentally and spiritually. Moreover, well-being of the mind, body and spirit in individuals contributes positively to group effectiveness and, ultimately, to overall operational effectiveness. The 3 dimensions are inextricably linked and a significant proportion of the commanders’ personnel management should be given to ensuring that measures that promote a sense of well-being and welfare enablers, such as physical recreation and off-duty relaxation, are available to the servicemen.⁴

1B6. There has been a view that sustaining an individual is solely about the contents of the OWP and is a separate J1 function to that of providing, pay, allowances and

² Cultural Alignment is about the expectations associated with the culture in which the individual is operating, confidence that they are not disadvantaged, for example a British and Nigerian serviceman will not expect the same rates of pay and treatment of their family, but these must be similar to others in their own society.

³ The measures may be publicly funded, provided from non-public funds, offered by voluntary organisations or gifts. For elements of the Maritime Force the measures are permanently in place, e.g. on board ships and submarines, although these may be supplemented as required.

⁴ On operations the term ‘Servicemen’ may include civil servants, contractors and other support staff.

personnel records. However, if individuals know that they are being regularly paid, that they can look forward to a secure pension and resettlement at the end of their career, this will contribute significantly to their peace of mind in the operational environment. The notion of an OWP is to identify, authorise and replicate, where necessary at public expense, the key enablers in the operational environment.⁵ The conceptual framework at Figure 1B.2 has been developed to illustrate the interrelationship of physical, mental and spiritual welfare and the array of key welfare measures in the operational environment. It recognises the inextricable and very important link between family/dependant's needs and the needs of those deployed.

1B7. Role of Leadership. Managing the expectations of the servicemen through good leadership is at the heart of welfare support. Strong, effective leadership, including good communication, and sound personnel administration throughout the chain of command are the 2 key welfare enablers; they are central to the maintenance of morale. Sustaining the individual with welfare support is an emotive subject and, without the full engagement of the chain of command providing firm leadership, its provision may be vulnerable to delay and confusion. A failure to provide anticipated welfare enablers will adversely affect morale. Based upon the prevailing conditions and circumstances, units should be briefed fully on their welfare support objectives, and should be encouraged to supplement officially provided support with imaginative self-help. The personal support of commanders for all personnel under their command is critical; failure may well result in a less effective fighting force.

SECTION III – WELL-BEING OF THE BODY

Overview

1B8. Historically, a graduated approach has proved successful in satisfying physiological needs on operations. For example, in Kosovo there was a migration from roadside relief (keeping to the blacktop to avoid unexploded ordnance), through deep-trench latrines to serviced Portaloos by D+10. Similarly, personal shelter evolved from vehicle cabs and compartments, through side-shelters and abandoned buildings, to basic tentage by D+14. The satisfaction of a few basic physiological requirements can impact appreciably upon the sense of physical well-being.

⁵ Commanders and individuals should not consider the need for such enablers unique to the operational environment. In order to retain morale, motivation and generate cohesion for the long-term retention of individuals in the Armed Forces, they are an everyday requirement.




Figure 1B.2 – Individual Operational Sustainment Framework

Physical Protection

1B9. **Climate.** Whilst being cold and wet or hot and parched may be viewed as anything from an inconvenience to – *in extremis* – life-threatening, the impact of the climate upon morale and operational effectiveness need not be significant, provided that personnel are adequately equipped, trained and acclimatised.

1B10. **Acclimatisation.** The operation may be conducted in an environment which is substantially different from that being experienced by the service personnel prior to their move into the Joint Operations Area (JOA). In such cases, consideration should be given to allowing a period of time for acclimatisation prior to the personnel engaging in the operation. For example, working at high altitude requires the body to adapt to lower oxygen concentrations in the atmosphere; given gentle exercise and a suitable a period of time, acclimatisation can be achieved by most individuals. Failure to do so may result in debilitating altitude sickness which will lower operational effectiveness before any engagement with the enemy.

1B11. **Accommodation.** Although it may, of necessity, be very basic in the short-term, accommodation appropriate to the local conditions will always be an early requirement. It may vary from basic forms of shelter which accompany the servicemen, to improvised shelter, to accommodation provided by the Host Nation, to accommodation rented from the local economy. Arrangements for the latter 2 may fall to the J1 staff to initiate, but this tends to be a J4 Infrastructure (Infra)/Host Nation Support (HNS)/Civ Sec responsibility.

1B12. **Clothing.** Although the combat clothing currently issued to UK Forces is designed to be useable across a wide range of climatic conditions, it is important that the most appropriate clothing is readily made available. Therefore a co-ordinated decision with J3, J4 and J4 medical staff should determine what clothing and personal-issue protective equipment the servicemen should use. The decision will take into account the climate and the projected hazards.

Sustenance

1B13. **Food.** Making adequate provision for hot, nutritious meals and drinks on a regular basis is another requirement to be satisfied at an early stage. Although the provision and distribution of food is a J4 responsibility, the J1 staff may be asked to provide information to ensure that adequate food provision and distribution is planned.⁶

⁶ This planning should have taken account of the effects of the cultural aspects of introducing certain foods to a country, e.g. pork products in a Muslim country.

Physical Exercise

1B14. **Off-Duty Relaxation.** Some degree of off-duty relaxation will be possible in all except the most intense operations. The following should be considered:

- a. **Space.** Although not always possible to provide, the requirement for space for individuals to be able to relax is necessary to support their overall well-being. Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure (ECI) should provide sufficient space⁷ for welfare purposes.
- b. **Leisure Facilities.** Leisure bars/lounges on major deployed bases should be provided and staffed by the Expeditionary Forces Institute (EFI),⁸ and should obviate the need for ad-hoc unit bars. However, commanders retain the right to authorise units to make their own provision should EFI be unable to provide the service, particularly in the early stages of an operation. Decisions regarding the licensing and control of unit bars also rest ultimately with the appropriate commanders.⁹ Separate consideration must be given to establishing Officers', Warrant Officers', SNCOs' and NCOs' Messes (these facilities are not routinely provided by EFI); however, NAAFI/EFI should be designated as their sole supplier of beverages, both alcoholic and non-alcoholic. Warships and Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) vessels have extant, albeit different, regulations governing the consumption of alcohol whilst aboard. When engaged in joint operations, pragmatism must be applied in the application of any rules and restrictions. This is particularly apposite when land-based forces are embarked for Rest and Recuperation (R&R) where no facilities are available ashore.
- c. **Physical Recreation.** Physical recreation provides diverse benefits: it enables personnel to maintain their physical fitness for role; in group activities, it engenders team spirit which contributes to unit cohesiveness and, in turn, operational effectiveness; and it provides a means for de-stressing. However, various factors, including security considerations and limited off-duty time, may place significant limitations upon the range and availability of activities. To help redress this situation, the deployment of Operational Fitness Equipment (OFE) as part of the OWP, together with the unit's own sports equipment (where possible) should also be considered.

⁷ 0.8m² per head (1999 planning figure).

⁸ EFI is the deployable element of NAAFI, and should be the Preferred Provider (i.e. in preference to other commercial organisations) of bar/leisure facilities for units/sub-units on deployed operations.

⁹ The JTFC is encouraged to develop an alcohol management policy to establish his guidance on the consumption of alcohol taking account of disciplinary and cultural aspects when working in multinational coalitions and in countries where alcohol is not consumed.

Sanitation and Hygiene

1B15. Service personnel are trained to maintain personal hygiene in the environment in which they will fight. Nonetheless the provision of suitable facilities is a key force protection measure for good health and as a countermeasure to biological warfare. The operational situation will dictate the practicality of providing collective sanitation, but the force protection issue must not be overlooked. There should be provision for personal hygiene with ready access to washing, toilet and other hygiene facilities. In addition, a regular and reliable laundry service will enhance both personal hygiene and the maintenance of morale.

Medical and Dental

1B16. While the requirement for medical and dental support is frequently self-evident, the J1 staff will be able to confirm the number of personnel deploying. The details of the how the support is planned, deployed, sustained and redeployed is a logistic function and is fully detailed in JWP 4-03.¹⁰

Personal Purchasing

1B17. NAAFI, through EFI and the Naval Canteen Service (NCS), is chartered to provide for the essential purchasing needs of personnel on operational deployments. They represent a key welfare support function and should be included in planning from the very outset. Close liaison between J1/J4 staffs and EFI should ensure that both are kept advised regarding planning and developments, and that the EFI detachments are configured and stocked to provide the required support. Such support comprises the provision of desirable items not provided by either the Services or the Host Nation (HN), and which are unavailable locally; typically food, beverages, aids to relaxation and personal hygiene products. In turn, EFI should be assisted, particularly in the early stages of a deployment, with the provision of premises from which to operate.

SECTION IV – WELL-BEING OF THE MIND

Overview

1B18. Morale, discipline and fitness (both mental and physical) depend in no small measure upon the ability of individuals to devote their energies primarily to the task in hand. If pre-occupied by, or not relieved of, their anxieties and worries, then they may not be fully effective or able to give their whole self to operational duties. Those who perceive that support in its various forms is available to them when it is needed will enjoy a better sense of well-being. Likewise, if Service families possess a sense of

¹⁰ JWP 4-03 'Joint Medical Doctrine'.




Figure 1B.3 – Mental Well-being

well-being, then the deployed servicemen are more likely to benefit from a similar state themselves. Everyone will live through personal crises at some stage in their lives. Although welfare services exist to help or deal with the practical and emotional aspects of these crises, personal problems should be dealt with as soon as possible. The conceptual model at Figure 1B.3 illustrates the causal relationship of variables affecting an individual's mental well-being.

1B19. Individual servicemen give their commitment in exchange for the Services' recognition of their reciprocal obligations towards personnel and their families. The Services should provide those benefits and services which ensure that they and their families enjoy a reasonable quality of life. The implications of balancing the expectations of the Services and servicemen are manifold, but the Services, for their part and at all levels, must honour their obligations by clearly demonstrating tangible and meaningful benefits and services. In the culture of the UK, part of these obligations, the TACOS, is regular remuneration in pay, allowances, leave, and the provision of family support, such as accommodation and education, and, in the long-term, resettlement and pension.

1B20. In order to provide comprehensive mental welfare support, a variety of quite different needs must be addressed. Continuing to meet the cultural expectations during operations is the bedrock of good mental welfare; failure to do so will often be revealed by family and friends at home, e.g. in letters to the press or Members of Parliament. Entertainment and off-duty relaxation are necessary, as there should still be off-duty time on all but the most intense operations; likewise, the importance of educational and personal development facilities should not be overlooked. Additionally the stresses of operations and the potential for Battleshock and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder require a stress management policy, outlined in Appendix 1B1. In the operational scenario the welfare enablers must address all such needs as an integral part of a support package.

Operational Terms and Conditions of Service

1B21. Operational Terms and Conditions of Service (OTACOS) should broadly be the same for all personnel deploying to operations. Inconsistencies are quickly highlighted by servicemen serving alongside one another and can damage morale if not corrected. OTACOS should be adjusted, where possible, to fit the operational situation with specific regard to the deployment of the operational welfare packages in austere and remote areas. Allowances will not compensate for inadequate individual sustainment; this shortfall can eventually reduce operational effectiveness.

1B22. The 3 factors which influence OTACOS on operations are: bespoke operational allowances; the OWP; and, the X-Factor. Responsibility for operational allowances and the OWP rests with MOD (SP Pol), and the Armed Forces Pay Review Body reviews the X-Factor.

Recreational Equipment

1B23. Recreational equipment, such as audio-visual equipment, videotapes and DVDs, is provided as part of an OWP package, but these may need to be purchased under single-Service arrangements from public funds as a 'get you in package' at the beginning of an operation. With a global deployment capability, this includes provision for HM Ships. The package should supplement other welfare equipment, such as board games, provided under single-Service arrangements from non-public sources.

Education and Personal Development

1B24. Aside from the most intense phases of an operation, personnel should have time to consider their professional and personal improvement. Subject to operational constraints, arrangements should be made and facilities provided (including access to the Internet) to enable deployed personnel, not only to study for and sit Service examinations, but also to undertake distance learning through, for example, the Open University and Learn Direct.

1B25. An Education Centre can provide the wherewithal for advancement and self-development through both *ad hoc* and formal tuition. The results can enhance self-esteem, assist with the maintenance of morale and help reinforce an individual's mental well-being. Once the operational situation permits, Education and Training Centres should be established.

Legal Support

1B26. On operations, legal support will be available to commanders and units at all levels. This support will primarily be concerned with operational law, including the laws of armed conflict and international humanitarian law, but, in addition, individual

personnel may require legal assistance on criminal and civil matters. For the Maritime Component in particular, guidance on the declaration of Active Service in a timely and uniform manner will have a disproportionate affect on the welfare of personnel who are eligible to receive additional pay for Active Service.

Rest and Recuperation

1B27. Rest and Recuperation (R&R) is designed to allow personnel, who may otherwise become mentally and physically exhausted by continuous service in an operational area, time to rest away from the areas of active engagement and ‘recharge their batteries’. R&R is not leave.¹¹ It should normally be taken in, or close to, the JOA. It may, however, be taken in the UK if more local options are impractical or, in either case, if the cost of repatriation makes it the cheapest option¹² and the operational situation so allows.

Leave and Travel

1B28. **Annual Leave.** Annual leave is to be granted during the leave year that it is due (the 12 month period commencing on 1 April each year), unless precluded by operational exigencies. Like periods of R&R, the aim is to refresh the body and mind to enhance operational output. In this context, an exigency of the Service is an overriding demand of military service over which Service personnel have no control and which must take precedence over the privately made plans of the individual. Commanders should encourage personnel to take leave carried forward during the following leave year.

1B29. **Leave Allowance.** On occasions when it is necessary for personnel to work during their ‘weekend’ or pre-planned periods of off-duty time, there is no entitlement to time off in lieu (TOIL). Equally, those on operations or extended exercises cannot expect a normal working week to apply. In the final analysis, the Service need must always take precedence. Although personnel have a right to expect a fair working regime, they should also understand that military life makes greater and different calls on their time than would be the case in a civilian organisation. This situation is in part recognised by the X-Factor.

1B30. **Compassionate Leave.** Compassionate leave is defined as an authorised period of absence granted to enable personnel to attend to a domestic crisis. A period of compassionate leave does not count against annual leave entitlement. The amount of Compassionate Leave, which may be awarded, is at the CO’s discretion, but it should only exceed 20 days’ in exceptional circumstances.

¹¹ Treasury delegations govern the provision of R&R; Shore Leave, for which Seagoer’s Local Overseas Allowance (SLOA) will normally be granted, is the broadly equivalent Naval version of funded R&R.

¹² Scheduled Air Transport (AT) or dedicated R&R flights should be used, where available.

1B31. **Temporary Relocation Leave.** Temporary relocation leave is an authorised period of absence in addition to annual leave granted to enable personnel to settle their affairs before proceeding and on return from a detachment (excluding courses) between theatres of 3 to 6 months. It should be noted, however, that personnel deployed on to operations (including detached duty to Falkland Islands) will not receive Temporary Relocation Leave but will instead receive Post Operational Tour Leave (POTL).

1B32. **Post Operational Tour Leave.**¹³ Individuals, returning from operational tours are to be granted post tour leave.¹⁴ This allowance is in addition to the annual leave allowance. Commanders may exercise discretion to increase the period of leave by allowing the use of days from the annual allowance. The overriding principle to be applied is one of fairness. POTL is not to be sacrificed for management reasons. The following principles will apply:

- a. POTL is to commence as soon as possible (but see sub-para 1B32d) after an individual's return from operations.
- b. Commanders are encouraged to consider building-in to post tour arrangements an acclimatisation period in barracks/establishment before commencing POTL. This will enable individuals to adjust to a non-operational environment and ensure that any necessary administration is done. Moreover, it has been shown to be effective in reducing the incidence of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.
- c. POTL is to be taken while on the strength of the unit with which the individual deployed. If a posting is imminent, the individual is not to be taken on strength at the new unit until POTL is completed.
- d. There will be circumstances where the POTL may need to be postponed for instance when the career interests of an individual require him or her to attend a course. Such postponements must be exceptional and must be agreed with the serviceman concerned. POTL is then to be taken as soon as possible (see sub-para 1B32a).

Communicating Personnel Administration Matters Within and External to the Joint Operations Area

1B33. Clear, accurate and concise lines of communication need to be established between the JOA and PJHQ to resolve individual personnel administration issues. Further lines need to be established to resolve Full Command issues including the welfare of dependants. For communicating personnel administration matters to a wide

¹³ Each Service has different terms for such leave e.g. RN - Sea Leave, RAF - Post Operational Deployment Leave.

¹⁴ SP Pol will advise on the extant POTL policy.

audience the MOD Press Secretary will provide a tri-Service co-ordinated brief or response which may be passed to single-Service Corporate Communication staffs to disseminate. Within the JOA the JTFC may consider using a Joint Force Orientation and Briefing Unit for JOA-wide dissemination.

Welfare Communications

1B34. **Constraints.** Personnel should be advised that there may be occasions when access to welfare communication facilities might be withdrawn at short notice for operational reasons. The Operations Security (OPSEC) plan must consider the implications of all forms of personal communications and address them specifically in OPSEC measures at all levels. Likewise the implications of the Communications Security (COMSEC) and Emission Control (EMCON) policies on welfare communication facilities should be considered by the J1 staff together with the relevant staff divisions. It is incumbent on commanders, as part of managing expectations, to explain in advance, why access to elements of OWP will be denied.

1B35. **Provision.** The provision of adequate, reliable and accessible communications with families is normally perceived by deployed personnel as the single most important welfare requirement to be met. Communication equipment, together with publicly-funded telephone time and an efficient British Forces Post Office (BFPO) mail service are now routinely expected; failure to satisfy the expectation could prove to be a significant de-motivator. Consequently, the requirement should be addressed in early staff planning and the facilities should, where possible, be available from the outset of a deployment. Other important modes of communication include:

- a. **E-Mail/Internet.** Many of those who deploy will use the Internet to maintain contact with home; others also may wish to make use of other facilities afforded, such as banking and e-shopping. Increasingly, distance learning is conducted via the Internet (some in-Service training courses are Internet-dependent), whilst access to newspapers and radio stations can serve both to inform and entertain. Once the operational situation allows, individuals should have access to the Internet. For those afloat, the necessary equipment may already be in place.
- b. **E-Bluey.** The e-bluey provides privacy to an e-mail, with the messages being printed off directly into sealed envelopes. Messages arriving in theatre should then be delivered to individuals through the internal mail system, whilst outgoing messages should be routed to the relevant local BFPO sorting office (Mill Hill in the UK) and forwarded on through the normal mail system. In certain operational circumstances 'fax-bluey' may be used.¹⁵

¹⁵ Fax-bluey is currently being trialled and is not formally introduced to service.

- c. **Newspapers, Magazines and Books.** Newspapers, magazines and books are an important part of the communications package and should normally be provided from the outset at appropriate scales; the availability of e-newspapers may be an acceptable alternative to printed newspapers.

Entertainment

1B36. On deployed operations, sufficient leisure time should, dependent upon the nature of the operation, be built into routines to offer opportunities for relaxation and recuperation. When confined to base (including ships) during off-duty time, personnel welcome recreational activities; this may range from individual audio-visual entertainment (radio and television) to group entertainment such as mobile cinemas and Combined Services Entertainment (CSE) shows. Off-duty relaxation and entertainment serve to both de-stress and provide a boost to morale.

Cultural Awareness

1B37. Serving in a foreign country where personnel are expected to adhere strictly to the cultural mores of the host society may occasionally affect morale; for example, an uncensored media and alcohol, taken for granted at home, are not available in some countries. It follows that care must be taken to ensure that all personnel are made aware of guidance issued by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) which stipulates the need to respect and follow local customs and, where appropriate, explains the reasons for the imposition of any local rules. FCO advice is usually reiterated in the Chief of Defence Staff or Joint Commander's Directive, the Mounting Order and single-Service preparation orders.

Casualty and Compassionate Reporting

1B38. It is vital to the mental well-being of serving personnel and their families that they can be confident that casualties and fatalities either on operations or at home will be rapidly and sensitively notified to their nominated Next of Kin (NOK). All staff should be sensitive to the speed at which the media operate and every effort must be made to ensure NOK are formally notified before they see or hear the news of a casualty or death via the media. Casualty and compassionate reporting procedures remain a single-Service function, though these are co-ordinated by the J1 staff in-theatre. An outline of the operations of the Casualty and Compassionate Organisations is at Appendix 1B2.

Repatriation of the Dead and Graves Registration

1B39. Since the Falklands conflict, it has been usual practice to repatriate the bodies of those killed in action for burial in the UK. It is a highly emotive matter. Indeed, the possible impact on the morale of both the servicemen and their families and the nation is of such the significance that the policy is usually addressed in the Directive from the

Chief of the Defence Staff. However, it will be subject to the prevailing operational conditions. As a consequence PJHQ will issue a specific instruction on the matter in the Deployed Operating Instructions.

Personal Wills

1B40. Although there is legal provision for personal wills to be completed during operations, it is preferable for such matters to be completed prior to deployment. The single-Service N1/G1 and A1 staff should encourage the completion of a will as part of the pre-deployment activity.

SECTION V – WELL-BEING OF THE SPIRIT

Overview

1B41. Each individual has a set of values which is built out of their own upbringing, culture, training within the Services and any personal beliefs. Some values are ubiquitous, such as the universal notion of ‘good’ and ‘bad’, albeit as no 2 people have an identical set of life experiences, what constitutes this specific notion varies from person to person. Such values underpin the morals of an individual and help them to decide if the cause for which they are fighting is justifiable.

1B42. The environment in which an individual is operating, and the behaviour of their colleagues and leaders can reinforce their values and help them decide on the morality of the operation. Whether the behaviours and the environment promote a feeling of ‘good’ or ‘bad’, spiritual well-being is a key component of individual and collective morale.¹⁶ Good morale will enable an individual and the Force to endure many of the hardships of military service. Moreover, individual morale can be mutually reinforcing and it is from this that the ideals of *esprit de corps* and ‘duty’ emerge.

1B43. Many individuals gain considerable resolve to endure difficulties by faith or belief. The majority of faiths and beliefs are shared by groups of people in common manner and they usually have nominated leaders. These are considered as religions. Within the UK Armed Forces there a number of recognised religions and serving religious leaders, or chaplains, support the followers. With the support of the J1 staff and the Chaplaincy, commanders are responsible for ensuring that spiritual well-being is underpinned by support and respect for both religious beliefs and the values espoused by the Services.

¹⁶ Definition of Morale: Concise Oxford English Dictionary: ‘the confidence, enthusiasm and discipline of a person or group at a particular time’. Webster: ‘a state of individual well-being based on such factors as a sense of purpose and confidence in the future’.

Values

1B44. **Recognition.** The recognition of an individual's performance, by peers, superiors and commanders can be a positive contribution towards spiritual well-being. Regular appraisal of an individual's behaviour and performance in routine duties can also identify those personnel suitable for promotion, in itself a form of recognition. Therefore, a system has evolved in the military which serves to recognise an individual's contribution to their Service and Nation. The system involves:

- a. **Appraisal Reports.** Personnel performance, good, bad or indifferent, on operations needs to be recorded and passed up the chain of command to the relevant single-Service manning agency for future promotion and appointing boards. Reports are to be completed in accordance with single-Service guidelines and can have a positive effect on both the individual's spiritual well-being and on the moral component.
- b. **Honours and Awards.** Commanders should consider eligible personnel for operational and State awards. Awards are an effective way of recognising outstanding service; they are highly respected and again have a positive effect on the moral component.
- c. **Campaign Medals.** Separate medals are struck for many campaigns and the Operational Service Medal (OSM) has been used for operations such as Sierra Leone and the global war against terrorism. Service personnel value the post-operation recognition that OSM and bravery awards formally represent and the effectiveness of medals should not be underestimated.

1B45. **Discipline.** Just as individuals wish to receive recognition for good performance they wish to see poor behaviour or illegal behaviour corrected or punished. Poor behaviour that goes uncorrected or unpunished can undermine individual and collective morale. Personnel therefore have an expectation that complaints and incidents will be investigated and, where appropriate, discipline applied. The J1 staffs have the responsibility for ensuring that the mechanisms are available in the JOA for discipline, although much of the responsibility for the application of discipline falls to the commanders. The following is guidance for all:

- a. **Complaints.** The Services have a comprehensive set of regulations regarding the processes by which servicemen can complain of their treatment by the Service or individuals. It is important that matters are promptly investigated and appropriate corrective action taken. Failure to be seen to be fair will undermine both discipline and morale.
- b. **Incidents.** In a similar manner to complaints incidents from bullying to vehicle accidents will occur. If these are not investigated in accordance with

current regulations and guidance, the values the Services wish to promote will be devalued.

c. **Incident Reporting.** All incidents will generate a demand for information, and dependant upon the scale of the incident, this may mean informing Ministers. In general, anything which influences or damages the Services, or incidents which may reflect badly on the UK or which are likely to attract media attention, are passed up to Ministers for information, along with media handling lines. All significant incidents involving UK Service personnel are to be reported up the chain of command immediately. Such incidents may be: death or serious injury (both as Killed in Action (KIA) or in other accidents), claims of causing/involvement in deaths or damage to property, accidents, deliberate attack, engagement resulting in the firing of weapons and any other incident that might draw public attention, such as: public disorder, corporate governance and equipment issues and lifestyle issues. Boards of Inquiry are to be initiated whenever an incident requires such action.

1B46. **Disciplinary Responsibility.** Discipline is a national responsibility and deployed UK forces will remain under Full Command of Commanders in Chief wherever possible. Single-Service disciplinary procedures are generally followed, although in some cases there are inter-Service attachments. It is recognised that parity of treatment is currently lacking on operations and in joint units, both for summary discipline itself and any post summary disposal action. To overcome this disparity a Tri-Service Discipline Act is being developed. The single system of summary discipline, based on the single Act, will provide common rights, procedures and penalties to all Service personnel. With the focus on operational capability in a joint environment, it is crucial that Joint Force Commanders have a system of summary jurisdiction that can be applied to all personnel under their command. The J1 and personnel administration staffs have the responsibility to administer the discipline system and advise the JTFC on issues accordingly.

1B47. **Conduct.** One of the stated values of the Services is ‘discipline’. Although a robust and respected system of discipline is fundamental to generating and sustaining military effectiveness, the best form of discipline is self-discipline. This needs to be inculcated into the attitudes and behaviour of all servicemen. To this end the Service Test¹⁷ has been introduced. It lies at the heart of the Armed Forces Code of Social Conduct but is equally applicable to all forms of conduct and is a good benchmark for self-discipline and personal conduct. It is the responsibility of all commanders to conduct themselves in such a way that they set a good example.

¹⁷ Have the actions or behaviour of an individual adversely impacted or are they likely to impact on the efficiency or operational effectiveness of the Service?

Beliefs

1B48. The serving representatives of the recognised beliefs, Chaplains, are an integral part of the J1 establishment at all levels of a Joint Force. In addition to all spiritual and pastoral matters, they will assist with many individual personnel administration matters, and especially those concerned with the preservation of the moral component.

1B49. **The Role of Chaplains.** The key role to be played by and high-value attached to Chaplains should not be underestimated - particularly in respect of their pastoral work and their proactive role in preventing welfare cases from escalating into crises. A Chaplain is multi-functional, ministering to both 'sacred' and 'secular' needs, and is a unique resource. They are able to work both within and outside the chain of command, and liaise closely with home-based agencies offering specialist welfare support. Accessibility to Chaplains is considered vital in all operational areas, particularly in their role as a 'Friend and Adviser to all'. Professional welfare workers are not usually deployed on operations and no other support agency can offer the unique commitment to absolute confidentiality given by Chaplains. They should be included on operational deployments in all major units and warships. The role of the Chaplain is explained in more detail at Appendix 1B3.

1B50. **Other Nations Values and Beliefs.** Every nation involved in a multinational operation possesses a unique cultural identity. The operation will have an amalgam of language, values, religious systems, and economic and social outlooks. Commanders should ensure that all personnel understand the reasons for the accommodation of religious holidays, prayer calls, dietary requirements and other unique cultural traditions which may be important to other participating nations.

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APPENDIX 1B1 – MANAGEMENT OF STRESS

1B1.1. A failure to manage stress appropriately can impact on morale, health and, ultimately, operational efficiency. In relation to the Armed Forces there are broadly 2 areas of stress. Those related to the peacetime workplace and those on operations. The management of both areas stress is an important function that centres on the chain of command but may involve the chaplaincy and welfare and medical services. The management emphasis should centre on prevention and early detection of adverse stress effects on health.

1B1.2. Prevention may be achieved by reducing the stressors where possible and by developing appropriate coping and support strategies. This may be achieved by the systematic preparation and training of personnel to develop stress awareness, coping skills and the use of peer-group support. Such training may be given during the pre-deployment preparations. In particular briefings on the early signs of stress may prepare those in the chain of command to identify those suffering from stress and promote a culture amongst peers and superiors which supports early access to specialist help.

1B1.3. Commanders should consider use of the following measures to counter the possible damaging effects of stress during operations:

- a. Pre- and post-deployment stress awareness briefings. Such briefings should be recorded.
- b. In-theatre specialist psychiatric support.
- c. Issuing more enduring reminders, such as leaflets, on dealing with traumatic experiences to all personnel leaving the Joint Operations Area.
- d. Providing briefing and leaflets to servicemen and their families.
- e. Providing an acclimatisation period where units remain together in barracks or their establishment prior to taking Post Operational Tour Leave (POTL). This should enable individuals to adjust to a non-operational environment and provide an opportunity for peer-group support.
- f. Retention of reservists with the units in which they served to provide a suitable acclimatisation period, avoiding premature demobilisation which may deny the individual and their superiors the opportunity to detect and deal with damaging stress.
- g. Ensuring that sources of post-operation support are identified and made available during POTL and on subsequent return to duty.

1B1.4. In the aftermath of a traumatic event, the chain of command has a number of options available for the care and well-being of their staff. The well-known adage of 'do nothing, let time pass', can, on occasions be the appropriate response when the traumatic incident is comparatively minor in nature. However, when the trauma is profound or long lasting, 'do nothing' ceases to be an option and the specialist support staff including the Medical Services must be used. The requirement to implement a stress policy is not only incumbent on commanders under the Health and Safety Act but also reflects the policy of 'best practice' for members of the Services.

APPENDIX 1B2 – CASUALTY AND COMPASSIONATE ORGANISATIONS - OUTLINE OPERATIONS

Overview

1B2.1. The Casualty and Compassionate (Cas/Comp) organisations of the single-Service provide 24 hour functional response throughout the year. These Cas/Comp Cells¹ co-ordinate procedures for all notifiable casualties worldwide, in peace, operations and war. The Cells also make recommendations and, where appropriate, arrangements regarding compassionate leave and travel for Service personnel serving overseas. Effective and efficient casualty and compassionate reporting is a key part of the moral component.

1B2.2. The Cas/Comp Cells have a critical operational function to ensure that all aspects of casualty and compassionate procedures are dealt with quickly, accurately and with due decorum. The Cells' functions are numerous and complex and demand a rigorous standard of accuracy, efficiency and timeliness. The work is dominated by 'people' issues, involving various agencies, and can be subject to turbulent political and legal requirements.² Dealing with Service personnel and their families in such circumstances has to be handled with extreme sensitivity, and many of the cases attract a high level of media and/or Parliamentary interest. Any amount of inaccuracy or delay may lead to increased distress for the relatives, and adverse public/media attention. The Cas/Comp Cells also have a surge capability in order to handle large numbers of casualty and compassionate cases that may result from protracted or intense operations or a single mass casualty incident.

Casualty Management

1B2.3. The management of casualties is undertaken by the Cas/Comp Cells in accordance with single-Service regulations³ and an associated Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) Deployed Operating Instruction (DOI). The signal advising of a notifiable casualty (NOTICAS) is the authoritative start point for creating a casualty record. The originator of the signal will depend on the operational circumstances. The signal is despatched, using the most efficient means available to a pre-determined list of addressees that includes the appropriate Cas/Comp Cell and PJHQ J1 Division. The appropriate Cas/Comp Cell will then co-ordinate all future activity for the

¹ The term 'Cas/Comp Cell' is used to refer to the various organisations within the Services that undertake the functions described. The organisations that execute these functions differ between the Services and may not be discrete entities, or known as a 'Cas/Comp Cell'.

² Of particular note was the introduction of the Human Rights Act in October 2000, designed to protect the rights of individuals.

³ BR 8886, 'RN Casualty Procedures' for RN, AC 12974, 'Army Casualty Procedure 2000' for the Army and AP 1922, 'RAF Manual of Casualty Procedures' for the RAF.

repatriation and subsequent management of the casualty. During a deployed operation and prior to the establishment of a tri-Service casualty cell, PJHQ, in consultation with the PPOs, may select one casualty cell as the co-ordinating office to record Cas/Comp data. In large-scale operations the repatriation of non-fatal casualties will be undertaken under the Reception Arrangements for Military Patients (RAMP), co-ordinated by the J4 Medical staff. Similarly, the repatriation of fatalities may be co-ordinated by the PJHQ J1 staff. The Cas/Comp Cells will verify the details of the Emergency Contact⁴ (EC) for listed casualties, and liaise with the appropriate Units and HQs to ensure that those involved in notifying the EC and any additional nominees are briefed and kept up-to-date on the casualty's status. A military officer is usually appointed to undertake the function of the notifying officer⁵ to inform the EC and any additional nominees of a casualty occurrence. For incidents involving fatalities, a second officer is then appointed to undertake the function of the visiting officer who offers longer-term support and advice to the EC. The Cas/Comp Cell will be advised of the notifying and visiting officers' details and maintain contact with them providing advice and information to ensure that the appropriate actions are completed. The visiting officer will remain in close contact with the EC, providing help and advice until the EC wishes the contact to cease. It is not unusual for the visiting officer to be assisted with these responsibilities by an appropriate Service Welfare or Regimental Association.

Compassionate Management

1B2.4. The Cas/Comp Cells are also responsible for the assessment of Service personnel (and in some cases MOD sponsored civilians) compassionate cases and, where appropriate, for the authorisation of leave and travel. Such action is considered appropriate in the event of death, illness/injury or significant welfare concern of an eligible relative where the presence of the Service person is considered necessary. The authorisation of travel at public expense and additional leave for compassionate cases will be in accordance with the prevailing policy.⁶ Once the circumstances are verified and if compassionate travel and leave is warranted, the appropriate Movements Authority, will be notified and receive the authorisation to make the necessary travel arrangements. It is the FLCs' responsibility to ensure that personnel who are given compassionate leave are returned to duty at the end of the compassionate leave period. The organisation of travel arrangements back to the deployed theatre is also an FLC responsibility.

⁴ The term Next-of-Kin (NOK) may also be used.

⁵ Each Service used different titles for the notifying and visiting officers but their functions are similar.

⁶ Either single-Service policy or policy promulgated by PJHQ in a DOI.

APPENDIX 1B3 – ROLE OF THE CHAPLAIN

1B3.1. The spiritual and moral welfare of all ranks, and especially the spiritual comfort of the sick and wounded are the responsibilities of chaplains who can make an important contribution to high morale. First and foremost chaplains remain ministers of their own churches, without whose authority they would not be permitted to conduct their normal array of duties. However within this context, their role can be as wide and varied as they and their commanders choose. They are uniquely placed as a channel of communication at all levels and all circumstances. Chaplains can act as a lightning conductor for servicemen's feelings and as a sounding board for commanders.

1B3.2. The effective chaplain is one who is a spiritual friend to the individual and a source of support and spiritual advice to the commander. The Army Field Manual describes the tasks of chaplains as being (but not exclusively):

- a. Ministry to the servicemen and Service communities.
- b. Maintaining the spiritual and moral capability of all ranks.
- c. Provide for divine services.
- d. Maintaining the highest standards of personal and corporate behaviour.
- e. Providing pastoral care and welfare.
- f. Conducting burial in the field (where this is permitted).

1B3.3. There are 2 principles underpinning the role of the Chaplaincy.¹ Firstly, to provide appropriate pastoral care for all personnel and their dependants irrespective of religion, belief or status; and secondly, to provide centres and facilities for worship, as appropriate for each Service, to enable personnel to practice their faith within reasonable constraints imposed by their respective Service. The link between spiritual needs and overall well-being means that there is an inevitable overlap between sustaining individual servicemen and chaplaincy support. Chaplains are not welfare officers yet they are part of a larger 'J1 Team' and play a key role in the pastoral support of servicemen and dependants. Chaplains are a crucial resource for commanders and servicemen. Their efforts should be focused on front line requirements and their command and control arrangements should be clearly articulated.

¹ AFOPS Personnel Strategy Guideline 21.

Pastoral Needs

1B3.4. Pastoral needs relate to the ‘whole person’ and represent the summation of an individual’s needs in many different areas. Everyone has pastoral needs, regardless of faith or religious conviction, and there is a significant overlap between the help provided to personnel and their families by welfare agencies, both professional and voluntary, and that by Chaplains. During operations the Chaplain’s proactive approach in identifying cases and providing a ‘listening ear’ is very valuable. The general availability of Chaplains in deployed units and their unique ability to offer absolute confidentiality can be a major help in preventing cases escalating to the point where a person is no longer combat-effective and may have to be repatriated.

Religious Needs

1B3.5. Whilst many people are not active members of any faith or religion, traumatic incidents will often bring out the need for spiritual support. Conversely, there are a significant number of individuals who are active in a faith or belief and would like the regular ministrations of a Chaplain, including the provision of worship. Likewise, adherents of other recognised faiths look to the Chaplain to ensure that appropriate provision is made for their religious needs. Spiritual needs will vary according to an individual’s particular beliefs and the circumstances in which they find themselves. Their needs are most likely to be acute in life-threatening situations or after traumatic incidents. The demands on the Chaplaincy will vary accordingly; the time of greatest spiritual need is likely to coincide with that of greatest pastoral need.

ANNEX 1C – THE PRINCIPLES OF PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

1C1. In helping to guide thinking on how to maximise the personnel contribution to military effectiveness, a recognised technique is to develop a set of enduring principles. Such principles should not be slavishly adhered to, or indeed regarded as a guarantee of success. However, they provide a framework for thinking, and, if applied with judgement, can serve as a guide in the planning process and offer a set of criteria against which proposed courses of action can be tested.

1C2. Personnel are part of the military resources in the same way other military materiel such as ammunition, vehicles etc are part of the fighting power. Thus, it is not surprising that the first 5 principles directly relate to the same principles for logistics. Indeed, this strengthens the relationship between the J1 and J4 roles and justifies the common practise of having a single J1/J4 staff. JWP 4-00 '*Logistics for Joint Operations*' recognises the 5 logistic principles of: **Foresight, Economy, Co-operation, Simplicity** and **Flexibility**. Slightly modified for personnel administration these are:

- a. **Foresight.** With the increasing operating tempo of modern warfare, it is essential that full and early account be taken of the needs of the Personnel area. Only by early and comprehensive planning can, for example, sufficient augmentees and welfare facilities be provided in a timely fashion. Equally, in peacetime, morale can be adversely affected if the 'people dimension' is not fully taken into account at an early stage in the decision-making process. Foresight, no matter what the operating environment, can lead to balanced, thorough planning where all the relevant factors are taken into account and at the right time.
- b. **Economy.** Personnel as a resource must be used effectively, efficiently and economically. In meeting this remit for economy of effort, methods for optimising the use of resources could include the use of Host Nation Support, Multinational Support or by providing a UK Personnel Administration Focus through the Joint Force Logistic Component or National Support Element.
- c. **Co-operation.** To implement personnel administration at every level, personnel administration cells should co-operate with each other. Services and systems of common usage at a national level in the Services should be led and provided by one Service for the use of the others. The completion of the Joint Personnel Administration project will substantially increase co-operation through a set of common procedures and supporting IT system.
- d. **Simplicity.** The simpler the plan the easier it will be to understand and implement, and the greater the likelihood it will work. Within the Personnel

area, the principle of Simplicity should apply to policy development and the way in which policies are then implemented. It is a way of creating a 'user-friendly' atmosphere and regime, and a means to developing trust, confidence and contentment.

e. **Flexibility.** Flexibility, as a Principle of War, also applies to personnel administration. At times, it may prove necessary to divert resources from one Service to another, depending on the commander's priorities. The principal criterion is that a commander must have sufficient authority over his resources to enable him to sustain the forces assigned to him.

1C3. There are a further 5 principles which must be applied in personnel administration. These are:

a. **Transparency.** Changes in people's attitudes and expectations are placing increasing pressure on both public and private bodies to offer greater transparency in the way they operate. Within the Armed Forces, this has particular resonance in areas such as career management and this demand needs to be recognised.

b. **Responsiveness.** For the Armed Forces to remain a career of first choice, and continue to retain quality people, it must be alive to the need for change and the forces that drive it. The Armed Forces need to be seen to be responsive both in terms of their willingness to adapt (when appropriate) and in the speed of their decision-action cycle. Nowhere will this principle be more important, or the effects more strongly felt, than in the Personnel area, where the Armed Forces' actions have a direct influence on the lives and well being of the servicemen and their families.

c. **Equity.** In an age where individuals are becoming acutely aware of their entitlements as well as their responsibilities, it will become increasingly important for the Armed Forces to demonstrate that the Services operate a fair regime - both at home and in the Joint Operations Area.

d. **Coherence.** Increasingly the 3 Services are operating jointly, with other nations, Non-governmental Organisations and civilians. As such the Services are operating in situations where there are ever-growing lists of national and international regulations and directives. Coherence or harmonisation needs to be introduced to ameliorate or capitalise on the differences when they affect or enhance operational effectiveness.

e. **Legitimacy.** The Armed Forces depend on the support of the British people both for their funding and the Services' ability to man to requirement. It is vital that the Armed Forces retain this support, and this in part hinges on

their ability to demonstrate legitimacy by operating within a legal framework. The Armed Forces will be judged, to a great extent, by the manner in which they operate and exercise their powers of military discipline. In a more open, litigious, modern day society, the requirement for the Armed Forces to operate within such a framework has never been greater.

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CHAPTER 2 – MILITARY STRATEGIC CONTEXT

201. Currently there are no J1 staffs¹ above the Operational Level permanently assigned to planning for operations, but it is vital that the context in which Joint Operational Personnel Administration (JOPA) operates is understood. This Chapter concentrates on personnel administration activity at the military strategic level. However, due to the overlap between the Levels of War² the activity is also described in context of the interaction with the Grand Strategic and Operational Levels. Although personnel administration matters are considered at the military strategic level they are fundamentally matters managed by the single-Service N1/G1/A1 staff. It is the outcome of the activity at the Military Strategic level in the form of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Directive and subsequently the Joint Commander's (Jt Comd) Mission Directive that shape the overall J1 effort for JOPA. This Chapter does not attempt to describe in detail the complete strategic planning process.³ Nonetheless, it does outline the personnel administration planning considerations and input to the various directives in their relevant context.

SECTION I – GRAND STRATEGIC TO MILITARY STRATEGIC CONTEXT

202. **Highest Level Planning and Direction.** The aim of the UK's national crisis management system is to provide a balanced and timely response to any situation that may occur. It is ultimately under political control. For crises that involve the military the principal body involved is the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO). The planning routine described in the following Sections is the ideal, but crisis management is usually achieved by both parallel and iterative activity at the different levels which imitates the ideal routine but delivers the necessary planning and direction in as quickly as practicable.

Defence Crisis Management Organisation

203. The role of the DCMO is to serve as the MOD's collective body for the overall management of crises. It is responsible for the dissemination of strategic direction through the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) to the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and the Component Commanders.

204. The DCMO consists of the Chiefs of Staff (COS) Committee, Central Staff of the MOD, and Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) and elements of the PJHQ. The input from the Central Staff, co-ordinated by Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) and

¹ Staff are drawn from MOD Centre and remain dedicated to each operation as required.

² BDD defines the Levels of War.

³ The Strategic Planning Process is covered in JWP 0-10 'United Kingdom Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations'. (UKOPSDOC). The planning aspects currently in UKOPSDOC will be replaced by JDP 01 'Joint Operations' and JWP 5-00 'Joint Operations Planning' due to published in April 2004.

Second Permanent Under-Secretary of State (2nd PUS), ensures the integration of military commitments with sustainable logistics, resource and personnel policies. Once agreement on the principle of UK military involvement in a crisis has been reached CDS will issue a planning directive to the Jt Comd, usually CJO.

205. Whilst the DCMO draws on Director Joint Commitments staff to provide staff for a particular crisis, J1 staff may be drawn from the military staff within Directorate of Civilian Personnel Central Human Resources Service Personnel & Establishments. In addition, advice on any personnel administration issues is available from Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Personnel) (DCDS(Pers)), DCDS (Health), Personnel Director, PJHQ, and the Front Line Commands (FLCs) of the Services. DCDS (Pers) provides advice on strategic personnel administration matters relating to crisis management and operations to ministers, the COS and the DCMO.

Chief of Defence Staff's Planning Directive

206. CDS' Planning Directive is issued to CJO on the results of high-level analysis. It is unlikely to give definitive guidance to PJHQ in every aspect and it will incorporate assumptions. Forces will not be assigned in the Planning Directive. However, the single-Service Commands are informed of the planning activity within the DCMO and PJHQ. This enables the various Command staffs, including the N1/G1/A1 staffs, to respond rapidly to any requests for information.

207. The Planning Directive allows the PJHQ, in conjunction with the DCMO, the single-Services and the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ), to conduct a Military Strategic Estimate (MSE). The MSE will derive a number of military Courses of Action (CoAs). The J1 and associated single-Service staff will have an input to the MSE. CJO will recommend one of the CoAs. The subsequent staffing by the Cabinet, CDS and the DCMO will result in CDS' Directive being issued. The Directive will nominate the Jt Comd and set the minimum strategic level parameters and constraints necessary for PJHQ to plan the selected operation in more detail.

Chief of Defence Staff's Directive

208. The Directive from CDS will detail the forces which may be assigned to the joint operation. The capabilities of the assigned forces should not reduce the planning options available to CJO unless absolutely necessary. Typically consideration will be given to force elements that have designated readiness requirements as a consequence of being earmarked for the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF). The Directive is produced with input from the contributing Services and in consultation with PJHQ; thus it is the activity that initiates JOPA.

209. The Directive provides broad direction on what CDS expects CJO and the supporting FLCs to achieve. It will detail the UK aim, the desired end-state and any

constraints applied. As CDS' Directive is a strategic document there is limited detail relevant to JOPA. The relevant section is usually one paragraph, written on the basis of advice from DCDS (Pers). An Annex may be included if this is appropriate and either the paragraph or the Annex will refer to the following areas:

- a. Command and Control.
- b. Personnel which may be assigned, including civilians.⁴
- c. Casualty and Compassionate Reporting.
- d. Repatriation of the Dead.
- e. Welfare.
- f. Prisoners of War and other detainees ie non-combatants.

210. **Single-Service's Role.** The role of the single-Services, in particular the FLCs, is to provide the force elements at the appropriate readiness to meet Defence needs and to provide advice on those elements for the strategic planning. They are involved at an early stage of crisis management. In particular they assist in determining which forces are available and suitable to be assigned to the JTFC in CDS' Directive, as well as any significant constraints such as commitments to significant exercises. Early consultation between PJHQ J1 staff and the single-Service N1, G1 and A1 staffs also allows the Services the opportunity to initiate the pre-deployment preparations.

SECTION II – MILITARY STRATEGIC TO OPERATIONAL CONTEXT

211. Within PJHQ, once ministerial permission has been granted and the CDS' Directive is received, the Jt Comd's Mission Directive⁵ to the JTFC will be written. This will form the executive document from which the JTFC draws his authority to carry out the operation. It is the key source for the JTFC's own Operational Level Estimate and Campaign Plan.⁶ The Jt Comd's Mission Directive articulates the military strategic direction given in CDS' Directive and the desired operational end-state. It includes a mission statement, commander's intent, outline concept of operations and guidance on the composition, deployment, sustainment and redeployment of the joint force. Typically it contains a detailed J1 Annex; an example of the contents is at Annex 2A. Mounting Orders (MO) will often follow, although

⁴ The UK is a signatory to the Optional Protocol (OP) to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. When finally ratified by the UN the circumstances when Servicemen under the age of 18 may be used on operations will be constrained by international law/treaty.

⁵ An example of a Jt Comd's Mission Directive is at JWP 0-10, Annex 5D.

⁶ The J1 contribution to these processes is detailed in Part III.

there are occasions when an MO will have been issued in anticipation of the detailed directive.

SECTION III – NON-COMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

212. A different planning process is associated with a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO). For each country potentially at risk of political or military unrest, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) task the MOD to prepare a Joint Planning Group (JPG). In the event of an emergency, the JPG details UK Government provision for support to or the evacuation of, entitled expatriate British personnel. The task to generate a NEO would be initiated by the FCO via the DCMO to PJHQ.

213. Depending on the potential duration of the task and the basing option, PJHQ may be required to conduct an Estimate to determine the shape and size of force, committed to the task. A short evacuation task to the nearest airhead would require few assets whereas a longer task based at an insecure airfield would clearly require a larger presence. Throughout the planning process PJHQ J1 would co-ordinate with N1/G1 and A1 as appropriate.

214. In the event of an NEO, the responsibility for JOPA would be in support of the military forces committed to the NEO, but it may extend to planning schooling, health support, visas, etc for the evacuated personnel. Further details on NEOs can be found in JWP 3-51 '*Non-combatant Evacuation Operations*'.

MILITARY STRATEGIC CONTEXT

- DCMO has the responsibility to ensure the integration of military commitments with sustainable logistics, resources and personnel policies.
- DCDS (Pers) provides advice on strategic personnel matters.
- CDS' Directive incorporates key personnel administration information regarding assigned forces, command and control, welfare (including casualty and compassionate reporting and repatriation of the dead) and PW and detainee handling.
- Jt Comd's Mission Directive includes a Personnel Annex, which is key to effective planning.

ANNEX 2A – EXAMPLE J1 ANNEX TO THE JOINT COMMANDER’S MISSION DIRECTIVE

2A1. The Mission Directive issued by the Joint Commander (Jt Comd) is more detailed than the Chief of Defence Staff Directive and typically includes a detailed J1 Annex. The directive enables the Jt Comd to direct the Joint Task Force Commander in what is to be provided and achieved. The subject headings in the detailed J1 Annex are typically as follows:

- a. Command and Control (C2).
- b. Personnel Administration:
 - (1) Field Administration Office
 - (2) Operational Location (OPLOC)
 - (3) Personnel Reporting (PERSREP)
 - (4) Receipt, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI)
 - (5) Casualty and Compassionate Procedures
 - (6) Management of the dead and mortuary arrangements
 - (7) Repatriation of the dead
 - (8) Prisoners of War (PWs)
 - (9) Detainees
 - (10) Evacuees and Displaced Persons
- c. Personnel Management:
 - (1) Personal Administration requirements:
 - (a) Age on deployment
 - (b) Premature Voluntary Retirement (PVR)
 - (c) Medical Categories (Med Cats)/Vaccination requirements/Fitness Standard
 - (d) Tour lengths
 - (e) Exchange appointments

- (2) Jurisdiction
 - (3) Discipline
 - (a) Civilians
 - MOD and other Government Departments (OGDs)
 - Contractors on Deployed Operations (CONDO)
 - (b) Customs and Excise
 - (c) Boards of Inquiry (BOIs)
 - (d) War trophies
 - (4) Pay and allowances
 - (5) Equal Opportunity
 - (6) Health and Safety
 - (7) Operational awards
 - (8) Confidential reports
- d. Welfare:
- (1) Operational Welfare Package (OWP)
 - (2) Chaplains
 - (3) Stress Management



PART II - COMMAND AND CONTROL

This Part is relevant¹ to those who will command, or be employed as, J1 staff undertaking Joint Operational Personnel Administration (JOPA). Within the Chapters the following is outlined: the command and control at the operational level, with respect to JOPA; the organisation of the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) from the J1 perspective and the likely organisation, equipment and training of the J1 staff. The JOPA role of the Joint Force Logistics Component (JFLogC) staff is also considered.

Suggested Readership	Applicable Parts			
	Part I	Part II	Part III	Part IV
Jt Comd and planning staff	✓	✓		
JTFC and planning staff	✓	✓		✓
J1 Staff	✓	✓	✓	✓
Commanders	✓		✓	
Other Service Personnel	✓			

Table 1 - Quick Reading Guide

¹ This publication has been structured to allow the use of the Quick Reading Guide. This is detailed in the Preface to this publication.

CHAPTER 3 – THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF COMMAND

301. This Chapter focuses on the operational level of command, as represented in Figure 3.1.¹ The deployment of UK forces assumes the appointment of a Joint Commander² (Jt Comd) exercising Operational Command (OPCOM)³ over the assigned forces. Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs) of the Supporting Commands retain Full Command⁴ of their forces assigned to an operation. In turn a Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) will be appointed.




Figure 3.1 – UK Command and Control Chain for Operations

¹ This should be read in conjunction with JWP 3-00 'Joint Operations' (to be replaced by a new version 'Joint Operations Execution' in Apr 04).

² See JWP 3-00 'Joint Operations' for more detail on the role of the Jt Comd (to be replaced by a new version 'Joint Operations Execution' in Apr 04).

³ 'The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. May also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander' - AAP-6.

⁴ Full Command is defined in AAP-6.

The JTFC is responsible for planning and executing the theatre campaign and will normally direct operations, including logistic support, from a Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) in theatre. He will normally have a designated Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS) to direct Joint Operational Personnel Administration (JOPA) planning and to advise him accordingly.⁵

SECTION I – PERMANENT JOINT HEADQUARTERS AND THE SERVICES

302. **Permanent Joint Headquarters J1 Division.** The J1 Division is integral to the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) staff and supports the Jt Comd; it is led by an Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS) J1/J4 with specific J1 responsibility assigned to DACOS J1. It is actively involved at all stages of the crisis management process and all stages of operations. As such, it is the pivotal J1 organisation and critical to co-ordinating the conduct of Joint Operational Personnel Administration (JOPA). As a crisis emerges a Contingency Planning Team (CPT) will be formed in PJHQ led by J5. A member of PJHQ J1 staff will be part of this CPT. The CPT will be responsible for monitoring the developing crisis and considering the operational level response. On the transition to an operation, an Operations Team (OT) is formed and a member of the PJHQ J1 staff will be part of the OT. In order to enable Jt Comd to exercise OPCOM of assigned forces PJHQ J1 is responsible for:

- a. Confirming the Forces, as formed units, and personnel individually drawn from formed units and Reserves, assigned to the operation.
- b. Identifying the constraints from a JOPA perspective e.g. acclimatisation or inoculations.
- c. Identifying the JOPA elements of the statement of logistic capability in conjunction with the J4 logistic and medical staff.
- d. Identifying the measures necessary to sustain the individual servicemen on operations, and their families at home, ie the constituents of an Operational Welfare Package (OWP).
- e. Identifying the preparation standard for personnel to deploy such as fitness standards, pre-deployment training and personal equipment.
- f. Publishing Deployed Operating Instructions (DOIs) which provide Operational level guidance for the completion of the JOPA function.

303. **The Single-Services.** The CinCs of the Front Line Commands (FLCs) (CINCFLEET, CINCLAND and CINCSTRIKE) are responsible for providing trained

⁵ The DCOS JTFHQ is usually assisted by 2 SO2 J1 staff and a small J1 support staff.

forces for joint and multinational operations. They are responsible for force preparation, force generation, training and readiness. They are not subordinate to the Jt Comd and the PJHQ but respond to them. They have a key role to play within the planning process and provide input to it prior to and during all stages of an operation. Critically, they are responsible for provision of force elements with their HQs, including personnel administration, life support and protection. These are held at appropriate readiness and able to support a range of scales of operation.

304. **N1, G1 and A1 Responsibilities.** The responsibilities of the N1, G1 and A1 branches at the supporting FLCs include:

- a. Maintaining situational awareness in order that they are as informed as possible, pending involvement in any crisis and the subsequent planning process.
- b. Being prepared to advise on readiness, and manpower availability.
- c. Providing representation on planning teams to give expert advice about manpower availability and to inform Course of Action (CoA) development.
- d. As required, generating the appropriate Component Mounting Order in conjunction with PJHQ.
- e. Ensuring that forces assigned to the Jt Comd are equipped and trained as determined by the J3 staff and capable of meeting the Notice to Move (NTM) times.
- f. Ensuring that assigned forces are deployed in accordance with the Desired Order of Arrival (DOA) and instructions from PJHQ.
- g. Sustaining deployed formations, units and detachments through the provision of replacement manpower where necessary and in accordance with priorities set by PJHQ.
- h. Sustaining families of those servicemen deployed.

305. **Director Special Forces.** Director Special Forces (DSF) is responsible to the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), through the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Commitments) (DCDS(C)), for the conduct of all UK Special Forces (UKSF) operations, exercises and deployments. DSF will provide direction on their use to the Jt Comd/CJO and the JTFC when required. DSF J1 staff will liaise with PJHQ J1 during joint operational planning and any subsequent deployment, sustainment and redeployment. He may nominate a SF Component Commander whose HQ will include an organic personnel administration capability.

SECTION II – JOINT TASK FORCE COMMANDER AND JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

306. **Joint Task Force Commander.** As a joint UK operation arises, CDS, based on the recommendation of the Jt Comd, and after consultation will appoint a JTFC. If the UK assumes the role of lead or framework nation in a multinational operation in which the UK is participating, the appointment will be as Combined Joint Task Force Commander (CJTFC) or National Contingent Commander (NCC), respectively. The JTFC will be granted Operational Control⁶ (OPCON) over the assigned forces, usually once they have arrived within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). The JTFC is responsible for planning and executing the theatre campaign to achieve his operational end state. He will normally direct operations, including JOPA support, from a JTFHQ in theatre. In multinational operations the NCC will normally sit alongside the lead nation's appointed CJTFC. JOPA support is always a national responsibility.

307. **Joint Task Force Headquarters.** A high readiness JTFHQ, with an experienced cohesive joint staff, will be required. This capability is currently provided by the standing Joint Force Headquarters (JFHQ). Under the Chief of Joint Force Operations (CJFO), it is held at the highest readiness and is the JTFHQ of choice. It is also the basis of many other potential JTFHQs. At an early stage of crisis management the JFHQ staff will provide representation on the CPT. The standing JFHQ staff incorporates a J1 staff division. This division has the resources and manning to support a JTFHQ for a small-scale operation. It will provide the core of capability for a headquarters to support a larger scale operation and can be augmented by specialist staff from the 3 services from the Combined Augmentation Manning List⁷ (CAML).

308. **Models of Joint Task Force Headquarters.** A JTFHQ will support the JTFC/NCC in theatre. The size and shape of the Headquarters (HQ) will be mission dependent. Generally, a small headquarters will be quicker and easier to deploy and established swiftly. Although a standing JFHQ is held at a high readiness to deploy, concurrency assumptions demand a flexible approach when determining how best to deliver a deployable operational level headquarters. Five principal models have been identified to achieve this:

- a. **Model A.** The standing JFHQ augmented as necessary from the FLCs, the CAML, or both.

⁶ 'The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.' AAP-6.

⁷ The CAML is maintained in conjunction with the Defence Augmentation Cell (DAC) in the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO).

- b. **Model B.** A small stand-alone headquarters comprising some or all of the standing JFHQ.
- c. **Model C.** A single-Service, deployable HQ with integrated JFHQ staff and reinforced with augmentees as necessary.
- d. **Model D.** A single-Service HQ capable of adapting into a JTFHQ.
- e. **Model E.** A bespoke HQ specific to one operation, drawing staff from relevant areas of all three Services as required.

309. **Joint Task Force Headquarters Afloat.** A capacity also exists for a Joint Task Force Headquarters Afloat (JTFHQ(A)) to be deployed on a number of capital ships including Aircraft Carrier (CVS) and Landing Platform Helicopter (LPH). An Operation Liaison and Reconnaissance Team (OLRT), as the basis of a very small joint headquarters, may be deployed on some frigates.

310. **Operation Liaison and Reconnaissance Team.** The OLRT, normally found from JFHQ staff, is deployable at any point during the planning process. Its deployment can be directed at the highest level (Cabinet Office). The OLRT fulfils an essential function and it should include a J1 element. Information is gathered by the OLRT to inform the planning process and, where necessary, to conduct early operational planning. The OLRT can form the lead element of the JTFHQ. It consists of staff officers from across the key staff branches of the JFHQ. There is always one OLRT (personnel and equipment) on high readiness, in the order of 12hrs NTM.

311. **The Components.** The Joint Task Force can be structured with up to 5 Components, these are: the Joint Force Maritime, Land, Air, Special Forces (SF) and Logistic Components (JFMC, JFLC, JFAC, JFSFC and JFLogC, respectively). Component Commanders (CC) are normally delegated Tactical Command⁸ (TACOM) of forces under command, although in certain circumstances the JTFC may elect to re-assign OPCON, subject to the agreement of the Jt Comd. The JTFC will establish the command relationships and division of responsibilities between component commanders. It is usual for the JTFC to determine that the majority of the JOPA functions are to be under the command of the Joint Force Logistic Component Commander (JFLogCC). Personnel administration in the other components will, by definition, not be 'Joint' and generally follow the predominant single-Service procedures.

312. **Joint Force Logistic Component.** The Joint Force Logistic Component Headquarters (JFLogC HQ) may be based on Headquarters 101 or 102 Logistic

⁸ TACOM is defined in AAP-6 as 'The authority delegated to a commander to assign forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority'. In this context, TACOM is the level of command normally delegated by the JTFC to his component commanders.

Brigades, or an ad hoc organisation, whose commander will act as the JFLogCC. The implementation of a JFLogC HQ incorporating J1 staff is detailed in JWP 4-00; however the details of JOPA are covered in this publication.

313. **Joint Task Force or Joint Force Logistic Component Headquarters J1 Staff.** The primary objectives for the J1 staff remain constant, no matter whether they are deployed as an integral part of the JTFHQ or the role is split with the majority of staff engaged in JOPA located with the JFLogC HQ. As discussed in Chapter 1 the objectives are to provide the JTFC with manpower as the key element of his fighting power and to sustain individuals in such a way that each is able to be a positive contribution to the fighting power. It is worth noting that collocation of J1 and both J4 Medical and Movements staff is particularly useful when managing the movement of casualties around and out of the JOA. The satisfaction of these objectives throughout the planning, conduct and subsequent redeployment of an operation is detailed in Part III.

314. **Other Headquarters.** There are a number of organisations that provide Joint Capability that may not fall within a component.⁹ These organisations are responsible for the provision of personnel administration to the elements they have deployed across the JOA. However, responsibility for overall co-ordination of JOPA remains with JTFHQ J1. It is possible that these other HQ may be co-located with JTFHQ or a Component HQ in which case the requirement may be met from resources at that location.

SECTION III – THE MULTINATIONAL DIMENSION

315. **National Responsibility.** The provision of personnel administration usually remains a national responsibility in any form of coalition. However, the principles of personnel administration call for equity, coherence and transparency. Thus, there may be a requirement for close liaison between the NCC J1 staff of contributing nations to ensure that inequalities, or perceptions of inequality, in the sustainment of individuals, including the welfare considerations, are minimised. Perceptions of inequality may undermine the morale and discipline of elements of the coalition, and clear information to all parties may assist in managing expectations.

316. **Liaison.** A simple way to overcome language and cultural barriers is to use Liaison Officers (LOs). Dependant on the role of the LOs this will bring with it additional J1 considerations, such as requests for assistance with welfare. However, in promoting mutual understanding and acceptance of cultural differences and expectations, LOs usually prove invaluable.

⁹ E.g. Joint Helicopter Command Headquarters and the Joint Nuclear Biological and Chemical Regiment Headquarters.

317. **Use of Allies' Facilities.** Where allies have provided facilities for the sustainment of their Service personnel local reciprocal arrangements for the use of the facilities may be negotiated. Such arrangements should aim to enhance the scope for and benefit to UK forces.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL COMMAND

- The organisation of the J1 staff will depend on the nature of the operation and how the JTFC chooses to delegate J1 responsibilities to the JFLogCC.
- The J1 staff within PJHQ and JFHQ work at the operational level; subject to the JTFC delegating responsibility JFLogC J1 staff may also work at the operational level.
- Throughout an operation the J1 staff will need to work closely with the single-Service N1/G1/A1 staff.
- The OLRT should include a J1 element or a staff officer with J1 responsibilities.
- In the absence of multinational doctrine, close liaison with other nation's J1 staff through a LO will help the J1 staff overcome difficulties that are the result of differences in culture and conditions of service between servicemen of different nations fighting alongside one another.

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CHAPTER 4 – J1 STAFF COMMAND, CONTROL, ORGANISATION AND TRAINING

401. The J1 staff principally co-ordinate the activities of others and manage the services others deliver in order to provide Joint Operational Personnel Administration (JOPA). The primary JOPA objectives are providing and sustaining manpower for the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC), and sustaining the individual servicemen so that they are able to be a positive contribution to the fighting power. Thus J1 staff will be involved in confirming the readiness of units and individuals with the N1/G1/A1 staffs of the contributing Front Line Commands (FLCs) and joint units. To sustain the servicemen, the J1 staff will ensure the availability of an Operational Welfare Package (OWP), which requires co-ordination with the J4, J6 and other staff. (Within the Maritime Component, the Commander-in Chief Fleet has responsibility for elements of the OWP.) Once an operation is underway, the J1 staff will co-ordinate the manpower accounting and personnel sustainment effort through the Component Commanders (CCs) and the Joint Force Logistic Component Commander (JFLogCC), respectively, or their equivalents.




Figure 4.1 – Typical J1 Command and Control Relationships

SECTION I – COMMAND, CONTROL AND ORGANISATION

402. J1 staffs at the operational level are concerned with directing support to meet the requirements of the campaign plan and subsequent operations. Only by exception or in small-scale operations are the J1 staffs concerned with the detailed management of personnel administration beyond knowing the assigned Units and their strengths. Therefore the role of the J1 staff is to control and co-ordinate all JOPA at the operational level; the relationships are shown diagrammatically in Figure 4.1. The Deputy Chief-of-Staff (DCOS) in the Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) or National Contingent Headquarters (NCHQ), or any other staff officer responsible for J1 matters, monitors performance and shapes support for future tasks. How the role is organised will depend on nature of the operation, as discussed in Chapter 3. J1 staff at the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) may assist in the production of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Directive. As the operation then matures, some J1 staff officers may move to provide continuity. Initially, J1 staff officers may assist in the Military Strategic Estimate (MSE) and the Chief Joint Operations (CJO) or Joint Commander's (Jt Comd) Mission Directive. The officers may then move on to the JTFC's staff and, finally, if the JTFC delegates some of the J1 tasks to the JFLogCC, on to the JFLogC staff. Where no such continuity exists, ideally key J1 staff will be briefed at PJHQ prior to deployment.

SECTION II - ESTABLISHMENT

403. The J1 establishment needs to be sufficiently robust and experienced to deal with the considerable number of JOPA actions. PJHQ J1 will provide advice on where the deployed J1 main effort might be carried. During large-scale operations, a J1 focal point in the Joint Operations Area may be required to co-ordinate the service activity and to act as a warning and reporting organisation for PJHQ and the MOD. However, the exact composition will depend on the purpose, scale and likely duration of the operation. Experience has proved that J1 is not considered sufficiently before the deployment. However, once deployment starts a number of J1 issues will emerge. These invariably concern the Operational Welfare Package (OWP) and administering the system recording the Operational Location (OPLOC) of the personnel. The establishment should be headed by an SO1, as a minimum, wherever possible. Experience has also shown that the inclusion of a Chaplain within the J1 Division is of considerable benefit. For enduring and medium scale deployments, and above, a Senior Force Chaplain should be appointed to co-ordinate, in theatre, the provision of chaplaincy services and to work with the JSU Northwood Chaplain, as the PJHQ focal point, and the FLC co-ordinating chaplains.

404. A large number of organisations and agencies are involved in the provision of the welfare enablers that form much of the OWP. A dedicated J1 officer is therefore needed to act as the focal point to co-ordinate the welfare provision. On all but small-

scale deployments, it would be appropriate for welfare co-ordinators to be appointed at component and formation level. Consideration should be given to the appointment of welfare co-ordinators at unit headquarters as well.

SECTION III – EQUIPMENT

405. Other than space, typical office equipment, communications and Office Automation (OA), J1 staff may need access to the 3 Services manpower accounting systems¹ to meet the requirement for accurate manpower reporting and OPLOC. Mobile telephones and laptop computers, as a suitable temporary OA, may be appropriate interim equipment. Close liaison with the J6 staff will ensure the J1 Information Exchange Requirements (IER) are not overlooked.

SECTION IV – TRAINING AND DOCTRINE

406. J1 training is accomplished within PJHQ as part of the Deputy Chief of Joint Operations (Operations Support) (DCJO(Ops Sp)) exercise programme. DCJO(Ops Sp) is the 2* PJHQ focus for joint operational standards and exercise planning programme. The joint exercise programme is designed to practise and test nominated staff in their roles whether acting nationally or as part of an alliance/coalition. The Joint Operations Planning Course² provides key staff with an overview of the planning process. Specific training in the J1 area should include the single-Service manpower accounting and tracking systems, casualty/compassionate reporting, the information systems in use in the various joint headquarters, and the sustainment of personnel³ on operations. In addition, key J1 staff should be briefed at PJHQ prior to deployment.

407. PJHQ is responsible for lessons from current operations passing into Joint Doctrine and the Defence Programme via the Directorate for Strategic Support, the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, the established procedures and inter-Service and Command liaison.

¹ Until the implementation of a deployable Joint Personnel Administration (JPA) System, the methodology for delivering personnel administration and the supporting systems will continue to be managed on the basis of an individual's own Service. PJHQ J1 will select one of the 3 Services' systems as the co-ordinating platform for the JOA from which the PERSREP will be constructed and passed to PJHQ.

² The course is currently held at HMS Dryad.

³ The Framework for Sustaining Individuals is at Annex 1B.

J1 COMMAND, CONTROL, ORGANISATION AND TRAINING

- The role of the J1 staff is to control all JOPA activity at the operational level, principally by co-ordinating the tactical level activity.
- How the J1 staff are organised will depend on the size of the operation and how the JTFC chooses to organise his HQ.
- The J1 staff should be led by an SO1 as a minimum and include a Chaplain.
- Typical office equipment with OA should suffice at the initiation of a deployed operation, but close liaison with the J6 staff should be established to ensure the IER is available for the appropriate specialist support systems as soon as possible.
- As no JOPA system exists specific training should be considered for the OPLOC and casualty reporting systems.



PART III - JOINT OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

This Part will be of most interest¹ to staff employed in the J1 role, their commanders and the commanders who will interact with the J1 staff. It details the roles and responsibilities of the J1 staff, as well as others, at the operational level from planning through to redeployment. Chapter 5 details the roles and responsibilities associated with Joint Operational Personnel Administration (JOPA) planning and pre-deployment activity. Chapter 6 gives further detail on the JOPA responsibilities with respect to the subsequent activities of deployment, sustainment and redeployment.

Suggested Readership	Applicable Parts			
	Part I	Part II	Part III	Part IV
Jt Comd and planning staff	✓	✓		
JTFC and planning staff	✓	✓		✓
J1 Staff	✓	✓	✓	✓
Commanders	✓		✓	
Other Service Personnel	✓			

Table 1 - Quick Reading Guide

¹ This publication has been structured to allow the use of the Quick Reading Guide. This is detailed in the Preface to this Publication.

CHAPTER 5 – JOINT OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION PLANNING AND PRE-DEPLOYMENT ACTIVITY

501. This Chapter examines the planning and preparation necessary for Joint Operational Personnel Administration (JOPA) on a joint operation. It offers an overview of the role of the J1 Staffs in JOPA and handling Prisoners of War (PW) and then details the general division of JOPA responsibilities.

SECTION I – OVERVIEW OF THE J1 ROLE

502. Within the Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO), Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), Joint Task Force Headquarters (JTFHQ) and Component Commander (CC) Headquarters (HQ), the allocated J1 staffs have the responsibility for ensuring the JOPA objectives, and those for handling Prisoners of War (PW),¹ are met throughout the conduct of an operation. JOPA has 2 primary objectives: the provision and sustainment of manpower² for the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and the sustainment of the individual servicemen.³ With respect to JOPA, the J1 role may appear to be one of co-ordinating the delivery of information, services and facilities by others. However, the staff have the on-going responsibility for ensuring that reports, information, services and facilities are available and appropriately managed. The staff are responsible for advising their commanders of the shortfalls and, most importantly, the likely operational impact. The J1 responsibilities regarding PW are summarised below for completeness.

503. The objectives of JOPA, are not mutually exclusive. For example, the J1 staff may direct that the pre-deployment briefings, given by the Front Line Commands (FLCs), are used both, to ensure that the servicemen are correctly trained and equipped, and to ensure that the servicemen receive adequate information on the welfare support available to them and their families during the operation. A representation is shown in Figure 5.1.

¹ See JWP 1-10 '*Prisoners of War Handling*'.

² Manpower as a key element of the Concept of Fighting Power is detailed at Annex 1A.

³ A Framework for Sustaining Individuals is at Annex 1B.




Figure 5.1 – Tasks Related to the Primary Objectives of Joint Operational Personnel Administration

Prisoners of War Handling

504. JWP 1-10 '*Prisoners of War Handling*' details the responsibilities of the commander and the J1-J9 staff, within the JTFHQ and the Joint Operations Area (JOA), regarding the appropriate treatment of PW. Within this document it is not intended to replicate the advice given in JWP 1-10, but merely to draw attention to the J1 role.

505. J1 staffs have overall control of the PW Handling Organisation and are assisted by J3 and J4 with operational, logistic and medical issues respectively. However, specific J1 responsibilities include:⁴

- a. Formulating policy on PW work in line with the policy guidance issued by MOD Service Personnel Policy Operations and Welfare (SP Pol O&W) and when appropriate, in conjunction with the J3 and J4 staff, identifying suitable work projects.
- b. Developing policy for the handling of PW within the JOA in conformity with the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 1977 Geneva Protocols and other relevant International Law, the Manual of Military Law Part III, JWP 1-10, JSP 383 and JSP 391, in conjunction with the Legal staff.⁵
- c. Issuing instructions for the safe custody, medical examination and treatment, welfare and discipline and evacuation of PW from the JOA.

⁴ JWP 1-10.

⁵ This will include liaison with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

- d. Nominating staff to run PW Collecting Points and PW Camps within the JOA area and the issuing of orders for the operation of these facilities.⁶
- e. Determining the status of captured personnel and convening Boards of Inquiry where necessary in order to determine the status of a PW.
- f. Arranging for the transfer of PW to other nations and from other nations and Services.
- g. Arranging for the repatriation of PW during and after hostilities.

SECTION II – RESPONSIBILITIES

J1 Responsibilities

506. The initiation of the operational level planning activity, and the context in which it occurs has been covered in the Part II. When planning at the operational level, the JTFC conducts an Estimate⁷ and develops a Campaign Plan.⁸ The J1 staffs are engaged in the estimate and campaign planning processes and invariably develop a Personnel [Administration] Element to the Estimate and a Personnel [Administration] Annex to the Campaign Plan. The checklist of planning considerations at Annex 5A will assist. As planning sets the foundation for subsequent activities, the basics which need to be addressed at the outset are:

- a. A thorough understanding of the strategic and operational objectives early in the planning process and how they are refined as mission requirements change over time.
- b. A thorough understanding of the estimate process, the selection process for a Course of Action (CoA) and the development of plans to support the mission objectives in order to:
 - (1) Ensure that JOPA requirements are adequately identified and prioritised relative to the J2- J9 staff input.
 - (2) Ensure that requirements for manpower, in particular, specific skills such as language or specialist training and knowledge are identified.

⁶ Recording the location of PWs, internees and detainees on the selected Operational Location (OPLOC) system will be included in the orders for operating PW facilities.

⁷ JWP 3-00 'Joint Operations' details the process for compiling the Joint Estimate. This process will be subsumed by JWP 5-00 'Joint Operations Planning' after its publication in Apr 04.

⁸ JWP 3-00 details the process for completing a Campaign Plan. Again, this process will be subsumed by JWP 5-00.

- (3) Ensure that the welfare enablers are planned and ordered early as there are long lead-in times for some of the enablers.
- (4) Ensure that adequate provision exists for a PW Handling Organisation.⁹

Other Organisation Responsibilities

507. To meet the objectives the following are responsible for contributing specific elements to JOPA:

a. MOD.

- (1) The Secretary of State (S of S) for Defence and Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) establish policy, assign responsibilities (through the CDS Directive), and prescribe procedures to include manpower readiness, reserves, PW handling and general personnel administration (manpower tracking, casualty and compassionate and welfare enablers).
- (2) The Defence Medical Services (DMS), under the direction of Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Health) (DCDS(Health)), are responsible for the provision of medical policy guidance and, through the J4 Medical planning, services.
- (3) Service Personnel Policy (SP Pol) is responsible for setting overarching operational welfare policy, under the direction of Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Personnel) (DCDS(Pers)) and the Principal Personnel Officers (PPOs) of the Service Personnel Board. SP Pol is also responsible for:
 - (a) Providing MOD agreement to specific operational welfare policy formulated by the Joint Commander (Jt Comd)/Chief of Joint Operations (CJO).
 - (b) All policy matters pertaining to Broadcasting Services and the provision of live shows.
 - (c) Navy Army and Air Force Institutes (NAAFI).
 - (d) Rest & Recuperation (R&R) policy.
 - (e) Operational Terms and Conditions of Service (OTACOS).

⁹ JWP 1-10 covers this aspect in detail.

b. **Single-Services.** The Front Line Commands (FLCs) have primary responsibility for providing personnel, usually in formed units, to support the joint operation. This includes responsibility for the mobilisation of Reserves. The FLCs are responsible for the provision and maintenance of non-public funded welfare equipment, to supplement the publicly funded welfare package. They also provide advice and support to the PJHQ regarding the detailed formulation of the Operational Welfare Package (OWP). As such they are responsible for the implementation of policy regarding and/or the delivery of:

- (1) Publicly funded fitness equipment (Army lead).
- (2) Post-Operational Tour Leave (POTL).¹⁰
- (3) Additional carry-over of leave.
- (4) Family welfare support and travel entitlements.
- (5) Expeditionary Forces Institute (EFI) (Army lead).

c. **Service Manning Agencies.** Through the PPOs, the manning agencies develop single-Service plans, policy and guidance on manpower and personnel administration issues.

d. **Directorate Command and Battlespace Management.** Directorate Command and Battlespace Management (D CBM) – CBM J6 Ops leads on policy for the provision of welfare communications means, in consultation with SP Pol.

e. **Directorate of Equipment Capability (Combat Service Support).** The Directorate of Equipment Capability (Combat Service Support) (DEC(CSS)) is responsible for making provision for welfare facilities within the Statement of Requirement (SOR) for Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure (ECI), including the provision of facilities specifically for the Expeditionary Forces Institute (EFI).

f. **Headquarters Adjutant General.** HQ AG is the tri-Service lead on policy for the provision of fitness equipment, whilst the PJHQ is responsible for its maintenance in theatre.

g. **Joint Commander/Chief of Joint Operations.** For operations and exercises which take place under the direction of Jt Comd/CJO, the JHQ/PJHQ J1 staff are responsible for:

¹⁰ Note for RN personnel POTL is Leave Due.

(1) The formulation of the operational welfare input to the Personnel and Administration Annex of the Jt Comd's Mission Directive, in consultation with SP Pol.

(2) The implementation of welfare support, in line with MOD policy. This includes the provision of:

- (a) Welfare telephone allowance.
- (b) Free newspapers and magazines.
- (c) R&R (in conjunction with Defence Transport and Movements Agency (DTMA)).

h. **Specific Welfare Services.** The following are responsible for the implementation/delivery of the following operational welfare services:

(1) **Defence Communications Services Agency (DCSA):** welfare telephones (and Internet) for private use.

(2) **British Forces Post Office (BFPO):** mail, Forces free aerogrammes ('blueys') and 'e-blueys'.

(3) **NAAFI/EFI/Naval Canteen Service (NCS):** retail and leisure facilities (facilitated by HQ LAND and FLEET respectively).

(4) **Services Sound and Vision Corporation (SSVC):** British Forces Broadcasting Service (BFBS) Radio and TV, Combined Services' Entertainment (CSE) shows and Forces Cinema.

(5) **Education and Training Service (ETS) Library Service:** Services Library Service.

SECTION III – PLANNING ACTIVITY

Personnel Element of the Estimate

508. The Personnel Element is a vital part of the commander's estimate and essential in developing the optimum CoA for a military response to a situation. The basis of the Estimate comes from the directives which have been issued by CDS, the Jt Comd and the JTFC, and from any relevant reconnaissance reports or similar sources of information e.g. media, Internet and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) reports. Information on the preparation of a personnel administration element of an estimate is at Annex 5B. The Personnel Element is the key to the J1 staff meeting the 2 objectives of JOPA. The J1 staff will need to address the following:

- a. **Manpower.** In co-ordination with J3, the J1 staffs are responsible for determining manpower requirements for the joint force and the HQ (including J1 Division itself). The manpower planning activity is discussed later; however, other than British regular forces, manpower¹¹ will inherently bring constraints that must be acknowledged in the Estimate.
- b. **Manpower Accounting and Tracking.** Manpower accounting should include provision for all Service personnel, MOD Contractors on Deployed operations (CONDO) and other civilians for whom MOD have responsibility (including other contractors), foreign exchange personnel and PW.¹² Similarly, casualty/compassionate reporting,¹³ mortuary management, repatriation of the dead or graves registration¹⁴ should also be considered. These and other activities associated with the Operational Location (OPLOC) of personnel are J1 staff responsibilities from deployment until the redeployment following the operation is complete.
- c. **Sustainment of Servicemen.** Sustaining servicemen must be an element of the Estimate, as many of the welfare enablers have logistic implications that must be accounted for by the J4 Division. Moreover the lead times for the provision of some facilities, can influence the manner in which sustainment of the individual servicemen is accomplished. For example the provision of food, accommodation and some recreational facilities by letting contracts with hotels in a Host Nation (HN) may substantially reduce the requirement for similar expeditionary facilities.

Campaign Plan Annex

509. The selection of a CoA by the JTFC will follow the Estimate process. The selected CoA will be refined into a Campaign Plan by all the staff divisions with the J5 staff leading. This Campaign Plan will incorporate an Annex to identify personnel administration support. The Annex will identify the command responsibilities. Moreover, functional arrangements for providing JOPA should be described and defined. See Annex 5C for guidance.¹⁵ The information for the Annex is derived from the Estimate process and the, invariably concurrent, planning activity.

¹¹ Manpower may include Reserves, Service Exchange Personnel and others.

¹² JWP 1-10 covers this subject in detail.

¹³ Casualty and Compassionate Organisations - Outline Operations are at Appendix 1B2.

¹⁴ PJHQ has a comprehensive set of Deployed Operating Instructions (DOIs) covering the procedures for Casualty/Compassionate Reporting, Operational Personnel Reporting, Mortuary Management, Repatriation of the Dead, and Graves Registration.

¹⁵ Planning will be covered comprehensively in JWP 5-00 'Joint Operations Planning' (Due to be published in April 2004).

Manpower Planning

510. The single-Service FLCs are responsible for providing the manpower to the operation and the CDS and Jt Comd's Directives will identify the units and/or capabilities which may be assigned to a Joint Force. These directives may also cap the number of personnel to be assigned. The manpower capping may become a significant constraint¹⁶ on the JTFC's chosen CoA. The planning process should identify the full manpower requirement and initiate the sustainment of that manpower through planned roulement or the mobilisation of reserves. Manpower planning is key to the construction of the Joint Force Element Table (JFET).

511. Assigned units may have manpower and skills shortages that need to be filled before they can be ready for operations. Although the single-Services have the primary responsibility for providing personnel, including the mobilisation of Reserves, J1 is responsible for planning, directing and co-ordinating the efforts of the Service components to optimise manpower for the joint operation.

512. There are a number of sources of skilled manpower, including from other regular units. However, each source of manpower brings with it certain constraints that must be recognised and managed. For example, the mobilisation of Reserves takes time, and usually requires ministerial approval. The sources, and the typical constraints they incur, are detailed in Annex 5D.

513. At the planning stage, the J1 staff will need to ensure that the manpower requirements are fully identified. There is inevitably a requirement for additional HQ staff for example, and equally some functions, such as PW handling¹⁷ or Media Operations, can be manpower intensive. Planning for contingencies is vital.¹⁸ Concurrent operations or the likelihood of concurrent operations may both constrain the manpower available for the operation and demand specific contingency planning with regard to skills that are vital or in short supply.

Planning for Manpower Accounting and Tracking

514. Accurate and timely manpower tracking, OPLOC, informs the operational commanders of the forces involved in an operation. Moreover, Ministers have visibility of the size of force they have committed. Recent experience has highlighted the need to track personnel carefully in operational theatres to enable the Department to answer questions relating to environmental or medical queries. Accounting for individual servicemen also enables the casualty and compassionate reporting system to

¹⁶ The UK is a signatory to the Optional Protocol (OP) to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. When finally ratified by the UN the circumstances when Servicemen under the age of 18 may be used on operations will be constrained by international law/treaty.

¹⁷ JWP 1-10 covers this subject in detail.

¹⁸ In the 1991 Gulf War, the numbers of PW subsequently overwhelmed the 3 battalions assigned to PW Escorting and Guarding duties in support of one division and the American PW chain was used to assist.

operate efficiently. Currently an OPLOC capability is directed by SP Pol and is then passed to the single-Services to conduct. A new and more comprehensive manpower tracking capability is being developed, under the direction of SP Pol for introduction in 2006.

515. Planning and implementing a JOA OPLOC system is a J1 responsibility. The planning will need to determine which personnel: civilians, deployed contractors and others, such as NGO representatives, are to be included. The PW Handling Organisation will need a similar manpower accounting system. The daily routine of the Personnel Report (PERSREP) and the accuracy of the OPLOC system will be the cornerstone for almost all the J1 activities.

Individual Sustainment Planning

516. **Division of Responsibility.** Planning to sustain personnel with food, water and accommodation is a J4 responsibility. However, increasing emphasis has been given to sustaining individuals in a more holistic manner,¹⁹ i.e. physically, mentally and spiritually, with a package of welfare enablers commonly known as the Operational Welfare Package (OWP) and guidance on managing stress and alcohol consumption. Planning the OWP and issuing stress and alcohol management policies are J1 responsibilities. J1 share responsibility with the legal staff for upholding discipline and the speedy investigation of incidents, usually by Boards of Inquiry.

517. **Welfare Co-ordination.** During the planning phase of an operation, and ideally at regular intervals thereafter, SP Pol should brief the senior welfare co-ordinator²⁰ within PJHQ on all aspects of the OWP. Where possible the respective FLC staff officers and JTFHQ J1 representative should be in attendance. Once deployed, and to enable the co-ordination to be properly and appropriately supported, it is essential that functional links up through PJHQ (and the FLCs, if appropriate) to SP Pol²¹ are retained.

518. **Expectation Management.** Many of the demands for welfare support will be generated not by a genuine need but because there is an expectation that certain facilities and services will be available. By synchronising the welfare plans with both the operational activity, and the briefings given to commanders and the servicemen, the level of expectation can, to some extent, be managed. Good leadership at the tactical level and sound judgement by an appointed welfare co-ordinator can be used to highlight the true welfare needs during planning and subsequently.

¹⁹ The framework for the holistic sustainment of individuals is detailed in Annex 1B.

²⁰ See paragraph 404.

²¹ Within MOD SP Pol, a dedicated staff officer directs and prioritises policy for operational welfare support to all JOA.

519. **Criteria for Operational Welfare Support.** Operational welfare support, in the form of an OWP, is provided to all personnel deployed on qualifying operations, exercises and other deployments. These comprise:

- a. Operations with a designated name, under the operational command of the PJHQ, and for which a MOD directive has been issued.
- b. Maritime deployments which are expected to last for 2 months or more away from the UK.
- c. Other UK operational, exercise or military task deployments outside the country in which personnel are normally based and which are expected to last for 2 months or more, by formed units/ships and/or individual Service personnel under the operational command of NATO, PJHQ or the single-Service Commands.
- d. Exclusions are as follows:
 - (1) Personnel on operations in the UK; for example, those engaged in providing Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA), for which separate welfare provision will be made on a case-by-case basis.
 - (2) Northern Ireland (NI), which has in place specific welfare support systems developed incrementally over the years.

520. **Operational Welfare Package Planning.** Welfare guidelines are given at Annex 5E; this Annex provides a planning guide, dependent upon the duration of the deployment, and also shows where responsibility for the policy and delivery of each welfare enabler lies. Regulatory and affordability issues have to be considered for each operation and experience has shown that operations differ in their welfare requirement. SP Pol can generally agree a package of welfare enablers within 24 hours of a request from PJHQ, in time for those departing with advance parties to be briefed. Annex 5F plots the provision of operational welfare enablers against a framework of Welfare Support Phases. Identifying timelines, and realising the provision of many aspects of an OWP is normally a Joint Force Logistic Component (JFLogC) responsibility; thus it may be useful to apply the logistics planning considerations of destination, demand, distance and duration (the 4 Ds).²² Whatever, it must be recognised by all that operational priorities may delay the implementation of the planned OWP. ‘Paradoxically, the more taxing the deployment, when an OWP would be of most benefit, the more difficult it is likely to be to ensure delivery’.²³

²² More detail may be found in JWP 4-00 ‘*Logistics for Joint Operations*’.

²³ Comment from a recent post-Operations report identifying lessons for the future.

521. **Welfare Support Phases.** For the purposes of planning welfare support provision the division into planning, deployment, sustainment and redeployment activities can be too coarse. Therefore, it may be beneficial to consider the operation divided into 6 phases. The phases provide a structure against which welfare facilities should be provided;²⁴ although the phases are discrete, there should be a seamless transition between them from the welfare perspective. These phases are shown diagrammatically at Figure 5.2. It must be emphasised that the phases serve as a planning guide and should not be rigidly imposed.




Figure 5.2 - Welfare Support Phases

522. **Stress Management Policy.** The stress management policy²⁵ should be developed as part of the planning activity and the resources (medical, chaplaincy,²⁶ and others) for Battleshock and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) included in

²⁴ The Naval component at sea may experience little difference in conditions aboard when moving from exercise to operational deployments. On the assumption that the basic physiological needs are catered for throughout a maritime deployment, the additional operational welfare requirements for maritime deployments should therefore be considered as being at the follow-on and sustained stages where welfare needs are enhanced to the full package.

²⁵ An outline guide to the Management of Stress is at Appendix 1B1.

²⁶ The Role of the Chaplain is explained in more detail at Appendix 1B3.

the planning. The policy and resources will need to be in place from deployment through to redeployment.

523. **Alcohol Management Policy.** Consideration should be given to the early development of an alcohol management policy. Working in coalition with forces that do not tolerate the consumption of alcohol will heavily influence this, but the driving consideration should be maintenance of well-being, particularly morale and discipline.

524. **Boards of Inquiry and Police Investigations.** The J1 Staff should ensure that Boards of Inquiry are initiated whenever an incident requires such action. The progress of a Board must be tracked with periodic updates provided to PJHQ. Records of major and contentious police investigations should be recorded and copied to higher formations where necessary.

SECTION IV - PRE-DEPLOYMENT ACTIVITY

Preparation of Manpower

525. **Preparation Standards.** It is the responsibility of the individual FLCs to ensure that their personnel are correctly prepared to deploy on a PJHQ-led operation. Preparation will be based on specialist advice and may include location specific training. FLCs should ensure that their respective Unit administrative staffs advise them, in good time, of an inability to prepare an individual for an operational deployment, in accordance with the pre-deployment preparation standards. To effect this there will need to be communication between the J1 Staff and the relevant N1/G1/A1 staffs and specialists. For example, early agreement with the medical staff²⁷ on, and promulgation of, medical pre-requisites such as fitness categories and inoculations programmes can ensure the maximum availability on manpower.

526. **Mounting Order.** The Jt Comd will nominate the appropriate FLC as a Mounting HQ.²⁸ The Command will be responsible for issuing an operation specific Mounting Order or Preparation Instruction to detail pre-deployment training, medical preparation, transport arrangements, and weapon requirements. This information will be disseminated during the Planning Phase and will be updated as required. Responsibility for collating and distributing the information rests with G3/N3/A3 within the Command providing the Mounting HQ in consultation with PJHQ J1 staff. Single-Service staffs may wish to provide their own pre-deployment information based on these instructions.

527. **Health Surveillance.** Overall health surveillance is the remit of Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (Health) (DCDS (Health)). The DMS are responsible for

²⁷ JWP 4-03 'Joint Medical Doctrine' addresses the aspect medical planning in detail.

²⁸ JWP 4-00 addresses the functions of a Mounting HQ in detail.

completing an environmental risk assessment of the JOA. However, to prevent individuals deployed to an operational theatre being unnecessarily exposed to health risks, such as asbestos or malaria, the relevant J1/N1/G1/A1 staffs are responsible for ensuring that the Mounting Order includes the appropriate medical advice, from the J4 Medical staff, on protective measures that individuals can take. For example, where possible individuals should be advised to avoid areas prevalent with the risk to health and the Mounting Order must also detail requirements for inoculations and the need for any protective clothing. DCDS (Health) staff will conduct any subsequent Health Surveillance programme.

Preparation of Individual Servicemen

528. **Personal Preparations.** The deployment of servicemen requires collective and individual pre-deployment training, briefing and equipping. Throughout this phase commanders have a responsibility to ensure that their personnel are adequately prepared for their deployment. This should include all personal administration matters including the updating of wills, adjusting pay allotments, life insurance, banking, nomination of emergency contacts and persons to be notified in the event of serious injury or death, and other arrangements.

529. **Briefing.** From a professional standpoint, UK servicemen are renowned for their positive attitude to operations. However, detailed orientation will always be needed for specific deployments. The orientation is in 2 parts: the first is to do with ensuring that individuals and their families are aware of the welfare provisions to maintain their well-being; the second is to inform those deploying about the JOA, this is usually given as part of the deployment activity. The briefing for larger operations may be helped by the provision of a guide, produced locally in leaflet form. The briefing will draw on the earlier planning and should help set expectations for welfare support at a realistic level. Every effort should be made to ensure that personnel are briefed and any issues are addressed in advance of the deployment.

530. **Families.** Welfare support to the families is especially important from the outset. Indeed, it is an integral part of the OWP. However, families need to be kept informed and may also require some support during lengthy tours, particularly those who are young, have dependant children or relatives, or who are geographically isolated. Whilst unit welfare officers and/or welfare organisations should ensure that information is passed on to families, a locally produced information leaflet will assist with this remit. In particular, for the families of those who do not deploy with formed units and who do not usually benefit from organised unit briefings, it is particularly important as it ensures that information is passed in a timely and proper manner. If families are aware of what to expect and what those deploying will receive in the form of welfare support, they will be better prepared emotionally for the tour. In turn, the emotional preparation of the family will be reflected by those actually deployed.

PLANNING AND PRE-DEPLOYMENT ACTIVITY

- Planning and thorough pre-deployment preparation are the foundation for all subsequent J1 activities; the development of the Personnel Element of the Estimate and Personnel Annex to the Campaign Plan are the products of this work.
- The Personnel Element of Estimate will identify the manpower requirements and effort that will be needed to sustain the servicemen; constraints such as the use of reservists or the lead-time for certain welfare enablers must be considered as part of the process.
- Once the requirements are identified the J1 staff will be responsible for overseeing and co-ordinating the activities of the FLCs to provide manpower and the FLCs and other providers of welfare support.
- Comprehensive briefing of individual servicemen and their families, as to the support that will be available to sustain them during the operation, will shape their expectations and prepare them all for any hardship.

ANNEX 5A – PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

SECTION I – CONSIDERATIONS PRIOR TO AN OPERATION

Prior to an operation, the preparatory work mainly covers the directives. This will in itself identify such issues as manpower requirements. The need for J1 involvement in the reconnaissance (recce) party will be discussed at this stage. PJHQ J1 will always seek to be present or represented on a PJHQ led reconnaissance.

Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Directive.

Joint Commander's (Jt Comd) Directive.

Joint Task Force Commander's (JTFC) Directive.

Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) as required.

Reconnaissance:

- Mounting Order.
- Manpower:
 - Identify requirements.
 - Identify Provider.
 - Raise requirement.
 - Track.

Manpower Reporting.

Deployed Operating Instructions.

Individual sustainment.

- Identify Policy and Qualification for Operational Welfare Package (OWP).
- Food and Accommodation requirements.

Briefings for deploying formations.

Directives will be raised and recce to be confirmed.

SECTION II – RECONNAISSANCE

When the recce is conducted, many issues will be covered but not necessarily resolved in theatre. Each heading must be considered to ensure questions can be answered on return; some subjects not required but the list may be changed to reflect requirements. The vast majority of work falling from the recce will be identified whilst away but conducted on return to PJHQ.

Command and Control and J1 Establishment

How does J1 fit into HQ C2 structure and link to the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC)?

Investigate J1 establishment requirements.

- Consider inclusion of Chaplain.
- Short-term reinforcements may be available from PJHQ (J1) establishment for specialist areas.

Jointery/Harmonisation

Are there any areas that could be harmonised to achieve greater operational effectiveness prior to deployment?

Manpower Provision

Is augmentation required? Identify requirement.

What is the augmentation plan?

Dispute handling.

Ensure respective governments clear Service Exchange Personnel.

Manpower Accounting

Need for Mounting Centre.

- If used, how will it be used?

Implement Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) for all including visitors.

- How will it operate?
- Who will operate it?
- What will the briefings cover?

What are the arrangements for Interim Operational Location (OPLOC)?

- Linked to the RSOI or MC.
- All personnel must log into and out of the Joint Operations Area (JOA).
- Efficient OPLOC will inform a health surveillance study.
- Daily Personnel Report (PERSREP) required.

Requirement for a tri-Service casualty cell (to include Civil Servants) working to one format, one set of procedures and policy.

- Deployed Operating Instructions (DOI) provides this – talk through the DOIs.

Mortuary management.

Only one point of exit/receipt for/of information in theatre.

Prisoners of War (PW)/Detainees/Evacuees.

- JWP 1-10.

Individual Sustainment

Expectation management.

Nomination of a welfare champion.

Collocation of welfare amenities.

Set up a simple audit system to ensure the system works and each of the locations are receiving what they need to maintain reasonable welfare levels.

Physical Welfare.

- Climatic considerations.
- Accommodation J1/J4.
- Personal protective equipment.
- Sustenance, principally J4, but numbers to be sustained.
- Physical recreation and relaxation.
- Personal Hygiene.
 - Laundry/Shower Bags.
 - J4 Issue but highlight and attempt to investigate (long delivery sometimes).
- Medical Preparation.
 - Inoculations, anti-malarial prophylactics to be considered (contained in J4 Med directive).
 - Med issues although J4 need to be highlighted.
- Personal purchasing.

Mental Welfare.

- Operational Terms and Conditions of Service (OTACOS).
- Ensure consistency where possible.
- Recreational and leisure facilities.
- Entertainment.
 - DVD/Video films:
 - ◆ Quantity.
 - ◆ Delivery
 - Newspapers.
 - Books.
 - Other Forms of Entertainment.
 - ◆ Type.
 - ◆ Quantity.
- Expeditionary Forces Institute (EFI).
- Education and personal development.
- Legal support.
 - Wills.
- Rest and Recuperation (R&R).
- Leave and travel.
 - Compassionate leave.
 - Post-operational Tour Leave (POTL).
- Communications.
 - BFPO.
 - E-Mail.
 - E-bluey.

- Telephones.
- Ensure distributed fairly.
- Disposable system or card for life.
- Radios/TV BFBS.
 - Publicly funded.
 - SSVC Op Welfare Fund possibly.
- Casualty and Compassionate Reporting.
 - Repatriation of Dead.
 - Grave Registration.

Spiritual Welfare.

- Recognition.
 - Confidential Report.
 - Honours and Awards.
 - Campaign Medals.
- Discipline.
 - Complaints.
 - Incidents.
 - Reporting.
 - Investigation including Boards of Inquiry (BOI).
- Responsibility/Jurisdiction.
- Conduct.
- Beliefs.
 - Chaplains.
 - ◆ Pastoral care.
 - ◆ Spiritual care.
 - Multinational beliefs and values.

Extra Joint Operations Area Issues

Dependants travel at public expense and various 'at home' issues will be raised.

Full recce report to be raised highlighting concerns and problems.

SECTION III - J1 AREAS FOR FURTHER ANALYSIS

Following the recce and further considerations being taken into account, more detailed planning will be undertaken to fully complete directives. Additional input and more detailed information to cover all headings will be covered.

Confirm Level of Information

Directives highlight what is expected:

- CDS to Jt Comd (minimal content but with priorities highlighted).
- Jt Comd to JTFC (more in-depth content – meat on the bone – and what PJHQ expects to be achieved and the general outcome of actions).
- JTFC to Force (in-depth this is what the Force will achieve and – generally – how).

Manning (augmentees, Non-Formed Unit (NFU)).

OWP authorisation.

Joint Task Force Commander's Directive to be Given

JTFC is personally responsible to ensure the following is actioned for all UK Forces under command which **includes** all MOD Civil Servants, Commonwealth Forces, exchange officers and – increasingly – contractors.

J1 will need to cover:

- Operational effectiveness.
- Discipline.
- Morale.
- Security.
- Policy on visitors to theatre.
- Status of deployed civilians.
- PW.
 - Detainees/Displaced Persons.
- Welfare (this is increasing in priority with every operation we plan for and execute).

Personnel Administration to be Covered

Command and Control (C2).

Manpower Provision.

- Personnel.
 - Age on deployment.
 - Training standards.
 - Residual service.
 - Restrictions on Premature Voluntary Release.
 - Medical category for deployment.
 - Tour lengths.
 - Roulement.
 - Battle Casualty replacements.
 - Exchange appointments.

Manpower Accounting.

- Theatre Field Admin Office (TFAO).
- OPLOC Tracking.
- Personnel Reporting.
- Casualty and Compassionate Reporting.
 - Management of the Dead.
- PW.
- Detainees.
- Evacuees.
- Attached members of a Commonwealth Force.
- Accompanying Civilians.

Sustainment of Individuals.

- As in Section II - Reconnaissance.

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ANNEX 5B – THE PERSONNEL ELEMENT OF THE ESTIMATE

Overview

5B1. The Estimate is the foundation for the commander's decision to select a Course of Action (CoA). The staff directorates analyse and refine each CoA to determine its supportability. The thoroughness of these staff elements to the Estimate¹ helps determine the success of the military operation.

5B2. Not every situation needs an extensive and lengthy planning effort. In some cases a commander can review the assigned task, receive oral briefings, make a quick decision, and direct the writing of a Campaign Plan in message format. Given an uncomplicated task, this could complete the process. However, most joint operations demand a thorough, well co-ordinated, plan necessitates a complex staff estimate process. Although written staff estimate elements are not mandatory, most will be carefully prepared and co-ordinated and fully documented.

5B3. The purpose of the personnel element is to collect and analyse relevant information for developing (within the time limits and available information) the most effective solution to a problem. J1 assists the commander in reaching a decision by determining whether a particular operation or mission is supportable from a personnel perspective. The estimate process is applicable to any operational situation and to any level of command.

Responsibilities

5B4. The PJHQ J1 is responsible for preparing the personnel element of the estimate and recommending a CoA from a personnel perspective.

Procedure

5B5. During the personnel estimate process, J1 will:

- a. Review the mission and situation - mission, enemy, terrain and weather, time, troops available and civilian considerations - from a personnel perspective.
- b. Identify the decision criteria that relate to the personnel arena.
- c. Analyse these decision criteria with respect to each CoA, identifying advantages and disadvantages from a personnel point of view.

¹ The Estimate Process is covered in JWP 0-10 'United Kingdom Doctrine for Joint and Multinational Operations'. JWP 0-10 will be replaced by Joint Doctrine Publication (JDP) 01 'Joint Operations' in Apr 04. Detailed coverage of the Estimate Process will be in JWP 5-00 'Joint Operations Planning' also programmed for publication in Apr 04.

d. Compare CoAs to one another based on advantages and disadvantages of each. Use a worksheet or matrix, if helpful, to display advantages and disadvantages and analyse their relative merits.

e. Conclude whether the mission can be supported and which CoA can best be supported.

5B6. A suggested personnel estimate format is at Appendix 5B1.

APPENDIX 5B1 - SUGGESTED PERSONNEL ESTIMATE ELEMENT FORMAT

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PERSONNEL ELEMENT OF ESTIMATE NO ____

- REFERENCES:
- A. Maps and charts
 - B. Other pertinent documents

1. **Mission.** State the mission of the command as a whole, taken from the commander's mission analysis, planning guidance, and other statements.
2. **Situation and Considerations**
 - a. **Characteristics of the Operational Area.** Summarise data about the area, taken from the intelligence estimate or area study, with specific emphasis on significant factors affecting personnel activities.
 - b. **Enemy Forces.**
 - Strength and Dispositions. Refer to current intelligence estimate.
 - Enemy Capabilities. Discuss enemy capabilities, taken from current intelligence estimate, with specific emphasis on their impact on personnel matters.
 - c. **Friendly Forces.**
 - Present Disposition of Major Elements. Include an estimate of their strengths.
 - Own Courses of Action. State the proposed CoA under consideration, obtained from operations or plans division.
 - Probable Developments. Review major deployments necessary in initial and subsequent phases of the operation proposed.
 - Status of Replacements and/or Augmentees.
 - Civilian Considerations.
 - d. **Logistic Situation.** State known logistics problems, if any, which may affect the personnel situation.

- e. **Command, Control, Communications and IT Situation.** State the command, control, communications, and IT situation, emphasising known problems that may affect the personnel situation.
- f. **Assumptions.** State assumptions about the personnel situation made for the estimate. Because basic assumptions for the operation already have been made and will appear in the planning guidance and in the plan itself, they should not be repeated here. Certain personnel assumptions which have been made in preparing this estimate should be stated here.
- g. **Special Features.** List everything not covered elsewhere in the estimate which may influence the personnel situation. For example, identify civil and indigenous labour resources available or essential to support military operations.
- h. **Personnel Situation.** State known or anticipated personnel problems which may influence selection of a specific CoA.

3. **Personnel Analysis of Own Courses of Action.** Make an orderly examination of factors influencing the proposed CoAs to determine the manner and degree of that influence and to isolate the personnel implications which should be weighed by the commander in the Estimate of the situation. Include consideration of any foreign languages, and urgency of need.

- a. Analyse each CoA from personnel point of view. The detail in which the analysis is made is determined by considering the level of command, scope of contemplated operations, and urgency of need.
- b. Decision criteria establish the elements to be analysed for each CoA under consideration. Examine each CoA realistically and include appropriate considerations of climate and weather, terrain, hydrographic, enemy capabilities, and other significant factors which may have an impact on the personnel situation as it affects the CoAs.
- c. Throughout the analysis, keep personnel considerations foremost in mind. The analysis is not intended to produce a decision but to ensure that all applicable personnel factors have been considered.

Comparison of Own Courses of Action

- 4. List the advantages of each proposed CoA - from the J1's point of view.

Conclusions

- 5. Do not restate the preceding work, simply:

- a. State whether or not the mission set out in paragraph 1 can be supported from a personnel standpoint.
- b. State, which CoA under consideration can be best supported from the personnel standpoint.
- c. Identify the major personnel-related deficiencies which must be brought to the commander's attention. Include recommendations of methods to eliminate or reduce the affects of those deficiencies.

ANNEXES:

(By letter and title). Use annexes when information is in graphs or is of such detail and volume which inclusion in the body makes the estimate too cumbersome. Annexes should be lettered sequentially as they occur through the estimate.

DISTRIBUTION:

(According to procedures and policies of the issuing headquarters)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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ANNEX 5C – CAMPAIGN PLAN SAMPLE TEMPLATE FOR PERSONNEL ANNEX

The following format and guidance should be followed in preparation of Campaign Plan Annex XX – ‘Personnel’.

CLASSIFICATION

HEADQUARTERS

DATE

ANNEX XX TO OPLAN XXXX-X PERSONNEL.

REFERENCES: Cite the references that are necessary for a complete understanding of the Annex.

1. **General**

- a. **Mission.** A clear, concise statement of the personnel objectives in support of the basic plan.
- b. **Concept of Personnel Support.** State the general concept of personnel support for the forces assigned to support the Operation Plan (OPLAN). The Joint Task Force Commander’s (JTFC) intent security and communications security planning guidance for personnel matters addressed in the Annex. In particular, provide guidance to ensure that personnel actions promote essential secrecy for the JTFC’s intentions, military capabilities, and current activities. Also, addressing arrangements to support the conduct of military deceptions and psychological operations (PSYOPS). Consider the following: Direct personnel support of UK military forces is provided through UK Service channels, whether or not forces are transferred to operational control of a multinational HQ (United Nations (UN), NATO, or other appropriate organisation). Component commanders (CCs) will co-ordinate directly with combatant command HQ for individual augmentation requirements and keep the combatant commander informed of major personnel problems. Combatant commanders will provide guidance as required to clarify ‘theatre unique’ situations and to co-ordinate the efforts of Service component personnel systems.
- c. **Assumption.** State any assumption that could influence the feasibility of the personnel annex of this plan. If any assumptions are critical to the success of the plan, include alternative CoAs.

d. **Planning Factors.** Refer to and use approved Service personnel planning factors and formulas for reserve and active duty component forces except theatre experience or local conditions favour otherwise. When deviating from approved methods, identify factors used, and reasons for such use.

2. **Personnel Policies Procedures**

a. For areas in which guidance is not provided or in which conflicts arise, the Joint Force Commander (JFC) will provide the necessary information and/or guidance as required to ensure adequate support to the plan.

b. **Specific Guidance.** Co-ordinate with supporting commanders and Service component commanders on the items listed below. For each subheading, state policies and concepts, assign responsibilities, and cite applicable references and inter-Service support agreements.

- **Individual Augmentation.**
- **Joint Personnel Reception and Processing.**
- **Operational Location (OPLOC) tracking.**
- **Personnel Accountability and Strength Reporting.** Joint force and component commanders will conduct personnel reporting procedures as directed by the combatant commander.
- **Rotation Policies.** The JTFC should consider establishing a tour length and roulement policy.
- **Non-combatant Evacuation Operation Repatriation Policies.** Include requirements for execution of dependent-care and reception plans.
- **Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, Retained Personnel, and Other Detainees.**
- **Formerly Captured, Missing, or Detained Personnel.**

- **Operational Welfare Enablers.** This paragraph should address responsibilities for initial, follow-on, and sustainment support of welfare enablers. Additionally, funding sources for welfare support should be addressed here including Service funds. Stress Management and Alcohol Management policies should be articulated.
- **Casualty Reporting.** Normal Service casualty reports will be made in accordance with individual Service directives.
- **Decorations and Awards.**
- **Pay and Allowances.** The combatant commander or the JTFC will determine the form of subsistence and address other unique pay and allowance issues.
- **Travel Procedures.** Include passport, visa, and theatre clearance requirements.
- **Medical Evacuees Returned to Duty.** Personnel evacuated for medical reasons will be returned to duty as expeditiously as medically practical IAW component and/or Service directives. Component commands co-ordinate with Services for replacements for those personnel unable to return to duty.
- **Leave policy.** E.g. special leave accrual.

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ANNEX 5D – MANPOWER SOURCES

Front Line Commands

5D1. The Front Line Commands (FLCs) retain the responsibility for providing manpower to joint operations. However, the J1 staff may be called upon to resolve manpower issues by co-ordinating actions between the FLCs. The J1 staff and the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) also need to be aware of the inherent constraints associated with manpower from sources other than the regular forces.

High Readiness Units

5D2. To provide a rapid and escalating response to urgent demands for military capability a pool of highly capable force elements are held at very high readiness. The most significant of these are the elements of the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF). As the elements are at high readiness the only constraint likely to be associated with manpower is time, time for planning, deployment and acclimatisation.

Front Line Units

5D3. Not all units within the FLCs are declared as High Readiness Units. The other units will be able to offer military capability but are likely to require time for pre-deployment training. In addition the units may be under strength and require augmentation from other units within the FLCs.

Augmentation

5D4. JWP 3-00 '*Joint Operations*'¹ provides details of the deployable headquarters and components established, as part of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR), to meet the JRRF concept established for expeditionary operations. In the event of deployment these headquarters require pre-planned augmentation to operate effectively. The provision of augmentees for headquarters and formed units will be managed by the Defence Augmentation Cell (DAC). FLCs have a responsibility to nominate and train personnel for these appointments, the appropriate headquarters have a responsibility to ensure that the nominated individuals participate in familiarisation training and appropriate training opportunities.

Reserves

5D5. The Reserve Forces consist of the Regular Reserve and the Volunteer Reserve Forces: Royal Naval Reserve (RNR), Royal Marines Reserve (RMR), Territorial Army (TA) and Royal Auxiliary Air Force (RAuxAF). Members of the Regular Reserve have a liability for call-out as a result of their commissions or engagements in the

¹ JWP 3-00 '*Joint Operations Execution*' is programmed for publication in Apr 04.

regular forces. Members of the Volunteer Reserve Forces accept a liability for training and call-out into permanent service. In addition, there are individuals who have completed their regular engagements and any necessary service in the Regular Reserve forces and have a liability for recall to regular service up to a defined age by virtue of statute or by being in receipt of retired pay or a pension.

5D6. The Reserves fulfil an increasingly vital operational role. In line with SDR they are now employed as an integral part of the armed forces to provide a surge capacity at times of increased operational activity as well as to fill skills gaps that are only critical in time of operations. Call-out of individuals from the Reserve Forces takes place under the Reserve Forces Act 1996 (RFA 96), as can the recall of Reservists with a liability for Service, provided that a Call-out Order is in place; this requires Ministerial assent. Volunteers may come forward for call-out. However, all call-out and recall is compulsory in order to provide the safeguards for Reservists and their employers for which provision is made in RFA 96.

5D7. Call-out under RFA 96 is constrained by the nature of the emergency, which in turn constrains the period for which the call up may last as follows:

- a. A maximum of 3 years service extendable to 5 in any 6 years under Section 52, i.e. in the event of national danger or great emergency;
- b. A maximum of one year in any 3 extendable to 2 years in any 3 under Section 54, i.e. in the event of warlike operations in progress or preparation;
- c. A maximum of 9 months in any 27 months under Section 56, ie for the protection of life or property outside the UK or on operations anywhere in the world for the alleviation of distress or the preservation of life or property in time of actual or apprehended disaster.

5D8. Volunteers from the Reserves can also be employed on Full Time Reserve Service (FTRS) commitments, on part-time Additional Duties Commitments (ADC) or they can be provided by the Services as a contribution from their Man Training Day (MTD) allocation. Reserves employed on FTRS or ADC are constrained by the terms of their contracts for each type of service. The use of MTD allocation is highly flexible, an individual will work a specified number of days within a time period but there is no firm commitment from the individual in terms of an uninterrupted period of service.

5D9. There is, in addition, a High Readiness Reserve category; members of either a Volunteer Reserve Force or of the Regular Reserve who accept, as a special arrangement and with the agreement of their employer, renewed annually, liability for very short notice call-out. There are also Sponsored Reserves, contractor's staff who are furnished as part of a contract between their employer and MOD which stipulates

that employees operating under the contract and which continues during operations must be members of a Reserve Force. The call-out of Sponsored Reserves is usually delegated from Ministers to the single Services.

5D10. The key constraints for Reserves are the duration for which they may be called to serve, the contract or terms under which they serve, the method by which they are called out, and most importantly the absence of a Service Welfare system in their normal day-to-day lives. This final constraint can be significant when ensuring that widely dispersed families are provided with adequate welfare support during an operation. Finally, the employers of Reservists can appeal against their call-out and this may have an effect on the individuals, not least curtailing their period of call-out which the responsible FLC will have to make good. Further details on the call-out and employment of Reserves are in single-Service publications.

Service Exchange Personnel

5D11. A number of front line units incorporate personnel from other nations operating with British forces as part of an agreed exchange plan. The employment of such servicemen from other nations in operational theatres requires prior approval from the appropriate Embassy/High Commission.² This is to ensure that the appropriate nation is content to be represented on the operation and to ensure that the host nation has no difficulty with the nationality of the individual deploying. Authority is to be obtained through single-Service chains of command. In order to achieve the requisite permissions, Unit administrative staffs are to seek authority as soon as possible, but no less than one week before deployment. The responsibility rests with the Parent Unit of the individual concerned to ensure that the Exchange Serviceman is prepared and trained in accordance with the Mounting Instruction for the operation. The matter of security clearances should also be addressed as part of this preparation.

Serving Foreign Nationals

5D12. Other nationals, whether from Eire, the Commonwealth or elsewhere, are enlisted or commissioned into the UK Armed Forces. Where such personnel are deployed, it may be necessary to inform the host nation of their presence. The matter is usually covered in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the UK and the host nation (HN). Alternatively, the operation may be conducted under an authority which does not require any declaration, e.g. as UN forces.

² The Embassy or High Commission will also need to be informed in the event of death of one of their nationals.

Roulement Management

5D13. To maintain a commitment for a prolonged period while ensuring operational effectiveness and without placing undue strain on the personnel concerned, it is essential to maintain a pool of forces to rotate through the deployed force. During the Planning Phase the duration of Unit and individual deployment is determined and is based on single-Service regulations such as currency requirements on aircraft simulators to prevent skill fade for aircrew. The responsibility for arranging the roulement of personnel to include sufficient handover periods rests with FLCs. Nonetheless the J1 staff should ensure the roulement plans prepared by the FLCs are consistent with the JTFC's requirements.

ANNEX 5E – OPERATIONAL WELFARE PACKAGE GUIDELINES[⊗]

Serial	Allowance ¹	1- 4 Mths	4 Mths plus	6 Mths plus	9-12 Mths	12 Mths plus	Lead	
							Policy	Implement
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
1	Additional Carry over of Leave ²	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	MOD – SP Pol	Commands
2	BFBS Radio Broadcasting ³	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	MOD – SP Pol	PJHQ/SSVC
3	BFBS TV Broadcasting ³	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	MOD – SP Pol	PJHQ/SSVC
4	CSE Shows	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	MOD – SP Pol	PJHQ/ SSVC
5	EFI/NAAFI	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	MOD – SP Pol	PJHQ/ LAND
6	Electronic Bluey ⁴	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	D Def PCS	CE BFPO
7	Extra Family Travel Warrant (UK) ⁵	No	2	2	2	2	MOD – SP Pol	Commands
8	Family Travel from Abroad ⁶	No	1	2	3	4	MOD – SP Pol	Commands
9	Fitness Equipment ⁷	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	PS4(A)	LAND/PJHQ
10	Forces Free Aerogrammes (Blueys) ¹⁰	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	MOD – SP Pol	CE BFPO
11	Internet Facilities ⁸	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	MOD – ICS Ops	DCSA
12	Newspapers	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	PJHQ	PJHQ/Theatre

[⊗] SP Pol/current DCIs must be consulted to ensure that the above detail reflects the most recent policy directives.

¹ The listed points are guidelines and not a right. Authority will have to be granted during the planning stages and will depend on the nature and security of each operation.

² Subject to single-Service approval, Service personnel may carry forward leave entitlements in excess of the existing 15 days maximum. RN retain the authority to authorise leave after sea service (LASS) when leave cannot be taken due to Service commitments.

³ If within existing satellite footprints.

⁴ Deployed when the infrastructure allows.

⁵ To visit parents, parents-in-law or nominated NOK. Does not apply to Seagoers for whom single Service allowances apply.

⁶ Can be exchanged for parents, parents-in-law or nominated NOK to visit families abroad. Does not apply to Seagoers for whom single Service allowances apply.

⁷ Non-electric fitness machines presently scaled as one pack per 120 individuals.

⁸ Facility to access the Internet.

Serial	Allowance ¹	1- 4 Mths	4 Mths plus	6 Mths plus	9-12 Mths	12 Mths plus	Lead	
							Policy	Implement
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
13	Post Operational Tour Leave (POTL) ⁹	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	MOD – SP Pol	Commands
14	Provision of E-mail	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	MOD –SP Pol	PJHQ/Theatre
15	R & R ^{10/11}	No	Yes ¹²	Yes	Yes	Yes	MOD – SP Pol	Theatre
16	Services’ Library Service ¹³	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	MOD-SP Pol	PJHQ/ETS Library Acquisition Services
17	TV, Video, DVD, Video Tapes, DVDs ¹⁴	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	MOD – SP Pol	PJHQ
18	Welfare guide for Service personnel and their dependants/families Guide ¹⁵	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Single Services	2SL/AG/AMPH Qs or Commands ¹⁶
19	Welfare Telephone Allowance ^{10/17}	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	MOD – SP Pol	Theatre

⁹ Army personnel pro-rata and then 4 weeks after a 6-month tour. Other Services extra time off depending on length of tour, e.g. RAF POTL earned from 2-month point, for RN – Seagoers Leave.

¹⁰ To comply with Treasury Guidelines.

¹¹ 4-6 months - 1 period, 7-10 months - 2 periods, 11-13 months - 3 periods. RN retain SLOA when in foreign ports in lieu of R&R.

¹² Treasury Guidelines state that tours are to be ‘over 4 months’ before R&R may be taken. That does not quite fit on the matrix, but is to be adhered to.

¹³ Scale of 1 book per 4 men/women per month.

¹⁴ One television, one video recorder and 10 videotapes may be purchased for every 30 personnel as a ‘get you in package’ at the beginning of an operation.

¹⁵ Leaflet form, explaining the operational welfare support that is available to the deployed Service person and their dependants/families.




¹⁶ This differs between Services and in the RAF HQSTC would have the lead. Some information in the RAF would be produced at local level.



¹⁷ 20 minutes talk time a week to authorised destinations.





ANNEX 5F – GUIDE FOR OPERATIONAL WELFARE ENABLERS PROVISION ¹




OPERATIONAL WELFARE PROVISION		TIME/WELFARE SUPPORT PHASES					
Dimension	Enabler	PLANNING/ PREP PHASE	BUILD UP PHASE	INITIAL PHASE	FOLLOW-ON PHASE	SUSTAINED/ ROULEMENT PHASE	REDEPLOYMENT PHASE
Physical Welfare	Publicly Funded Physical Fitness Equipment	PJHQ/UK LAND/Single-Service Commands - feasibility - scaling - allocation. UK LAND to authorise drawing up from storage or procurement.	Theatre to identify unit locations for equipment. UK LAND arrange for deployment to Theatre.	Once firm, units identify real estate to position equipment.	When it can be accommodated equipment moved to Theatre under direction of UK LAND and installed in unit accommodation	Continue.	At conclusion of op UK LAND arrange for maintenance and storage.
Physical Welfare	Leisure Bars (EFI)	MOD/PJHQ/Land Command: liaison and plan.	Mobile facility.				Recover equipment under direction of commands.


¹ This table is for planning guidance and is not intended to convey entitlement or precise timing.



OPERATIONAL WELFARE PROVISION		TIME/WELFARE SUPPORT PHASES 					
Dimension	Enabler	PLANNING/ PREP PHASE	BUILD UP PHASE	INITIAL PHASE	FOLLOW-ON PHASE	SUSTAINED/ ROULEMENT PHASE	REDEPLOYMENT PHASE
Physical Welfare	Welfare Equipment	Single-Services to liaise with non-public funds Trustees.	Single-Services to liaise with non-public funds Trustees and issue eqpt.				Recover equipment under direction of commands.
Physical Welfare	Personal Purchasing - EFI Shop	Mobile facility.				Allocated retail/recreational space in semi-permanent camp.	Close down and recover equipment.
Mental Welfare	Audio-Visual Equipment	MOD/PJHQ/ Land Command: liaison and plan.	Initial issue followed by an issue of replacement tapes/DVDs on a scale of 1:50 per month.				Recover equipment under direction of commands.

OPERATIONAL WELFARE PROVISION		TIME/WELFARE SUPPORT PHASES 					
Dimension	Enabler	PLANNING/ PREP PHASE	BUILD UP PHASE	INITIAL PHASE	FOLLOW-ON PHASE	SUSTAINED/ ROULEMENT PHASE	REDEPLOYMENT PHASE
Mental Welfare	Deployment of Telephones	<p>PJHQ plans and liaises with DCSA.</p> <p>DCSA tasks the contractor with the provision of telephones system.</p>	Contractor deploys and installs equipment in consultation with JTFHQ J1 staffs.	Contractor re-deploys assets in consultation with JTFHQ J1 to ensure best coverage around JOA.	Continue	<p>Contractor, in consultation with JTFHQ J1, provides max coverage to all camps and bases around JOA.</p> <p>Maintain equipment.</p> <p>Withdrawal of surplus equipment.</p>	End of Op Contractor to liaise with JTFHQ J1 to provide staged withdrawal of equipment.
Mental Welfare	Publicly Funded Weekly Phone Time	CJO to confirm with MOD that deployment will comply with Treasury Delegations and that publicly funded telephone time will be provided.	Personnel in receipt of weekly publicly funded telephone time.			Continue. CJO review to ensure conditions of deployment continue to meet with Treasury Delegations for provision of publicly funded telephone time.	Continue until personnel withdrawn.

OPERATIONAL WELFARE PROVISION		TIME/WELFARE SUPPORT PHASES 					
Dimension	Enabler	PLANNING/ PREP PHASE	BUILD UP PHASE	INITIAL PHASE	FOLLOW-ON PHASE	SUSTAINED/ ROULEMENT PHASE	REDEPLOYMENT PHASE
Mental Welfare	Deployment of e-mail/ Internet	As above.			Installation begins.		As above.
Mental Welfare	Mail (including e-bluey)	CJO to confirm with MOD that deployment will comply with Treasury Delegations for Forces Free Aerogrammes ('blueys')/ e-blueys/ Concession Parcel rates. CE BFPO issues intrs and BFPO number.	Blueys, e-blueys and parcels at concessionary rates for family mail. Deployment of PCS Ops.			Continue. CJO to review to ensure conditions of deployment continue to meet with Treasury Delegations in respect of mail concessions.	Continue until personnel withdrawn.
Mental Welfare	Mobile Cinema	MOD/PJHQ/ Contractor planning & procurement.	Contractor deploys mobile cinema to APOD and/or SPOD.	Contractor re-deploys into JOA on instructions of JTFC J1 staff.			Withdraw at conclusion of op.

OPERATIONAL WELFARE PROVISION		TIME/WELFARE SUPPORT PHASES 					
Dimension	Enabler	PLANNING/ PREP PHASE	BUILD UP PHASE	INITIAL PHASE	FOLLOW-ON PHASE	SUSTAINED/ ROULEMENT PHASE	REDEPLOYMENT PHASE
Mental Welfare	Live Entertainment (CSE)	PJHQ/ Contractor live show planning. Live show contracts placed.	Live show(s) in APOD/SPOD as contracted (Contractor to coord with JTFC J1).	No live shows.	Live show(s) as contracted in JOA (Contractor to coord with JTFC J1).	Live show(s) as contracted in camps/bases (Contractor to coord with JTFC J1).	Live shows to end on a timeframe agreed with JTFC J1.
Mental Welfare	Newspapers	CJO issues instructions	Newspapers issued on a ratio of 1:10.				
Mental Welfare	Library Books	CJO liaises with the Army Library Service.	Library books initial issue, followed by an issue on a scale of 1 book per 4 individuals per month.				

OPERATIONAL WELFARE PROVISION		TIME/WELFARE SUPPORT PHASES 					
Dimension	Enabler	PLANNING/ PREP PHASE	BUILD UP PHASE	INITIAL PHASE	FOLLOW-ON PHASE	SUSTAINED/ ROULEMENT PHASE	REDEPLOYMENT PHASE
Mental Welfare	Radio & TV Broadcast	<p>PJHQ/ Contractor planning -coverage -feasibility -frequency allocation.</p> <p>MOD authorises procurement. PJHQ authorises provision of TVs, VCRs or DVD players and videos or DVDs.</p> <p>Broadcasting equipment procurement.</p>	<p>Contractor deploys and installs Radio & TV satellite receivers & low power transmitters.</p> <p>Public scaled provision of: TVs, VCRs or DVD players and videos or DVDs.</p> <p>Broadcast radio and TV to deployed personnel.</p>	<p>Contractor re-deploys assets as required by JTFHQ J1 to ensure best coverage around JOA.</p> <p>Continue to broadcast.</p>	<p>Contractor deploys mobile radio studio (for major ops only) to JTFHQ.</p> <p>Continue to broadcast with addition of locally produced radio.</p>	<p>Contractor re-deploys assets as required by JTFC J1 to provide max coverage to all camps & bases around JOA.</p> <p>Continue to broadcast full service.</p> <p>Test & maintain equipment.</p> <p>Withdraw surplus equipment to UK.</p>	<p>At conclusion of Op contractor withdraws assets in liaison with J1 JTFC.</p> <p>Continue to broadcast until departure.</p> <p>Recover equipment.</p>

OPERATIONAL WELFARE PROVISION		TIME/WELFARE SUPPORT PHASES 					
Dimension	Enabler	PLANNING/ PREP PHASE	BUILD UP PHASE	INITIAL PHASE	FOLLOW-ON PHASE	SUSTAINED/ ROULEMENT PHASE 	REDEPLOYMENT PHASE
Mental Welfare	R&R	PJHQ to clear authorisation of R&R with MOD. Recce Group to seek R&R location in JOA region. If none available, authority should be obtained from MOD for travel to UK.	No R&R.	No R&R.	Instigation of R&R. Length of R&R period at Comd's discretion. One R&R for those serving more than 4 months in JOA. Second period for those with expectation of serving between 7 and 10 months inclusive and third period for those expecting to serve more than 11 months.		R&R concludes.

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CHAPTER 6 – JOINT OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION DEPLOYMENT, SUSTAINMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES

601. The post-planning activities for Joint Operational Personnel Administration (JOPA) are detailed in this Chapter. These activities are the deployment of a Joint Force to the Joint Operations Area (JOA), the sustainment of the Force whilst in the JOA and, finally, the redeployment of the Force from the JOA.

SECTION I – DEPLOYMENT ACTIVITY

Manpower - Provision, Sustainment and Accounting

602. Once the manpower has been identified there will be last minute shortfalls following individual bereavements, accidents and illness. Although the onus to make good shortfalls lies with the Front Line Commands (FLCs), the J1 staff may need to seek key skills from other than the nominated FLC, and thereafter resolve disputes. Moreover, the J1 staff will need to ensure that any roulement of manpower planned by the FLCs is consistent with the roulement policy determined by the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and, most importantly, with his campaign plan; roulement should not coincide with key phases in the plan.

603. To ensure that the forces are deployed to theatre in the right order at the right time, a Desired Order of Arrival (DOA) is prepared by the J3 staff and implemented by the Mounting HQ. This is usually detailed in the Mounting Order, prepared in conjunction with the JTFC's Campaign Plan. Units and individuals will be allocated a module code within the DOA and allocated vehicle, shipping or aircraft seats accordingly. J1 staff will work with J4 Movements staff to ensure that the DOA is consistent with the Plan and that it is executed appropriately.

604. The DOA is the first step in the manpower accounting. Accurate reporting and tracking of manpower, Operational Location (OPLOC), underpins the subsequent activities, ensuring that casualties can be accounted for and replaced and that the correct level of welfare enablers is maintained to sustain the deployed personnel. The co-ordination of the various manpower-tracking processes, single-Service, medical and Prisoners of War (PW) will become the pre-eminent co-ordination activity controlled by the J1 staff until the redeployment is completed. From the perspective of this publication, the OPLOC process is largely a tactical procedure and once planned for the execution is carried out in accordance with Deployed Operation Instructions (DOIs) from PJHQ J1 staff. The output from OPLOC tracking however has significance at both the Operational and Military Strategic levels, and is of key importance.

605. **Mounting Centres.** The operation-specific Mounting Order will detail the requirement to use mounting centres for the deployment of personnel. The use of a mounting centre facilitates the smooth deployment of a large number of personnel. Individuals and their baggage are checked in and boarded by their module code. The FLCs may choose to take advantage of a captive audience to conduct final briefings, confirm pre-deployment training and carry out kitting checks. However, this is manpower intensive and the FLCs would need to allocate additional manpower for the task. The use of mounting centres also allows the J1 and J4 staff to monitor the DOA and, if appropriate, initiate the OPLOC.

606. **Theatre Reception and Departure Centres.** Rather than using mounting centres to initiate the OPLOC, the J1 staff may choose to use the Points of Disembarkation (PODs) or Theatre Reception and Departure Centres (TRDC) which will be established in the JOA. Where there is more than one national operation underway in the JOA, the TRDC commander will advise respective JTFs of each operation on relevant manpower matters. TRDCs are responsible for the management of all personnel (including MOD Civil Servants, contractors on deployed operations and attached foreign/commonwealth) into theatre regardless of the number of operations underway.

607. **Reception, Staging and Onward Integration.** The receipt, briefing and movement of personnel into the JOA is part of the OPLOC/asset-tracking scenario and a key responsibility, usually executed by the Joint Force Logistic Component Commander¹ (JFLogCC). Although Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) is nominally a Movements function,² this complex joint operation is best controlled through a single Headquarters to draw together the movements and administrative functions necessary to move, process, accommodate and provide life support functions to a transiting force. Integration may involve a training package with input from the environmental Components as well as the guidance on local conditions conducted by a Joint Force Orientation and Briefing Unit (JFOBU), as discussed later in this Chapter.

608. **Joint Force Field Administration Office.** From the deployment through to the redeployment there will be a requirement for a Force Cashier and the maintenance of records for all UK elements of the Joint Force. This may be provided by a discrete Joint Force Field Administration Office (JFFAO) or by nominated personnel or sections. The JFFAO or equivalents are usually provided from within the JFLogC; however, the J1 staff will be required to provide oversight and policy. Typically the JFFAO, or an equivalent, has responsibility for supporting formation and personnel administration staffs. Its duties are usually as follows:

¹ Detail on this is in JWP 4-00 'Logistics for Joint Operations'.

² NATO limits the scope of this task in terms of movements. Consequently AJP-4.4 'Allied Joint Movement and Transportation Doctrine' covers only Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM).

- a. Indenting and accounting³ for and supplying cash to formation and Imprest Account holders.
- b. Maintaining field records by accounting for all manpower in the JOA, including ship-to-ship movement of personnel, using the available OPLOC systems. The section should be capable of deploying at least one data capture team for each Port of Disembarkation (POD)/Port of Embarkation (POE) or TRDC, with one team held as reserve.
- c. Operating a casualty and compassionate cell⁴ which integrates with the casualty and compassionate reporting system.

Sustaining Individuals⁵ during Deployment

609. **Joint Force Orientation and Briefing Unit.** To ensure individuals are adequately informed and prepared for the tasks ahead J1 staff should consider a JFOBU initially based at the mounting centre or TRDC, and subsequently within the JFLogC. The JFOBU should be responsible for co-ordinating personnel training/information/education across the Force. This tri-Service unit should be capable of:

- a. Pre-deployment orientation and in-theatre 'top-up' briefings.
- b. Preparation of Orientation handbooks and language cards as appropriate.
- c. Preparation of a Forces newspaper or news sheet as directed.

610. **Personnel Support.** The Force deployment and build up⁶ in the JOA prior to action may be characterised by uncertainty, often under intense media coverage. For those ashore, temporary living conditions may well be 'spartan' and the requirement for welfare support will be clear. In the early stages of a deployment, units might not be static and the provision of accommodation for the full spectrum of welfare support may not be possible; indeed, support should be tailored to the operational situation and should be mobile. Where possible, it should include arrangements for individuals to telephone home, take a shower, launder their clothes, receive mail and newspapers, and obtain low-key basic support from the Expeditionary Forces Institute (EFI) or the Naval Canteen Service (NCS).

611. **Initial Support.** In accordance with the welfare planning phases, the next stage is the Initial Phase.⁶ The Initial Phase commences with entry into the JOA and

³ See Chapter 7 for financial administration.

⁴ Appendix 1B2 contains an outline description of the operation of a Casualty and Compassionate Cell.

⁵ A Framework for Sustaining Individuals is at Annex 1B.

⁶ The phases for planning Welfare Support are detailed in Chapter 5.

endures throughout the crossing of the line of departure until the initial mission tasks are completed and operational activities have reached a 'steady state' which allows re-organisation. This could be a protracted period. During this phase, units naturally concentrate on the operational task; there is a high work rate, sometimes with an expectation of a hostile or potentially hostile reception, and welfare needs may assume a lower priority. Even at this stage, however, the well-being of deployed personnel cannot be ignored if combat effectiveness is to be maintained for long periods. Thus, whilst units may not be ready to take on the burden of elaborate welfare facilities, personnel will nonetheless require welfare support.

SECTION II – SUSTAINMENT

Manpower Sustainment and Accounting

612. Once in the JOA, manpower will need to be sustained as losses will occur through accidents, illness, casualties and those Killed in Action (KIA). The need for replacement personnel, particularly Battlefield Casualty Replacement (BCR), will be derived from the daily reporting of the personnel status in the Personnel Report (PERSREP) and the OPLOC details. The J1 staff will have the responsibility for co-ordinating the policy and the execution of BCR and overseeing the roulement of personnel by the FLCs. The J1 staff will be responsible for advising the JTFC on all matters associated with the manpower which may affect his fighting power and hence the execution of his plan. The work of the casualty and compassionate reporting cells,⁷ which are within the staff of the single-Service Principle Personnel Officers (PPOs), will be critical to both this and the efforts to sustain the well-being of the individual servicemen.

Sustaining Individuals⁸

613. As work patterns are regularised, personnel may have more time of their own and welfare needs - particularly in the form of relaxation, leisure and education - come to the fore. Commanders should be especially alert to welfare needs as stability gradually becomes the norm. Units should be able to accommodate more welfare equipment and, where this is possible, they should make proper provision by earmarking areas of the Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure (ECI)⁹ which may be used for relaxation and physical fitness.

614. The Sustain Phase¹⁰ of welfare provision should be concurrent, in general, with the force stabilisation period and may also coincide with the initial changeover of units. Although individuals will work long hours and the work rate will necessarily be

⁷ Appendix 1B2 outlines the operations of a Casualty and Compassionate Cell.

⁸ A Framework for Sustaining Individuals is at Annex 1B.

⁹ Maritime Forces deploy with welfare equipment and infrastructure in place.

¹⁰ The phases for planning the Sustainment of Individuals are detailed in Annex 5F.

high, they will lead a more routine life. It is at this point that many personnel will expect a level of welfare enablers more akin to peacetime deployed exercises. For example is it likely that those ashore in a static environment will seek living conditions which are semi-permanent in nature. Expectation management through good communications will be key, particularly where different locations, Services, or nationalities are enjoying different levels of welfare support both, within the JOA and, for families at home.

SECTION III – REDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES

615. There may come the time due to, a decrease in operational tempo, or an increase in other concurrent commitments, or a change in the political will to share the task amongst other nations, to redeploy forces and close down the operation. The formal authority to close down an operation can only be given by PJHQ. The Redeployment Phase is the final phase of the operation and will include the drawdown of manpower and the recovery of assets from the JOA.

Manpower and Manpower Accounting

616. The redeployment will need detailed planning akin to that of the deployment. The order in which personnel and their equipment depart the JOA will need to be planned and transport allocated with the J4 Movements staff. Redeployment planning should commence at the earliest opportunity. Consideration should be given to using the TRDCs and mounting centres in reverse. For example, a TRDC could carry out security checks to ensure unauthorised souvenirs¹¹ are not exported from the JOA and the personnel are recorded departing the JOA. Accurate OPLOC during the Redeployment Phase is essential. This will also ensure that individual entitlements to leave, campaign medals and allowances are correctly recorded. The mounting centres could be used to initiate recovery of equipment not usually held on personal charge. A final briefing could be given to ensure personnel are aware of any Operational Terms and Conditions of Service (OTACOS) entitlements and ongoing welfare support in particular stress counselling.

Sustaining Individuals

617. On return to base, and once the immediate post-tour tasks have been completed, personnel will depart on Post-operational Tour Leave (POTL) or the RN equivalent. There may be a requirement for Stress Trauma Debriefing, which is an operational command issue that should be instigated under the direction of the unit CO. Commanders should be especially alert to the signs of stress amongst those who deployed. When shore-based units are not being replaced in the JOA, there will be a

¹¹ Prior to redeployment, a policy on war trophies will be published by J1 staff after consultation with legal and provost personnel. This policy will be implemented through Op PLUNDER, to ensure no unauthorised items are removed from theatre.

requirement to return welfare equipment to store or to redistribute it. This will be co-ordinated by PJHQ with the FLCs.

Lesson Identified

618. Once an operation has concluded with redeployment, it is usual for post-operational reporting to be completed, including Lessons Identified.¹² Lessons should focus on key issues where action is required to improve procedures and capabilities. Description of events, more general observations and statements, to confirm action already in hand or of fact, should only be included if considered absolutely necessary. As each operation will be different, there is no set format for recording the lessons. However, when seeking lessons the co-ordinating instructions should seek to receive them in a format that will be easily adapted into PJHQ's co-ordinated record.

DEPLOYMENT, SUSTAINMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES

- Manpower accounting and tracking, OPLOC, will become the bedrock of all activities from deployment through to redeployment; it will allow the J1 staff to sustain the JTFC's manpower and to co-ordinate the sustainment of the individual servicemen.
- OPLOC can be initiated at the mounting centre, or the POD or the TRDC.
- The use of a JFOBU can ensure personnel are well briefed and quickly integrated into the JOA.
- Redeployment will require authorisation from PJHQ; redeployment planning is essential to ensure units and personnel depart the JOA in a suitable order and transport can be appropriately allocated.
- Support for the individual serviceman must be available on redeployment, not least in terms of POTL and access to stress counselling.
- Lessons Identified must be documented for their subsequent integration into doctrine and procedures.

¹² Chapter 4 outlines the integration of Lessons Identified into Doctrine.



PART IV - OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

This Part will be relevant¹ to the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) and all J1 staff. There are a number of administrative functions that are often considered to be the responsibility of the J1 staff yet, the specialist staff and knowledge required to execute these functions usually operate in the J2-J9 divisions.² Nonetheless, the exploitation and co-ordination of the specialist skills is closely aligned with J1 staff responsibilities. These administrative functions are not strictly part of Joint Operational Personnel Administration (JOPA); however, for completeness, they are identified in Chapter 7.

Suggested Readership	Applicable Parts			
	Part I	Part II	Part III	Part IV
Jt Comd and planning staff	✓	✓		
JTFC and planning staff	✓	✓		✓
J1 Staff	✓	✓	✓	✓
Commanders	✓		✓	
Other Service Personnel	✓			

Table 1 - Quick Reading Guide

¹ A Reading Guide is provided in the Preface to this publication.

² Capstone JWPs exist for the majority of the J1-J9 functions.

CHAPTER 7 – OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

701. In the broadest sense administration is considered to be an enabling function for operations. In the absence of a Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) covering some of the staff divisions in detail, the following administrative functions are included to provide a more comprehensive picture of the additional responsibilities that the J1 staff may be required to assume or co-ordinate.

SECTION I – SECURITY (J2/3)

Personnel Vetting

702. Ensuring that all personnel have been subject to vetting and hold the appropriate level of security clearance, for their role, will fall to the J1 staff. Although the vetting criteria and processes are neither determined nor carried out by J1 staff, the Joint Task Force Commander (JTFC) will expect the manpower to include individuals with the appropriate levels of clearance to undertake the tasks allocated to them.

Physical Records

703. There is a need to maintain adequate records of action, decisions and correspondence to meet subsequent scrutiny by government and other bodies after an operation. The headquarters will require a suitable filing system and security of the records to be in place for all the staff. The JTFC may delegate responsibility, formally or informally, to the J1 staff to provide and administer a secure filing system. The execution of this responsibility may fall to the Joint Force Field Administration Office (JFFAO).

SECTION II – CONTRACTS (J4/J8)

Contracting Services

704. It is highly likely that the J1 staff will be asked to administer contracts on behalf of the JTFC for such services as hotel accommodation. Although either the J4 or J8 staff will undertake the contracting of such services, the contracts need to be managed. Specialist advice on contracts will be available from either the J4 or J8 staff.

Locally Employed Civilians

705. Specialist skills, such as translators, may not be available in either the numbers, or the languages, necessary to support an operation. The local employment of suitably skilled civilians may provide the JTFC with the necessary specialists. Locally Employed Civilian (LEC) contracts should be the remit of the J8 staff but in

their absence the task may fall to the J1 staff. The employment of LECs must not be overlooked when closing down an operation, as local employment laws or the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), rather than UK Employment Law, may govern the termination of employment.

SECTION III – FINANCE (J8)

Public Budgetary and Financial Matters

706. The provision of budgetary, financial and contractual expertise falls to the deployed Civil Secretariat, ie the J8 staff. In the absence of a dedicated JWP for J8 matters, the impact of J8 functions on J1 matters is summarised here.

707. **Financial Accounting.** It is vital that all additional costs associated with an operation be captured and recorded accurately. Where costs can be levied directly on non-MOD organisations, this should be done. JTFCs are accountable to Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) for the management of all expenditure committed on operations and will look to the Civil Secretariat to provide suitable financial advice on all requirements involving procurement, disposal of assets, the settlement of claims and write-off procedures, conducting financial appraisals as appropriate. JTFCs also receive a formal letter setting out, in detail, the delegated financial authority. J1 staff may in turn receive delegated authority to administer finances and execute financial responsibility on behalf of the JTFC. Inevitably provision of some welfare enablers may require expenditure within the JOA; for example the use of civil recreational facilities.

708. **Policy Advice.** In exercising the delegated powers described above, and in the conduct of the JTFC's day-to-day activity, full consideration should be given to the Parliamentary, political and other presentational aspects of proposals and to the interests of other government departments (OGDs). The JTFC will receive appropriate and timely advice on these matters from the Civil Secretariat.

709. **Repayment.** Support may be provided to nations contributing to a coalition on a repayment basis. This will be in accordance with the relevant Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and Implementing Arrangements. JTFCs are to ensure the correct procedures are followed and a clear audit trail is maintained. The nation requesting support, supplies or services will do so in accordance with the MOU between the British Government and the requesting nation. The JTFC should receive appropriate and timely advice on these matters from the Civil Secretariat.

Service Funds

710. Responsibility for ensuring that any Service (non-public) funds are correctly administered within the JOA will fall to the J1 staff. The procedures for administering

such funds are laid down in single-Service regulations and these should be adopted appropriately.

SECTION IV – LEGAL (J3/J9)

711. Legal support to operations, including joint and multinational operations is available on a tri-Service basis. It is covered in detail in JWP 3-46 ‘*Legal Support to Joint Operations*’.¹

Discipline

712. Although discipline is managed as a personnel administrative matter, it is based on legislated provisions, in particular in the single-Service Discipline Acts, and Regulations. Legal advice will be available on all aspects of discipline within the JOA or from outside it. In particular, legal advice will be required when Boards of Inquiry are initiated because an incident requires such action.

Status of Forces Agreements

713. When operating in a Host Nation (HN) the UK Forces may be subject to the terms of a SOFA. The SOFA will have been agreed between the HN and the British Government and will include clauses on jurisdiction in crimes and civil liabilities. The J1 staff will need to be conversant with the terms of the SOFA as it may impact discipline and also the provision of welfare support; for example, some nations do not allow the consumption of alcohol.

OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS

- J1 staff will be required to co-ordinate the exploitation of specialist staff from other J2-J9 divisions to support JOPA; in the absence of the specialists in the other divisions J1 staff may be asked to assume responsibility for some administrative functions.
- J1 staff will be involved in Operations Security (OPSEC) matters ensuring personnel are appropriately vetted and cleared to carry out the tasks allocated to them.
- J1 staff may be required to administer a filing system on behalf of the HQ.
- Guidance on contractual matters should be available from either the J4 or J8 staff.
- Guidance on public finance matters should be available from the Civil Secretariat in the J8 division.
- Legal support for disciplinary matter and legal advice for SOFA and contractual matters will most probably come from legal experts in J3, J4 or J9 divisions.

¹ Programmed for publication mid 04.

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

The primary references for the terms and definitions used in this Glossary is indicated in parentheses.¹ New terms or definitions introduced by this publication are annotated (JWP 1-00) and will be subsumed into the next edition of JWP 0-01.1 '*The UK Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*' as UK agreed terms. Where appropriate they will also be submitted to the NATO Terminology Programme.

Administration

1. The management and execution of all military matters not including tactics and strategy.
2. The internal management of units. (AAP-6)

Battle Shock

A temporary acute psychological reaction to extreme stress causing an inability to function and cope normally. (JWP 4-03)

Command

1. The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, co-ordination, and control of military forces.
 2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action.
 3. A unit, group of units, organisation or area under the authority of a single individual.
 4. To dominate an area of situation.
 5. To exercise command.
- (AAP-6)

Conduct of Operations

The art of directing, co-ordinating, controlling and adjusting the actions of forces to achieve specific objectives. (AAP-6)

Control

That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate organisations, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated. (AAP-6)

¹ JWP 0-01.1 '*The United Kingdom Glossary of Joint and Multinational Terms and Definitions*', JWP 3-43 '*Joint Medical Doctrine*', AAP-6 '*The NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*'.

Grand Strategic Level (of Conflict)

The application of national resources to achieve national policy objectives (including alliance or coalition objectives). This will invariably include diplomatic and economic resources as well as military. (JWP 0-01.1)

Joint Operational Personnel Administration

The activities carried out at the operational level to ensure the provision of manpower for joint operations, the sustainment of the personnel and their subsequent redeployment following the operation. (IJWP 1-00)

Joint Operations Area

An area of land, sea and airspace defined by higher authority, in which a designated Joint Task Force Commander plans and conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. A Joint Operations Area including its defining parameters, such as time, scope and geographic area, is contingency/mission specific. (JWP 0-01.1)

Military Aid to the Civil Authorities

The collective term given to the three types of operations which may take place in a civilian environment, i.e. MACC, MACM and MACP. (JWP 0-01.1)

Mounting

All preparations made in areas designated for the purpose, in anticipation of an operation. It includes the assembly in the mounting area, preparation, and maintenance within the mounting area, movement to loading points, and subsequent embarkation into ships, craft, or aircraft if applicable. (AAP-6)

Military Strategic Level (of Conflict)

The level of command and planning for armed conflict (level of war) at which military resources are applied to achieve policy objectives. (JWP 0-01.1)

Operational Level of War

The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. (AAP-6)

Operational Welfare Package

The Operational Welfare Package is the collective term for the planned, and largely publicly-funded, welfare enablers delivered to the Serviceman and his family while the Serviceman is serving on active operations. (IJWP 1-00)

Operations Security

The process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces. (AAP-6)

Personnel Administration

In its most comprehensive military sense, personnel administration is defined as ‘the art of enhancing military effectiveness by cultivating, obtaining, retaining, sustaining and remembering² service personnel’. (IJWP 1-00)

Post-traumatic Stress Disorder

Stress disorders may appear as an immediate, delayed or long-term reaction to stress arising from the battlefield or other unusual stressors. This will normally require mental health intervention. (JWP 4-03)

Redeployment

The complete operation involving preparation and relocation of units and stocks to a new destination. This may be to a new deployment area or to peacetime locations such that units can be available for subsequent deployment as quickly as possible. (JWP 0-01.1)

Tactical Command

The authority delegated to a commander to assign forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority. (AAP-6)

Tactical Level of War

The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical formations and units. (AAP-6)

Welfare Enablers

Facilities and services which are likely to improve an individual’s sense of well being. (IJWP 1-00)

² Definition based on the Armed Forces Overarching Personnel Strategy (AFOPS) which defines these activities as follows:

Cultivate - ‘prepare the ground’ for obtaining personnel.

Obtain - attract, acquire and train high quality, motivated people.

Retain - provide personnel with a rewarding career which stimulates and develops them and provides the foundation of a second career on leaving the Services.

Sustain - provide an environment in which Service men and women and their families will be willing to maintain their commitment.

Remember - provide ex-Service personnel and their dependants with help and support, particularly with resettlement back into civilian life.

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACOS	Assistant Chief of Staff
AFOPS	Armed Forces Overarching Personnel Strategy
AML	Augmentation Manning List
APOD	Air Ports of Disembarkation
AT	Air Transport
BCR	Battlefield Casualty Replacement
BFBS	British Forces Broadcasting Service
BFPO	British Forces Post Office
BFBS	British Forces Broadcasting Service
BOI	Board of Inquiry
C2	Command and Control
CC	Component Commander
CCT	Current Commitments Team
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CIMIC	Civil Military Co-operation
CinC	Commander-in-Chief
CIS	Communication and Information Systems
CJO	Chief of Joint Operations
CJTFC	Combined Joint Task Force Commander
CoA(s)	Course(s) of Action
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COS	Chief of Staff
COS	Chief(s) of Staff
CPT	Contingency Planning Team
CSE	Combined Services' Entertainment
CVS	Aircraft Carrier
DAC	Defence Augmentation Cell
DCDS	Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
DCJO (Ops Sp)	Deputy Chief of Joint Operations (Operations Support)
DCMC	Defence Crisis Management Centre
DCMO	Defence Crisis Management Organisation
DCOS	Deputy Chief of Staff
DCSA	Defence Communications Services Agency
DEC(CSS)	Directorate of Equipment Capability (Combat Service Support)
DJW	Directorate of Joint Warfare
DMS	Defence Medical Services
DOA	Desired Order of Arrival

DOI	Deployed Operating Instruction
DSF	Director of Special Forces
DTMA	Defence Transport and Movements Agency
DVD	Digital Video Disk
ECI	Expeditionary Campaign Infrastructure
EFI	Expeditionary Forces Institute
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FLC	Front Line Command
GSE	Grand Strategic Estimate
HN	Host Nation
HNS	Host nation Support
HQ	Headquarters
JAMC	Joint Air Mounting Centre
JFAC	Joint Force Air Component
JFFAO	Joint Force Field Administration Office
JFHQ	Joint Force Headquarters
JFLogC	Joint Force Logistic Component
JFLogCC	Joint Force Logistics Component Commander
JFOBU	Joint Force Orientation and Briefing Unit
JFSFC	Joint Force Special Forces Component
JOA	Joint Operations Area
JOPA	Joint Operational Personnel Administration
JPASS	Joint Personnel Administration
JPG	Joint Planning Guide
Jt Comd	Joint Commander
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTFC	Joint Task Force Commander
JTFHQ	Joint Task Force Headquarters
JTFHQ(A)	Joint Task Force Headquarters Afloat
KIA	Killed In Action
LEC	Locally Employed Civilian
LO	Liaison Officer
LOA	Local Overseas Allowance
LPH	Landing Platform Helicopters
LSSA	Longer Separated Service Allowance

MACA	Military Aid to the Civil Authorities
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSE	Military Strategic Estimate
NAAFI	Navy, Army and Air Force Institute
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCC	National Contingent Commander
NCS	Naval Canteen Service
NEO	Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
NOK	Next of Kin
NSE	National Support Element
NTM	Notice to Move
OA	Office Automation
OFE	Other Forms of Entertainment
OGD	Other Government Department
OLRT	Operation Liaison and Reconnaissance Team
OPCOM	Operational Command
OPCON	Operational Control
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPLOC	Operational Location
OPSEC	Operations Security
OT	Operations Team
OTACOS	Operational Terms and Conditions of Service
OWP	Operational Welfare Package
PC	Personal Computer
PCS	Postal and Courier Service
PJHQ	Permanent Joint Headquarters
POD	Port of Disembarkation
POE	Port of Embarkation
POTL	Post-operational Tour Leave
PPO	Principle Personnel Officer
PUS	Permanent Under Secretary of State
RAMP	Reception Arrangements for Military Patients
R&R	Rest and Recuperation
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RSOI	Receipt, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration
RSOM	Receipt, Staging, and Onward Movement

SF	Special Forces
SLOA	Seagoer's Local Overseas Allowance
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOR	Statement of Requirement
SOR	Statement of Requirement
SP Pol	Service Personnel Policy
SP Pol P&W	Service Personnel Policy Pensions and Welfare
SPG	Strategic Planning Group
SPOD	Sea Port of Disembarkation
SSVC	Services Sound and Vision Corporation
TACOM	Tactical Command
TRDC	Theatre Reception and Departure Centre
TV	Television
UKSF	United Kingdom Special Forces
VCDS	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff
VCR	Video Cassette Recorder
VHR	Very High Readiness